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Abstract 
This thesis attempts to explore how technology affects people’s behaviour in the 
public sphere. Particularly, at a time when information communication technologies 
(ICTs) are rapidly reshaping nearly every aspect of our everyday life, this study asks, 
has citizens’ civic engagement been affected as well? In addition, this study takes 
Taiwan, a third wave democracy in East Asia, as a case study, with the aim of 
demonstrating how Western liberal democratic values can be compatible with so-
called “Asian values”, whilst at the same time analysing if and how the civic 
engagement of Taiwanese people has been affected by the rise of ICTs mentioned 
above. To make the research scope more focused, this study only focuses on civil 
society during the years of President Ma Ying-Jeou’s administration from 2008 to 
2016. This study focuses on what ICTs have changed, and what these changes can tell 
us. The main research method deployed is qualitative analysis, which was 
supplemented by a series of semi-constructed interviews with people who played 
significant roles in one or more of the major social movements that took place during 
the Ma administration.  
 
The findings and analysis of this study identify the impacts of ICTs on citizens’ 
behaviour from three perspectives: (1) how do ICTs reshape and revolutionise the 
way citizens communicate with each other; (2) how do ICTs enable social movement 
and empower activists; and (3) how do ICTs reshape and redefine the notion of the 
9	
	
public and private spheres. In the information age, when technology has profoundly 
changed our social structure, it is important to continuously revisit people’s 
perception of their shared values of democracy, their political participation, and their 
role in a democracy. It is might be equally important to clarify that the idea of 
citizenship studied in this thesis is viewed more from a sociological perspective rather 
than a normative one. It is possible that such a changing perception may lead to 
further academic research on the normative definition of citizenship in future research. 
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1. Introduction   
 
It is said that ‘Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty’. That saying is more relevant 
now than ever. Only by taking collective action, can we ensure that democracy will 
continue to shape the future of our world. 
- President Tsai Ing-wen (2018)1 
 
On 25 June 2018, President Tsai Ing-wen（蔡英文）of Taiwan was invited to deliver 
an opening address at an event celebrating the fifteenth anniversary of the Taiwan 
Foundation for Democracy (TFD)2 in Taipei. In her remarks, President Tsai reflected 
on the past, present, and future of global democratisation with a bold statement, 
saying: “Democracy won the twentieth century.” The first female leader of Taiwan 
pointed out that the victory of democracy became evident when the end of the Cold 
War accelerated a third wave of democratisation, with a significant number of 
countries from Eastern Europe to Latin America, and from Asia to Africa, embracing 
the values of freedom, democracy, and human rights.3 When the third wave of 
democratisation reached the shores of East Asia, Taiwan joined this trend and 
embarked on its journey of becoming the vibrant democracy it is today. However, 
despite celebrating this happy occurrence, Tsai also warned that, “while democracy 













In order to highlight the fact that democracy has been tending towards retreat 
in the twenty-first century, the president cited a 2018 report by Freedom House, 
which shows that 2018 was the twelfth consecutive year of decline in global freedom. 
She then pointed out that democratic values such as the rule of law, freedom of 
speech, and human rights are being challenged around the world, and argued that in 
many places these challenges can be seen in erosions to democracy caused by 
increases in terrorism and populism. However, despite this gloomy outlook on the 
state of global democracy, with regards to Taiwan, Tsai had this to say:  
 
Historical trends do not always favour the forward march of democracy. But 
in Taiwan, moving backward is not an option.4 
 
Since Larry Diamond coined the term “democratic recession” in early 2000, 
the world has been lamenting the manner in which democracy has seemingly ceased 
its expansion and lost its influence in many parts of the globe. In the middle east, 
more countries have regressed in terms of freedom and civic rights and even some 
established democracies, such as the US, seem to be under threat of becoming less 
democratic. Added to this, people in democratic societies are growing increasingly 
unhappy about the way these systems function in their countries. Research by the 
PEW research centre found that across the thirty-six surveyed countries, a global 
median of 46 per cent said they were very or somewhat satisfied with the way their 
democracy was working, while 52 per cent were not too or not at all satisfied.5 In 










brink of falling back into authoritarian regime. According to a report published by the 
Economist on 31 January 2018, 89 of the 167 countries assessed in 2017 received 
lower democracy ratings than the year before, with the report also noting that less 
than 5 per cent of the world’s population currently lives in a “full democracy”. When 
viewed in tandem with the findings of the Freedom house report, it is possible to paint 
a depressing picture of democracy’s path in recent years, despite the Economist 
noting a potential pause of such a decline in 2018. In any case, it seems as though no 
one should assume the victory of democracy in the twentieth century will be easily 
maintained and become a norm in the twenty-first century. With the world facing a 
continued trend of a global “democratic recession”, the Economist’s 2018 report 
shows that Taiwan’s democracy stands as a stellar example in the world. 
Unlike the seemingly bleak global patterns highlighted above, democracy has 
continued to move forward in Taiwan. In the Economist’s 2019 Democracy Index, 
Taiwan is ranked third in Asia and 32nd amongst the 167 countries and territories 
included on the list. Over the past two years, Taiwan’s democracy has been given 
recognition by pro-democracy institutions within the international community, such 
as Freedom House and Reporters without Borders. In the 2017 Freedom House Index 
issued by a Canada-based think-tank, the Fraser Institute, Taiwan’s ranking jumped 
forward eight places from the year before to 18th . Out of the 159 countries assessed 
by the Fraser Institute, Taiwan was one of the 61 countries where freedom was seen 
to have increased in 2017 compared to the previous year (Strong, 2018).  
While democracy in some established democratic countries is being 
challenged by the rise of populism and growing partisan divisions, Taiwan’s 
democracy, young when compared with many more established ones, remains vibrant. 
Since the lifting of martial law in 1987, there have been three rounds of peaceful 
transfer of power, with the first one taking place in 2000. Only three decades after the 
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lifting of martial law, Taiwan’s freedom of press stands praised by Reporters without 
Borders (RSF) as the freest in Asia (RSF, 2018). In a surprising contrast with the 
worldwide decline of democracy suggested by the PEW research, the people of 
Taiwan, particularly those who did not experience the martial law era, demonstrate 
strong support for the democratic system. According to a survey conducted by the 
TFD in 2018, 86.2 per cent of the 20-39 age group, the highest percentage of all age 
groups, agreed that there are problems with Taiwan’s democratic system, but still 
considered it the best system amongst all other forms of political system.6 This group 
were born between 1980 and 1998, thus mostly coming from the Millennial 
generation, and did not spend a significant part of their life, if any, experiencing the 
period of martial law that ran from 1949 to 1987. Unlike their parents or grandparents, 
they probably remember very little, or nothing at all, about the so-called “White 
Terror”, a time which marks a significant page in the political development of Taiwan. 
Thus, these young Taiwanese have not experienced political suppression in the same 
manner as their older counterparts and, also of importance, nor did they witness the 
events and changes that occurred during Taiwan’s rapid economic development in the 
1970s. Compared with their parents or grandparents, Taiwanese Millennials have 
grown up in a politically stable and economically prosperous Taiwan. 
While some might argue that these Millennials take democracy for granted, 
their political participation in recent decades would suggest this not to be the case, 
and indeed, their participation could be said to have reinvigorated Taiwan’s civil 
society. For example, during the time when President Ma Ying-Jeou (馬英九) of the 









number of important social movements and protests, calling for a better, more open 
and more just society. Though dubbed with a derogatory nickname by their senior 
counterparts - the “Strawberry Generation”7 -  and often criticised for being lazy, 
entitled, and too weak to withstand pressure or to work hard, nevertheless, during the 
eight-year tenure of President Ma, it was people from the “Strawberry Generation” 
who took action to ensure that democracy will continue to shape the future of Taiwan. 
Between 2008 and 2016, they took to the streets and staged protests and 
demonstrations to advocate greater social justice and transparency in politics.  
Important as they are, elections were only one means taken by these citizens to 
participate in politics. While their parents who were perhaps traumatised by the White 
Terror tend to stay away from social movements, many Taiwanese Millennials have 
utilised their creativity and social media skills to transform the image of social 
movements into something more “positive” in Taiwan. A good example of this is the 
Wild Strawberry Movement of 2008, the first large-scale social movement by this 
generation, in which Taiwanese students across Taiwan took to the street calling for 
media freedom and as a result inspired more Millennials to actively participate in 
Taiwanese civil society (Ho, 2015). In an op-ed, National Taiwan University 
sociology professor, Ho Ming-sho, commented that these Millennials opened a new 
phase in the history of Taiwan’s civil society and encouraged more youngsters to take 
part in public affairs. This argument was backed up strongly only six years later in 
2014 when young protesters  staged an unprecedented occupation protest in Taiwan, 
known as “the Sunflower Movement”. The protesting students occupied the 
Legislature for 24 days, significantly expanding the scale and influence of social 






development, something which now marks a critical point in modern Taiwanese 
political history.   
So, with democracy undergoing an apparently alarming decline across the 
world, Taiwan stands as living proof that positive change is still possible. Thirty years 
after the lifting of martial law, today’s Taiwan is considered one of the world’s freest 
countries, with a comparatively strong press freedom8 and a seemingly strong will, for 
a number of very understandable reasons, not to let its freshly established democratic 
progress march backwards. It is this stellar example of democracy that acts as the 
inspiration behind this research, and has inspired its author to revisit the significant 
revival of social movements in Taiwan during the eight years of President Ma’s rule. 
The reason for doing so is that it allows the opportunity to take a closer look at the 
somewhat unexpected contribution of Taiwanese Millennials within these movements, 
and in particular reveals an excellent chance to analyse the participation methods of 
these tech-savvy protestors, something that until now has perhaps not had the 
attention it has required. And by doing so, this study hopes to explore and find some 
potential answers as to whether Taiwanese people’s political engagement in the 
information age offers some clues about young people’s perception of democracy 
and their roles as citizens in a democracy.  
 
1-1 Sunflower Movement takes social movements in Taiwan to another level 
Around-the-clock live streaming and heavy social media use quickly turned 
the protest into a large movement (Cheng, 2014).  
 
On 18 March 2014, an assembly of university students broke into the compound of  






was organised in response to an announcement by the then ruling KMT government 
of the sudden passage of the cross-Strait Service Trade Pact (CSSTA) with Beijing, a 
highly controversial trade agreement. The protesting students argued that the trade 
pact was passed without a clause-by-clause review at the Legislature. They criticised 
the ruling KMT, which controlled the majority of the Legislature, for neglecting a 
prior agreement made by both ruling and opposition parties that the Legislature 
should hold a review process to protect the rights and benefits of Taiwanese people 
and prevent closer cross-Strait economic relations from posing any form of threat to 
Taiwan. The protesting students made four demands: (1) the government should 
withdraw the trade pact from the Legislature; (2) the government should enact a bill 
on cross-Strait agreement supervision (CSAS); (3) the government should legislate 
the CASA bill before the legal review of CSSTA; and (4) that the government hold a 
national conference on constitution to consult public opinion.  
At the initial stage of the occupation, there were only a few hundred protesters 
inside the parliament. Within twenty-four hours, however, the number of protesting 
students had swelled rapidly, buoyed by round-the-clock news coverage, and through 
the dissemination of information via Facebook, Twitter, and other social media 
platforms. This student-led protest, which was dubbed the “Sunflower Movement” by 
Taiwanese media outlets, lasted for twenty-four days, turning the compound of the 
Legislative Yuan into a sea of banners and posters. The protesting students expressed 
worry that the human rights and the freedom of speech they hold so dearly would be 
eroded if the communist Chinese government were to obtain greater access to 
Taiwan’s free market and, as a result, society. For a society rooted in East Asian 
culture, one that might frown upon such confrontation by a younger demographic, this 
unprecedented movement surprisingly received support from the majority of 
Taiwanese people. A poll conducted by TVBS television (traditionally considered to 
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be a pro-KMT TV channel), found that 70 per cent of respondents supported the 
protesting students and agreed that the government should review the CSSTA on a 
clause-by-clause basis. The same poll also found that 48 per cent supported the action 
of occupying the Legislature.9  Twenty-four days later, the government gave in and 
agreed to withdraw the CSSTA, and legislate a bill to oversee all cross-Strait 
agreements.  
The “Sunflower Movement”, was more than a one-off student-led protest, but 
a movement that marked a new milestone in the history of Taiwanese social 
movements as it was the first time the Internet had played an instrumental role in both 
organisation and mobilisation throughout the event (Chen, et al., 2014). In addition, 
the Sunflower Movement challenges existing scholarly literature on the subject of 
young Taiwanese  citizens’ political engagement. A comparative study by Sonoda 
(2012) finds that Taiwanese are only slightly more interested in social movement 
activities than the Singaporeans, and much less than the Japanese and South Koreans. 
Sonoda’s argument is disproven by the 2014 Sunflower Movement, which evidently 
garnered popular support, especially amongst college and university students. As the 
aforementioned TVBS poll finds, Taiwanese people generally agree with the demands 
and rationales of the protesting students, who called on the KMT government to 
review the CSSTA on a clause-by-clause basis. The poll findings show that such a 
radical protest enjoyed broad popular support and further indicates that Taiwanese 
citizens might hold a more open attitude towards such radical forms of social 
movement than previously thought.  
The success of the movement has also inspired many to investigate the role 
social media played in the Sunflower Movement (see Hsiao & Yang 2018; Tsatisou, 





Taiwanese youth to transmit their messages during social movements. Little attention 
so far has been paid to the hidden messages that can be gleaned from the way 
Taiwanese protesters organised the movement and communicated with each other and 
elected representatives. This study recognises a gap in the existing literature that 
young Taiwanese people’s civic engagement needs to be reviewed from within a 
digital context and seeks to establish whether their political participation reflects a 
changing attitude towards democracy or citizenship. This study does not aim to 
redefine the meaning of democratic citizenship. However, it attempts to revisit the 
essence of democratic citizenship by dealing with the changing behaviour exhibited 
by Millennial protesters and social movement participants in recent social movements. 
For instance, the Sunflower Movement was not simply just another example 
of recent civil movements in Taiwan. It was the largest student-led social movement 
of its kind, and was spread largely by grassroot movements, civil groups and social 
media. In a report titled “The Sunflower Movement, brought to you by the Internet”, 
Enru Lin, a journalist for the local paper the Taipei Times, it is argued that Taiwanese 
citizens who are under thirty-five used the Internet and other social media platforms 
in unexpected and unconventional ways to recruit people and share information 
during the Sunflower Movement (Lin, 2014).10 Facebook in particular, Lin points out, 
with its 65 per cent penetration rate in Taiwan, proves to be the most useful and 
popular tool for Taiwanese people to communicate with each other. Protesting 
students took advantage of this popular platform and live broadcasted their 









collective editing tool similar to Google Docs, to collectively edit and translate their 
news releases and statements without spending a penny.  
Another article titled “How Technology Revolutionized Taiwan’s Sunflower 
Movement” published by the Diplomat, paints a vivid picture of how Taiwanese 
youth used Facebook, Google, and other social media sites to connect with people 
from all over the world (Chao, 2014). These kinds of connections with the outside 
world would have been ‘unthinkable’ thirty years ago in Taiwan. During Taiwan’s 
democratisation process, protests and movements have been hard-pressed to receive 
accurate first-hand news reports in the post-martial law era. However, with advances 
in technology and increased accessibility to the Internet, as well as various social 
media platforms, the Millennial protesters turned the Legislative Yuan into a media 
centre, delivering news to the outside world, and communicating their demands with 
Internet users within Taiwan and much further afield.  
Nevertheless, like most social movements, their success still has to rely on 
resources and funds. The Sunflower Movement was no exception. The protesting 
students successfully raised NTD 6.3 million (USD 210,000) within three hours 
through FlyingV, one of the biggest crowdfunding websites in Taiwan. They used the 
funds to purchase a full-page advertisement in the New York Times and another full-
page advertisement in one of Taiwan’s major local newspapers, the Apple Daily. 
According to Chao’s report, a publicly accessible Google document detailed a list of 
supplies needed and directed donors on how to contribute. The list successfully 
helped the protesting students to the extent that for two days during the occupation 
donated supplies could be seen overflowing outside the Legislative Yuan.  
The movement also successfully forced the KMT government to meet the demands 
made by the protesters and pass a scrutiny bill on cross-Strait agreements before the 
CSSTA could pass through the Legislature. As the movement has proven itself 
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successful in both social and political aspects, this research argues that many aspects 
of the Sunflower Movement could well be worthy of further discussion and 
investigation regarding young citizens’ political participation, their usage of social 
media, and their engagement in social movements.  
The existing literature mainly touches upon how the Internet and ICTs have 
changed the form of social movement and affected citizens’ political participation, 
and yet relatively little attention so far has been paid to the specific participation of 
Taiwanese Millennials. Indeed, without the Internet, the Sunflower Movement could 
have not received the international attention it did, nor could it have garnered over 
NTD 6 million within three hours. However, as the core driving force behind the 
Sunflower Movement was the Taiwanese Millennial generation, with their demands 
for stronger public scrutiny and broader public participation in the policy-making 
process, it might be useful to further investigate their political participation and civic 
engagement, particularly the way young people expressed themselves during the 
Sunflower Movement and during other social movements under the KMT government.  
As Daniel Bell argues in his The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (1973), 
science and technology are the core driving force of change in social structure. The 
argument of this book indicates a future where a professional and technical workforce 
will become the dominating class in a knowledge-based economy. In this type of 
economy, communication plays an instrumental role in terms of allowing these 
knowledge-based workers to engage and bounce ideas off of each other, and therefore, 
communication becomes a sort of social obligation as social progress relies on 
individuals and shareholders to work together. Written in 1974, Bell foresaw a post-
industrial society, with a strong emphasis on free-thinking professionals, intellectual 
freedom, and openness in politics.  
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Reading this book today, one can be reminded as to how advances in 
technology have made a profound impact upon every aspect of society over the past 
four decades. And it is also evident in the case of Taiwan’s recent economic 
development, one which was strongly driven by the pairing of a knowledge-based 
workforce with a high-tech driven economy. Indeed, Taiwan’s democratic and 
economic development have gone hand in hand together over the past half a century. 
In a manner very reminiscent of Bell, starting in the 1980s, as society became 
increasingly affluent because of its leading position in global high-tech industries, its 
people began to demand more and more freedom and liberty after the lifting of 
martial law in 1987. Less than 10 years later in 1996 Taiwan had held its first 
presidential election.  
Fast forwarding to the twenty-first century, it is clear to see that technology 
continues to reshape people’s behaviour, including their political participation. Taking 
the case of the Sunflower Movement as an example, evidence exists to show that 
technology changed the way protesters now mobilise supporters and strengthen 
momentum. In an around-the-clock manner, the protesting students used social media 
platforms, including Facebook, to liveshare the event with the world, and they used 
crowdsourcing websites to mobilise financial support and further generate a 
significant level of momentum amongst Taiwanese society. An excellent example of 
how Sunflower Movement protesters aimed to make use of this technology can be 
seen on a website launched during the first week of the protest called “4am.tw”. On a 
page titled “Who Are We” it states: 
 
The full-page ads on international New York Times [are] only the first step to 
empower all citizens… We aim to provide first-hand information to the wider 
public, without censorship or filters… This is the place we collect and present 
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diverse voices from the street. With photos, videos, and messages, you deserve 
unfiltered information to form your own judgments.11  
 
The aforementioned statement perfectly summarised the key elements of 
recent social movements in Taiwan: (1) photos taken by protestors, (2) live videos 
showing the world the development of the event, (3) unfiltered information which is 
directly shared by the protesters, and (4) a desire shared by protestors that people 
should be allowed to form their own judgment over public affairs.  
Such trends in social movements can be found in many places around the 
globe. The Internet and social media platforms provide young people with a wide 
range of social tools to express themselves in a way that otherwise would not have 
been possible before. In order to understand how the Internet affects society, 
especially in regards to citizens’ political engagement, it might be useful to observe 
and analyse how citizens perceive and respond to political matters when they are 
bombarded with information 24/7. Furthermore, when people are exposed to massive 
information overload on the Internet, it might be worth asking whether the changing 
forms of political engagement that come along with this indicate a new notion of 
citizenship (Dalton, 2008).  
With regards to political engagement, scholars like Robert Putnam (2000) 
often praise the engagement of citizens older than the Millennial generation, and 
target the blame for decreasing levels of participation in public affairs at the an 
apparently disaffected and apolitical younger generation. They argue that young 
citizens shoulder the responsibility for  declining political participation as they appear 
aloof to politics and do not actively participate in public affairs in the more traditional 





communities and communication tools, to some extent, offer citizens a venue where 
they can feel free to assess, share, exchange, and discuss their opinion on domestic or 
international affairs, as well as all manner of other topics. Since social media sites 
such as Twitter and Facebook have allowed users to personalise their news feed, these 
digital platforms and communication tools have made  it easier for citizens to obtain 
news relating to their interests, and much faster for citizens to receive political 
information at their own convenience. For instance, by simply clicking on the 
“following” or “Like” button on social media accounts of government officials and 
public figures, citizens can receive first-hand information sent directly by the White 
House, American President Trump, or @Number10gov (the official Twitter account 
of the Premier of the United Kingdom). As Dalton states in his research, young 
citizens in the United States and in other Western democracies are quite concerned 
about their ability to make a difference in society (Dalton, 2008), and these citizens, 
who are generally better educated and more cosmopolitan than their parents, are 
generally more supportive of self-expressive values than any of their predecessors in 
the history of democracy. Holding a drastically different view to Putnam, Dalton 
argues that instead of running away from politics, today’s young people want to be 
more involved in public affairs. 
Here we see two different images of young citizens. One perspective labels the 
Millennial generation as apolitical, while another group of scholars sees new potential 
in young citizens as they take part in politics in a more creative and non-traditional 
way. Before this study proceeds to elaborate the rational of its research questions, 
perhaps it is appropriate to first revisit the classic works of Charles and Robert 




Certainly citizenship is something more than merely adding up a set of specific 
rights and duties or jobs to do, such as voting, paying taxes and obeying the 
law. There is something beyond all that –something being the call of legal 
duties. We might expect of a good citizen, a distinctive if vaguely defined 
attitude –something akin to the idea of responsibility. Good citizenship 
properly embraces an acceptance of individual responsibility, moral as well 
as political, for the condition of the government and the general welfare of the 
community (Merriam and Merriam, 1954: 805).  
 
The element of citizenship has a long tradition in politics and political 
thinking. Charles and Robert Merriam elaborate the concept in terms of dual 
principles – legal duties and a sense of individual responsibility in public affairs. 
Following the same logic, Dalton distinguishes the conventional notion of citizenship 
as comprising the dual elements of ‘duty-based citizenship’ and ‘engaged citizenship’ 
(Dalton, 2008). The first stresses traditional concepts of citizenship, such as the duties 
and obligation to pay tax (or serve mandatory military service in some countries). The 
latter emphasises the importance of participation, especially direct-action and elite 
challenging activities, such as volunteering or joining a protest. In addition, 
participation in the notion of engaged citizenship also means an attempt to express 
policy preference but in place of a passive expression of allegiance and duty (Dalton, 
2008: 32).  
Change does not come from technology, but from the way people use it. In 
the case of the Sunflower Movement, the participation of Taiwanese Millennials 
indicates a strong emphasis on ‘engaged citizenship’. In this research, the aim is to 
capture a more accurate outlook of young citizens’ political participation and discuss 
the role technology plays in youth-led social movements. Furthermore, as young 
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citizens are generally more well versed in social media and technology, it might be 
worth revisiting the development of social movements in Taiwan through a digital 
lens, and perhaps explore whether there exists the possibility of an idea one could 
term as “digital citizenship”. (Mossburger, Tolbert, Hamilton, 2012).  For “digital 
citizenship” to make sense in the information age, it requires regular and effective 
Internet access and citizens with relevant skills to use the technology (ibid). 
Mossburger and his colleagues found that those who solely relied on mobile phones to 
access the Internet are younger and more likely to find job or entertainment online. 
Although optimists might view it as an opportunity for more connected citizens who 
can gain fuller access online and become more informed. However the findings of 
Mossburger’s research show that the disparity remains and in some areas the 
inequalities in economic and political participations online also remain, despite the 
growing number of phone-user only Internet users (ibid, 2012: 37). 
 
Compared with qualitative research, what qualitative research can’t reveal is how 
citizens learn communication and skills through accumulated online activity 
experience.  Therefore, it is with such an intention that this study takes a qualitative 
approach to explore such a process, and hope the findings can provide useful 
indications for theories of democratisation and social movements. It is also part of the 
goal of this study to offer refreshing insight that can possibly be ignored or seen as 
peripheral by those who simply focus on the decline of traditional political 
participation.  
 
1.2 Outline of the Study 
There already exists an abundant volume of useful research on people’s online 
behaviour and whether such activities contribute to civil society (Bimber, 2003; 
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Dalton, 2008; Wellman et al., 2001). However, most of the research focuses on 
Western or older democracies and few of them focus on Taiwan or other countries in 
East Asia. It might be safe to argue that value of a case study of Taiwan has been 
overlooked in the studies of the Internet, social media, or even digital citizenship. 
Fortunately, the research on Taiwan’s democratisation and social movements have 
flourished over recent decades, and can offer a good foundation for this research. 
With that in mind, this research aims to bridge the gap between understanding the 
development of democracy in East Asia, particularly in the case of Taiwan, and the 
implications of technology on civil society by taking Taiwan as a sole case study, and 
focusing on the main actors, young Taiwanese people, during its recent upsurge in 
youth-led social movements.  
As discussed above, the decline of traditional forms of civic participation 
might have bred a hunger for new forms. For instance, in studies of democracy many 
have pointed out the correlation of participation in voluntary associations and civic 
culture (Putnam, 2000). It is suggested that social group engagement can positively 
contribute to social capital and then the functional aspect of a democracy, such as the 
way that citizens learn civil skills through undertaking volunteering work or 
discussing public affairs at a town hall or church. So, when traditional civic 
engagement began to decline, many lamented how such a decline would weaken 
social capital (Putnam, 2000; Stolle and Hooghe, 2005). Putnam (2000: 176) even 
argues that personal interaction and face-to-face communication within traditional 
social group are vital to social capital, because it is through direct contact and social 
interaction that social capital develops. However, some find online social interaction 
to be useful in terms of helping advance social capital (Dalton, 2008), while some 
even suggest the benefit of a “virtual civil society” (Wellman et al., 2001). Therefore, 
this study will put a certain level of emphasis on the changing forms of political 
27	
	
participation and the online civic engagement of Taiwanese Millennials, most of 
whom have grown up with the Internet. The internet penetration rate in Taiwan 
jumped from 62.7 per cent in 2005 to 82.3 per cent in 2017 due to the popularity of 
smartphones and other mobile devices.12 Against that backdrop, these Millennials 
might quite naturally have developed different media consumption habits from their 
older counterparts, with a potential example of this being their news consumption. 
Research released by Taiwan-based Shih-hsin University in 2015 finds that 98.9 per 
cent of university students consider the Internet as their major source of news. The 
number exceeds that of the ordinary people of Taiwan, for whom the figure is 77.7 
per cent.13 It is of interest then that it is young people, who spend more time than any 
of their older counterparts online, that have also been the main driving force behind 
several important social movements in Taiwan over the past ten years. Such a 
development was unanticipated by early researchers of East Asian studies, or even 
within Taiwan studies itself, and therefore a reappraisal might well provide a 
meaningful contribution to these fields, as well as other relevant ones, such as social 
media, civil society, and democratisation.  
The online behaviour of Taiwanese youth thus raises new research questions 
and provides new opportunities, particularly when new forms of virtual political 
engagement seem to be en vogue. This research plans to take a new lens to understand 
the perspectives of these Taiwanese youth and how they have perceived their roles 
during these movements, their usage of social media tools, and the relation between 











of this research comes from.  
Most quantitative approach-driven research uses big data to analyse a specific 
online behaviour, such as tweeting (Ampofo, L., Anstead, N., and O’Loughlin, 2011), 
and the possible implications of such a behaviour. This study, which takes a 
qualitative approach, also focuses on the online behaviour of social movement 
participants, but in a broader manner. With a wide variety of social media available 
online, instead of relying on one particular platform to understand people’s civic 
behaviour, this study hopes to take a more ambitious approach by analysing a wide 
range of social media usage during social movements As Hoskins and O’Loughlin 
(2007: 13-17) have already noted, the integration of social media platforms has led to 
a ‘renewed’ mainstream media. For instance, those British people who watched the 
2010 Leaders’ Debate were not just passively confronted with a live broadcast but a 
live broadcast with live responses from all kinds of social media: Facebook, Twitter, 
Snapchat, blogs, and so on. In the same vein, participants in a social movement are 
not simply mobilised to take part physically, but also to actively share with their 
friends and social media followers how they think of and engage with the event. This 
research hopes to capture a broad idea of how social media tools were used and any 
strategic thinking behind such usage. By interviewing key participants and analysing 
how they use social media to mobilise and gather support from people outside their 
age group, the research question aims to explore whether Taiwanese people’s 
political engagement in the online and offline worlds offers some clues about 
young people’s perception of democracy and roles as citizens in a democracy. 
With this question, an attempt will be made to argue that relying on people’s 
engagement in traditional community activities as the only measurement to evaluate 
their civic engagement will only result in the misbelief that today’s social capital and 
young people’s political participation are in decline, as has been advocated by the 
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likes of Putnam (2000).  
Another important aspect contributing to the originality of this research comes 
from the selection of its specific site for case study: Taiwan. Given that democracy in 
the West has been practiced for a few centuries, it may be important to place the 
Western experience in a broader cross-national context, as there may or may not be 
patterns of citizenship which are idiosyncratic and typical of the West. As Dalton 
asserts, there are many trends apparent in American norms of citizenship and political 
activity that are common to other advanced industrial democracies, and it is only by 
broadening the scope of comparison that one can better analyse the similarities and 
the differences (Dalton, 2008: 6). This is precisely the goal of this research, which 
takes Millennials in Taiwan and their civic engagement as the main research subject. 
As one of the freest democracies in Asia, the civic engagement of Taiwanese youth 
can provide a useful comparison for future research as to the question of if and how 
the advance of technology changes people’s political participation. To strengthen its 
originality, the empirical findings presented in Chapter 4, 5, and 6 cover social 
movements all of which have to some extent have made a certain impact on 
Taiwan’s civil society and democratisation. Also, this research does not attempt to 
use big data gathered from participants of social movements. Instead, the uniqueness 
and strength of this research lies in the selection of its interviewees as most of them 
have played significant roles in these movements and a number of them have later 
gone on to continue their engagement in public affairs as politicians.  
In the following chapters, this study will begin with an extensive review of 
existing research and literature on citizenship. Chapter 2 covers a wide range of 
relevant studies and literature, not all of which are related to the case of Taiwan. The 
reason to include such a wide ranging amount of work is to set out the theoretical 
basis for the conceptual debate that exists around the notion of civic engagement in a 
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democracy. In Chapter 3, this study reviews the development of democratisation and 
revisits the history of social movements in Taiwan. The discussion in this chapter will 
help focus the research question within a Taiwanese context and explain why the 
resurgence of social movements in Taiwan is important to the study of democracy.  
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 compose the main body of this study. They review and analyse 
the empirical findings from major social movements in Taiwan from 2008 – 2016 
under the KMT government. Chapter 4 examines the first stage of the renaissance of 
social movements during the first term of previous President, Ma Ying-Jeou (2008 – 
2012). With extensive qualitative review of these movements, this chapter offers an 
outlook as to why Taiwanese Millennials’ political participation differs from that of 
their older counterparts in the last century. Chapters 5 & 6 examine social movements 
under Ma’s second term (2012 – 2016), with a special focus on how social movement 
participants utilised their creativity in their usage of social media. The findings of 
chapter 4, 5, and 6 help reveal a trend within Taiwanese Millennials’ political 
participation in the information age and why such a trend matters to Taiwan’s 
democratisation. These chapters also discuss the empirical findings on how activists 
and citizens use ICT tools to engage, express viewpoints, and respond to political 
issues. In order to supplement the empirical findings, this study conducts semi-
structured interviews of key participants, staffers of political parties, and media 
professionals. Their first-hand observations, experience and reflection also help 
provide a unique perspective of social movements in Taiwan.  
After the empirical findings, chapter 7 proceeds to compare the findings and 
analytically reviews the movements under Ma’s two terms (2008-2012 and 2012-
2016). It then discusses the potential impact of ICTs and social media on the 
organisation processes of social movements, as well as the way activists mobilise and 
generate their momentum via online tools. It also discusses whether social media 
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allows citizens to engage in politics differently, not just from the perspective of their 
engagement methods but also from a conceptual perspective.  Chapter 7 then 
concludes the findings and conceptualises the empirical research. It also discusses the 
contribution, validity and limitation of the study, as well as offering suggestions for 
future research.  
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, many have recently lamented 
the decline of democracy worldwide. Some criticise “apolitical” citizens for simply 
sitting in front of their computers and staring at their smartphones and not physically 
connecting with their local politicians or political parties. However, as the Internet has 
changed nearly every aspect of our life, civic engagement, and what this means, 
should not be viewed as being in any way immune to this phenomenon. Of course, it 
is only when citizens effectively use social media to effect change offline that real 
change, or even a more solidified idea of digital citizenship, can become more 
possible and worthy of discussion. History shows that the idea of citizenship has 
experienced different interpretation in different eras, and the question of what 
constitutes a good citizens receives different answers now than might have been 
applied to people in ancient Greece. Perhaps, in the first quarter of the twenty-first 
century, citizens in democracies are at the beginning of a move toward a new phase of 
citizenship, a networked and hybrid public sphere, and a more connected online 
community. And perhaps, by taking a closer look at Taiwan’s democracy and its 







Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Almost half of the world’s population now live in a democracy.14 Today’s 
democracies are generally defined as systems which gives its citizens the rights and 
powers to directly or indirectly elect representatives amongst themselves. Through 
this process, citizens form a governing body, and so, theoretically speaking, if a 
democratic system consists of a government formed from the elected representatives 
chosen by its citizens, it might be reasonable to argue that the engagement and 
participation of its citizens gives democracy legitimacy as well as vitality. Likewise, 
the competency of citizens might also largely determine the quality of the democracy 
they govern (both directly or indirectly). As in any functioning democracy, active 
participation of citizens in politics and civic life functions as an indispensable pillar in 
a democratic system of government (Diamond and Morlino, 2016). Therefore, to 
ensure the quality of a democracy, as Robert Dahl comments, it is reasonable to ask 
citizens, the actual rulers of democracy, to be ‘politically competent’ (Dahl, 1992: 46).  
  Many political thinkers would agree that for a democracy to function well, its 
citizens are expected to be equipped with certain attitudes, capabilities, and 
characteristics. However, the conceptualizations of what it means to be a good citizen 
in a democracy can, and do, vary greatly. Since the time of Greek philosophers, who 
debated the nature and core value of ‘democracy’ centuries ago, different schools of 
concept as to what constitutes a good democratic citizen have been postulated in the 
long human pursuit of a functioning democracy. Whatsmore, in a democracy, “active 
																																																								
14 According to the Democracy Index 2017 published by the Economist Intelligence Unit in 2017, 19 
out of the 167 countries covered by the Index are classified “Full democracy”, 57 were “Flawed 




citizenship” is considered beneficial to a democratic society and therefore many 
theorists including Putnam (2000) have emphasised the importance of fostering 
“active citizens” through social interaction and participation in social settings. Such 
an emphasis had been regarded as the remedy for maintaining and keeping a 
functioning democracy, that is until the rapid advance of digital and online technology 
began to reshape the societies in which we live.  
 
2.2 Citizenship  
The word ‘civic’ derives from civitas, the Greek city-state, and the Latin civium, 
indicating the notion of ‘citizens’. The word civic resonates with the meaning of 
public in the sense of being visible and in some way accessible and available to the 
people. This is a notion that runs in opposition to the word private, the notion of the 
intimate domain. “Civic” therefore carries the implication of engagement in public 
life – the backbone of democracy.15  
Often, citizens’ engagement in politics is defined as a key element in a 
democratic regime. As such, in the studies of political science and political 
communication, “civic engagement” is often defined as a form of voluntary activity 
aimed at solving problems in the community and helping each other. For Immanuel 
Kant, being an “active citizen” is not only about being part of a civil society, but 
being an active a member of the society as well (Kant, 1991). Kant views 
independence and partaking in the right to vote as a means for citizens to become 
actively involved in politics. By doing so, citizens show that they are not simply being 
																																																								
15 Similarly, Bernie Ronan of the Centre for Civic Participation, during his testimony at the White 
House Conference on Aging Public Forum on Civic Engagement in an Older America (held on 25 
February, 2004), defined “civic engagement” according to the collective and political dimensions of 
the term. He said, “civic engagement is about rediscovering politics, the life of the polis, the city 
where men and women speak and act together, as citizens… the word civic, when connected to 




a silent element, but active members of society. Kant also states that citizens have to 
be economically independent enough to earn their right of existence and not reside 
under the will of any other member of society. His view suggests that the attribute of 
civil independence can be a prerequisite of the bottom-line for the distinction between 
active and passive citizenship (Kant 1991: 139). Passive citizenship  means only that 
citizens are entitled to the rights of being free and enjoying equality. Voting, however, 
is not included in the core concept of passive citizenship. In other words, Kant’s 
comments suggest that passive citizens are not truly active citizens, since they offer 
no contribution to law-making or policy-formation in a society, even though passive 
citizens are still entitled to the right to demand equal treatment by others in 
accordance with natural freedom and equality laws. 
Another theorist who suggests the importance of active citizenship is British 
utilitarian philosopher, John S. Mill, who argues: ‘the possession and the exercise of 
political rights is one of the chief instruments both of moral and of intellectual 
training for the popular mind’ (Mill, 1991 [1859]). Mill’s thinking on democracy 
favours educated citizens, as demonstrated in Thoughts On Parliamentary Reform, 
where he defends the idea that the value of a citizen’s ballot paper should be 
proportionally defined and based on her or his level of education (ibid.) However, the 
duty of citizens, as Mill states, is to ensure that the elected representatives can 
appropriately wield political judgments for the benefit of the electorate. Mill’s view 
indicates that citizens are expected to cast their vote wisely when they choose the best 
representatives for themselves.  However, is voting alone, based on the notions 
described by Mill, enough to elevate and enlighten citizens’ minds? Isn’t it the case 
that around Mill’s time voting in democratic America was, at best, a privilege enjoyed 
only by male citizens and, at worst, plagued by fraudulence, vote-buying, and even 
degraded into a role which merely reaffirms the legitimacy of the ruling elites? 
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(Schudson 1998: 162-165)16? Perhaps, judging from the historical context of the time 
when Mill was reflecting on the idea of citizenship and democracy, it might be safe to 
argue that Mill is proposing an ideal political system in which only well-educated and 
informed citizens are better qualified to make political decisions (such as voting) than 
uneducated individuals. 
  Now, moving forward to the twenty-first century, citizens in democracies 
around the world generally enjoy greater access to education than those living in 
Mill’s time. Such development leads to a bigger question: compared with citizens 
living in Mill’s time, do the citizens of today make better political decisions and 
engage in politics more actively? 
Before this chapter further explores this question, it is important to mention 
that not all democracies are the same. In new democracies, for example, citizens face 
more challenges in becoming ‘competent active citizens’. Third-wave democratic 
countries are often troubled by social division of class, wealth, ethnicity or national 
identity (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Many challenges for citizens in a new 
democracy come from their internal divisions of identity and values. Such divisions 
often become vicious circles themselves as citizens might find it difficult to tolerate 
and understand fellow citizens with different sets of views or identities. Similarly, in 
some democracies, party affiliation becomes another source of confrontation. On 
political party division, James Bryce (1993) warns of the dangers of ‘party split’ or 
‘party identity’ in modern politics. He says: 
																																																								
16 In Schudson’s The Good Citizen, he argues that there are four different eras with each 
characterized by a different model of citizenship. Citizens played a relatively passive role during the 
time between the eighteenth and early nineteenth century as they mainly submitted and seldom 
challenged the ruling class. In the late nineteenth century, citizens became moderately more active 
and yet remained passive as they generally were pacified through the appealing nature of 
entertainment, patronism, or material reward. The third era, which ran through the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century, saw some citizens favour technocracy whereas others began to 
emphasise the importance direct participation by citizens in politics. The fourth era, starting from the 
1950s and continuing until now, has seen citizens develop a stronger sense of “rights” and playing a 




The ‘spirit of party’ may be so diverted from its original character of an 
attachment to certain principles, that it has become a mere instinct of loyalty 
to a leader, or to a name, or to a set of catchwords. […] victory, not truth, 
becomes the aim […] and the fellow citizens of the opposite party are treated 
as enemies rather than partners in a common state (Bryce 1993: 137-138). 
 
To ensure a robust and healthy citizenship in a modern democracy, Bryce 
suggests that the ‘average citizen’ has a significant role to play in helping the party 
better itself and thus saving the country from the tyranny of any particular party. He 
notes, ‘leaders need a great mass of sensible, well-intentioned followers to keep them 
in track’ (ibid., 154-155). From the views of Kant, Mill, and Bryce, it can be noted 
that today’s citizens are not only expected to be active in public affairs and civic life 
and make sensible electoral decisions, but would also appear obligated to help keep 
their government and affiliated political party accountable as well. However, today’s 
citizens find it increasingly difficult to forge consensus amongst themselves, despite 
all the existing democratic tools (i.e. voting, petition, protesting) they have at hand. 
With clashes due to race, identity, religion, and differing values becoming arguably 
more fierce than at any point in democratic history,17 can active citizenship remain a 
realistic possibility, or is it perhaps now the case that the concept of citizenship has 
evolved into different forms?  
																																																								
17 Francis Fukuyama comments in his article “Identity, immigration, and liberal democracy” (in 
Journal of Democracy, published on April 2006, Vol. 17) that citizens in postmodern societies which 
uphold the values of individualism and relativism have found it more and more difficult to find a 
consensus on the issue of identity, religion, or even immigration. He says, “[T]he dilemma of 
immigration and identity ultimately converges with the larger problem of the valuelessness of 
postmodernity…. Postmodern societies, particularly those in Europe, feel that they have evolved past 
defined by religion and nation and have arrived at a superior place. But aside from their celebration of 
endless diversity and tolerance, postmodern people find it difficult to agree on the substance of the 
good life to which they aspire in common”. 
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Almond and Verba (1963) describe citizenship as a set of attitudes towards the 
role of the individual in the political process. Such sets of attitudes are sometimes 
called “political culture”, which outlines what to do to become good citizens. 
Alternatively, another way that  this can be seen is when Tocqueville describes the 
American emphasis on participation, freedom, and equality as the core foundations of 
its democratic development (Tocqueville, 1960). From these sets of attitudes, Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady (1995) go on to then further define participation as the most 
important element of democratic citizenship (also seen in Dahl, 1998). As Verba and 
others argue, democratic participation should emphasise a flow of influence upward 
from the masses (Verba et al, 1978). If one is committed to the traditional image of a 
democratic citizenry as portrayed in the literature of political culture (Almond and 
Verba, 1963; Campbell et al. 1960; Verba and Pye 1965) and chooses to dismiss 
contemporary thought, then their conclusion might be a perceived reduction in 
involvement in public affairs. On the other hand, there are scholars who argue that the 
transformation of modern society and the development of technologies actually 
encourage average citizens to be more politically active (Inglehart 1990; Macedo et al. 
2005).  Regardless of the disagreements between traditional and contemporary 
thinking, participation is a prime criterion for defining democratic citizens.  
Another term, “cultural citizenship”, has now begun to be more widely 
discussed at a time when more and more people are advocating for minority needs 
and in a world when migration has become common in many countries throughout the 
world (Kymlicka, 1995). Because of globalisation and the advance of technology, it is 
not rare to observe citizens deciding willingly not to live in their homelands. They 
move to a different country, a different continent, or even a different culture for a 
plethora of reasons. As Dahlgren (2009) argues, the themes of global citizenship, 
post-national citizenship, cosmopolitanism, and global civil society have been 
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discussed quite widely (also see Held, 2006; Sassen, 2002, Beck and Grande, 2007). 
In a world when the distance of countries has been significantly shortened by faster 
transportation and communication, the concept of citizenship is no longer restricted to 
a singular membership of a territorial community or country. Some suggest that the 
meaning of citizenship in today’s globalised world needs to be rearticulated, as the 
connection between citizenship and the national borders have been weakened in a 
world connected through the ‘overlapping community of fate’ (Held, ibid). As there is 
no universal form of citizenship that can be applied to all democracies, what does 
citizenship mean to today’s citizens? What falls inside the landscape of civic life, and 
what remains, outside, are questions that cannot be answered unequivocally, as the 
landscape is ever changing. For instance, in the UK and the US, charity work is often 
defined as a form of civic engagement. Yet in Northern European countries, where the 
social welfare system has been very strong, such activity and organizations might not 
have the same significance as they have in the UK or the US (Dahlgren, 2009).  
Perhaps, when civic life continues to become increasingly complex, 
citizenship should not be defined as merely a set of legal rights and obligations of 
citizens, but also a “mode of social agency”. The lack of a shared definition of 
citizenship not only reflects the complex postmodern political environment we are 
dealing with, but an opportunity to revisit and enrich the meaning of citizenship itself. 
In this ‘revisiting’ process, it is important not to mindlessly identify everything as 
citizenship. Because, if everything is citizenship, then nothing really is.  
 
The Changing Orientation of Citizenship 
In the face of an increasingly connected world, the following section aims to further 
explore whether the orientation of citizenship has changed, and, if so, what are the 
causes. In recent decades, the long-term development of economics, media, and 
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globalisation have fostered the growth of so-called post-materialistic values, and the 
world has thus been saturated with information and communication (Kumar, 2005). 
Despite the massive change in the way people live, Inglehart’s research on ‘post-
material’ value, with its emphasis on political participation as a key measurement of 
‘post-materialism’, shows that today’s citizens, like their predecessors, still expect to 
obtain opportunities to take part in democratic processes (Inglehart, 1990 and 1997). 
As citizens are becoming progressively informed and perhaps critical, they generally 
consider a democratic political regime as a good way of governing, and yet they are 
also concerned that their opinions might be consistently left out if their views do not 
aligned with that of the mainstream.  Moreover, younger generations raised in the late 
twentieth century are attaching less importance to traditional social and political 
values.18 They focus more on quality of life, individuality, lifestyle choices, freedom 
of expression, and participation. As Huntington and his colleagues argue in The Crisis 
of Democracy (1975), the value shift towards freedom, equality, order, and political 
opposition is creating tensions that democracies are struggling to resolve. It seems as 
though in a modern, diverse society, the idea of citizenship can be perceived 
differently by different groups of citizens.  
In this value shifting process, mass media has come to play an important role, 
reshaping the relationship between the governed and the governors. In particular, for 
the major part of the twentieth century, television has offered the public a major 
forum for political communication. Through political talk shows and audience-based 
discussion programmes, television allows citizens an access to forums to learn and 
express their views on public affairs (if they want, they can even call the show host or 
																																																								
18 It’s important to note that “younger generations” here refers to those who have grown up in 
relatively safe, wealthy, and developed Western countries. After World War II, Western countries, led 
by the United States, benefitted from extraordinary growth and progress in the third quarter of the 




tweet with a unique hashtag so their opinions can be represented and displayed). In a 
way, mass media creates a kind of ‘public sphere’, where the relations between the 
governed and the governors begin to change. However, the wide range of media 
outlets, or the so-called bourgeois public spheres, according to Habermas, only 
provide a pseudo-public sphere that is ultimately unhelpful for citizens to form a 
consensus among themselves, not to mention the problems these kinds of formats 
create when it comes to the forming of well analysed responses to complex social 
issues. Perhaps this problem is best summed up by Mouffe (1988) when he talks of: 
 
… the existence in each individual of multiple subject positions corresponding 
both to the different social relations in which the individuals is inserted and to 
which the discourses which constitute these changes. 
 
While mass media seem to offer citizens a consumerist cultural view, without 
providing a singular or institutionalized public sphere, it does, however, allow citizens 
with different sets of values, interests, and the ideologies to find a talk show or 
programme they can identify with. One result of this can be said to be that , society 
becomes fragmented and heterogeneous. Yet one other important element emerges 
from a vibrant mass media scene, and that is a potentially much increased reflection 
of diversity.  
To some, such as Putnam (2000), changes in the values of contemporary 
publics are seen as an eroding of the governability of democracies. But as Mouffe 
argues, those different values reflect different social relations of citizens in a society. 
More so, these changing values show the transformation of today’s civil society. 
Taking Dalton’s ‘engaged citizenship’ theory into account, changing social conditions 
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may reshape the norms of what it means to be a good citizen, and this affects how 
citizens act and think about politics (Dalton, 2008). 
 
   
 
 
Figure 2. 1 The Changing Public, from Dalton (2008: 4) 
 
              As discussed in previous sections, Dalton argues that changing social 
structure brings to our civil society a number of political consequences and thus one 
should not simply adhere to traditional patterns of citizenship, but also attempt to 
understand these consequences. By doing so we can have a better understanding of 
today’s citizenship and therefore he suggests we are able to categorise different norms 
of citizenship into two groups: (1) duty-based citizenship, which encourages citizens 
to be law abiding and expects citizens to pay taxes, contribute to the national need; 
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including things such as compulsory military service and voting; (2) engaged 
citizenship, which stresses the social responsibilities of citizenship; such as 
understanding others, being involved in elite-challenging activities, and being self-
expressive (Dalton, 2008: 29). The norms of engaged citizenship overlap with some 
patterns of post-material values as identified by Inglehart and other scholars(Inglehart 
and Welzel 2005). It is important to note that ‘duty-based citizenship’ and ‘engaged 
citizenship’ are not contradictory. In fact, they both involve a type of participation, 
but from different perspectives. Both of them define citizenship as a mixture of 
responsibilities and rights, but each emphasizes these areas dissimilarly. One can 
achieve both duty-based and engaged citizenship by paying tax (duty) and taking part 
in social movements (engaged).  
At the beginning of this section, it was argued that the modernisation of 
society might have transformed the notion of citizenship as it affects people’s values 
and behaviours in politics and life. Postmaterialists tend to be sceptical about social 
and political institutions but at the same time they are more confident when it comes 
to democratic values (Dalton, 2004). Additionally, Postmaterialists have higher 
democratic ideals, and it is here that often, when held to this higher standard, that 
contemporary politicians and political institutions fall short. Furthermore, a mix of 
value orientations characterises todays’ orientation of citizenship. Such an attitude is 
more salient amongst young people who grew up in democracy. Compared with Baby 
Boomers and their older counterparts, young people are probably not as sold as their 
parents and grandparents on democratic ideas. A 2017 Pew Research found that 
young people are more likely than older ones to support technocracy as opposed to 
democracy. In the US, 46 per cent of people aged 18 to 29 say they prefer to be 
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governed by experts compared with 36 per cent of those aged 50 and above.19 While 
in the US, the age gap difference in this area is 10 percentage points, it is even wider 
in other advanced economies, such as Australia (19 points), Japan (18 points), the UK 
(14 points), and Canada (13 points). 
 
2.3 Is it possible young citizens’ perception of citizenship might have changed?   
Following the election of Donald Trump and the passing of the Brexit referendum, 
politics in the United States and other advanced Western industrial democracies have 
changed in ways that are not easily comparable to those of the old patterns of 
democracy. Perhaps then, this adds weight to the argument that the notion of 
citizenship, along with the development of politics, is also changing. The decline of 
citizens’ engagement in voting or traditional political activities should not be seen as a 
failure of civic virtue. It needs to be understood in terms of both the elements of social 
structure and the changing landscape of the citizen’s everyday life. 
Voting is one area that can be taken into consideration by way of an example. 
It is evident that the voting turnout, particularly amongst the youth in the West, is 
decreasing. However, what should be noted is that the repertoire of political action 
has actually expanded, and people are now more engaged in various forms of political 
participation (Dalton 2008: 76). In Putnam’s  Social Capital Survey (2000), he 
replicates four questions from the Verba-Nie participation series: protest, general 
interest in politics, attending a rally, and working with a community group. None of 
these four questions display a statistically significant decrease from the Verba-Nie 
participation levels of 1989. Perhaps it suggests that the decline of voting turnout 
																																																								
19 According to the Pew Research, which surveys twenty-three countries, young people in a number 
of advanced economies are especially attracted to technocracy. The 2017 Pew Research Report on 





cannot provide a strong indicator of the direction of the political involvement of 
today’s citizens.  
Changes in the media landscape have also transformed the nature of 
democratic politics, as citizens consume more information from a greater selection of 
media sources and outlets, many of which did not exist a generation ago. The author 
of this study shares the views of Chadwick that news media is a massive product of 
‘assemblages in which the personnel, practices, genres and temporalities of 
supposedly “new” online media are increasingly integrated with those supposedly 
“old” broadcast and press media’ (Chadwick 2011: 25, 32). The Internet offers 
citizens an endless list of outlets to access information, as well as tools to express 
themselves. Shifts in the technology of communication have encouraged citizens to be 
more informed, as they can use the information they consume and their own social or 
political identification to develop their own ideals of how democratic governments 
should function. As a result, the gap between citizens’ ideals of how a democracy 
should work and the reality of what is happening in political institutions might 
discourage citizens from getting involved in public affairs through traditional methods. 
If citizens find no satisfaction from the current state of political reality, they might 
rather find an alternative method to influence politics. The development of social 
media, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, allows citizens to share their 
thoughts on the news they are consuming in real time as they watch. Such a changing 
news consumption behaviour  might also change, to some extent, how citizens 
perceive the information they receive. This research does not intend to simply 
generalise that citizens in the past merely passively received information as it was 
presented to them on television. However, one should also not easily dismiss the 
potential impact of a changing media landscape on citizenship in the twenty-first 
century. In a similar vein, young citizens might express themselves more comfortably 
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with more non-traditional or unconventional methods, while their activities still can 
demonstrate a more engaged norm of citizenship.  
Some scholars note that there are signs of new civic engagement in non-
governmental areas, including increases in community volunteering work, high levels 
of consumer activism, and active involvement in social causes from a focus on the 
environment to economic inequality both on a local and global scale (Lopez et al., 
2006). Lopez and his colleagues find that 13 per cent of American youth engage in at 
least over two different forms of community and political participation respectively. 
The finding indicates that young people attempt to directly address public issues by 
taking up activities such as volunteering. These activities include volunteering in a 
charity, engaging in fundraising events for charity, or serving on boards of non-profit 
organisations (NGOs). However, the increasing engagement in volunteering activities 
does not necessarily lead to a decrease in traditional civic activities such as voting. 
Evidence shows that young people are more likely to vote if they are approached and 
asked to do so.20 
  Therefore, one cannot carelessly dismiss the importance of voting. In a 
democracy, citizens cast their vote to elect representatives, approve democratic 
legitimacy, and engage in other forms of opinion expression, such as referenda. Apart 
from voting, citizens’ engagement in other arenas may be an indicator of what they 
perceive their role in a democracy is, and what they consider as an important element 
to be a good citizen.  
Secondly, the changing norms of citizenship reinforces a new style of political 
participation. As Dahlgren (2009) points out, formal citizenship per se does not 
always guarantee equality of resources and opportunities for all groups of citizens. 
Various mechanisms of social and political exclusion might well be placing 
																																																								
20 Young Voter Strategies with CIRCLE, Young Voter Mobilization Tactics (September 2006). 
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challenges on many aspects of citizenship as well. More citizens now engage in 
increasingly demanding forms of political action, such as individualized activity, with 
direct action, as well as directly reaching out to politicians or government by writing 
letters. It is found in Dalton’s (2008) research that writing letters to a government 
official can be more effective in today’s politics. One of the reasons is that today’s 
citizens are more informed and educated than before, therefore their direct action hold 
a larger weight than that of their predecessors. According to Dalton, three-fifths of the 
populace in their fifties have an education below that of highschool, whereas three-
fifths of the populace in more recent times have at least a college degree. 
Thirdly, today’s citizens are attaching greater importance to activities which 
might appear to be less relevant to political affairs. Such change is reflected in how 
citizens participate in politics and how they spend their leisure time. In a modern 
society, a citizen might choose to spend more time attempting to realise her/his 
personal ambition or goals, rather than to donate a large amount of time towards 
political activities. Therefore, citizens might make more effort in investing within 
other spheres of life other than in politics (Fuchs 2007: 38). The findings of the World 
Value Survey shows that the most important value to citizens are family, friends, and 
then work (see in van Deth 2000). As Fuchs argues, from the normative point of view, 
it is a matter of concern that leisure time is given the same level of importance as that 
of politics.  
That said, citizens might be more willing to take actions that they think could 
allow them to focus on their own interests while at the same time having the ability to 
select the means of influencing policymakers at their own convenience. One example 
is ‘political consumerism’, as identified by Stolle and her colleagues and defined as 
the “consumer choice of producers and products based on political and/or ethical 
considerations” (Micheletti, Follesdal & Stolle, 2003). Citizens choose their purchase 
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based on the consideration of justice, fairness, or an assessment of business practice 
or government behaviour. Whether such behaviour is collectively or individually 
conducted, it nevertheless shows that citizens’ market choices can reflect an 
understanding or awareness of material products as embedded in a social and 
normative context. This can therefore be called the “politics behind products” (Stolle, 
Hooghe, and Micheletti 2005).  
Fourthly, the changing norms of citizenship and political participation 
demonstrate a demand for the revival of citizenship to address the problems that face 
contemporary democracies (Putnam, 2000; Macedo et al. 2005). Macedo and 
colleagues warn of the danger of today’s shallow and polarised public discussion, as 
well as a decline of civic engagement.21 They also explore whether participation in 
civic engagement is really declining, as Putnam has pointed out. Their findings show 
that citizens are not only participating less, but also participating more unequally, as 
poor citizens and minorities continue to be disadvantaged and less likely to take part 
in politics. The authors in the report also suggest measures to encourage civic 
participation including voting reform, education, revitalised local politics, and 
encouraging citizens to further engage in church life or labour unions (Macedo et al., 
2005: 169). If Dahl's (1992) argument of citizens’ competency were to make sense in 
today’s democracy, measures to increase citizen engagement seem to be even more 
instrumental to the health of a democratic society. 
Despite the concern over a decline in voter turnout and civic engagement, 
Dalton suggests that, though some norms of citizenship have weakened, others might 
actually have become strengthened (2006). For Dalton, today’s citizens are more 
creative in terms of their political participation. As he puts it: 
																																																								
21 The authors conduct a wide-range of research which finds that American democracy has been 
eroded by a decline in civic engagement. And yet they also argue that the decline cannot be entirely 
put down to personal reasons because the design of political institutions discourages more active 




Citizen participation is becoming more closely linked to citizens’ influence. 
Rather than democracy being at risk, this represents an opportunity to expand 
and enrich democratic participation (Dalton, 2006: 11). 
 
   In summary, the changing pattern of citizens’ political engagement and the 
decline of voting turnout may pose a “is the glass half-full or half-empty?” kind of 
question. One perspective is that today’s citizens, particularly the young ones, are 
more creative and innovative in finding ways to voice their opinions. Although voting 
is a major method to ensure the elected representatives are accountable, the infrequent 
chance to cast a vote for a pre-packaged policy is a limited tool of political influence. 
Therefore, it might be safe to say that expanding the framework and possibility of 
political participation means that citizens can convey their opinions, more 
immediately, and exert more political pressure than they could through traditional 
norms of participation. Today’s youth may be less likely to vote and show little 
interest in politics, and yet they are more active in ‘engaged citizenship’, and that taps 
into participatory norms, which is considered broader than duty-based citizenship 
(Dalton, 2009). They seem to be more likely to engage in boycotts, demonstrations, 
and participate in discussion on Internet forums. When it comes to young citizens 
who have grown up with the Internet as part of their daily lives, it might be prudent to 
ask, whether the Internet, or the development of ICT, has changed their way of 







2.4 New Forms of Political Participation  
Can we apply ICT to improve the condition of each individual? Can ICT, 
designed for one-to-one links in telephone networks, or for one-to-many links 
in radio and television networks, serve to bond us all? And how can new forms 
of ICT- peer-to-peer, edge-to-edge, many-to-many networks- change the 
relationship between each and every of us?  
- John Gage, quoted in the Global Information Technology Report  
(World Economic Forum, 2002) 
 
These questions become particularly relevant given the important role played by 
Information Communication Technology (ICT) during political upheavals in 
authoritarian countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, or even China. In an interview with 
Time Out Hong Kong, Chinese contemporary artist Ai Weiwei asserts that the 
Jasmine Revolution was a genuine online movement, adding that the tight control of 
the Chinese government in fact reinforces people’s beliefs and desire for change (Ai, 
2011). He describes the situation in China as follows: 
 
[t]here’s no discussion, no intellectual exchanges or argument. It’s so much 
like Chinese parents from the olden times, where the children just had to listen 
to them without showing any sign of disagreement, or questioning, or different 
attitudes. To try and challenge the economic and political situation today is 
not going to be OK. 
 
And yet, even at this time, Ai still holds the hope that one day young Chinese 
people can have equal opportunities, commit to challenges, and be free to lead their 
life rather than sacrifice themselves for other people’s excuses. This strong statement 
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from Ai shows that being free to express her/his view is as important to people living 
in an authoritarian regime as it is in a democracy. Ai is not alone in these sentiments. 
Some Chinese bloggers have attempted to challenge local power abuses by facilitating 
public opinion online to force the Communist Chinese State to change national 
regulations. Some optimists comment that the Internet and other forms of “liberation 
technologies” can help expand political, social, and economic freedom, and 
eventually empower citizens, facilitate communication and information, and 
strengthen an emergent civil society (Diamond, 2010: 3).22 
The discussion on the normative expectation of online activities is similar to 
an idea of the “Global Village” which entered into academic and popular discourse 
with the publication of Marshall McLuhan’s 1962 book, The Gutenberg Galaxy. In 
this book McLuhan suggests a transformation from print mass media to electronic 
mass media and how such transformation might reshape Europe. According to 
McLuhan, the development of electronic mass media would enable humankind to 
interact on a global scale, and encourage a global, common identity, and ultimately a 
form of identity that would be increasingly shaped as people resided in one, same 
‘global’ village.  
In ways very similar to the concept illustrated by The Gutenberg Galaxy, the 
Internet also brings people closer with instant messaging applications, such as Skype 
or WhatsApp, allowing people to communicate without the constraints of time and 
space. But underneath the surface, how do these technologies affect the way people 
consume political news, as generally speaking political affairs still imply a certain 
level of “national boundaries”? 
																																																								
22 At the time when this thesis was being revised (2018), the growth of censorship and the use of ICT 
for surveillance in China had largely dispelled these hopes. It is said that by 2020, China will have a 
system which allows them a nationwide facial recognition and surveillance network that will enables 
the achievement of near-total surveillance of urban residents, including their private homes via smart 
TVs and smartphones (see Radio Free Asia report: “China Aims For Near-Total Surveillance, Including 
in People’s Homes”: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/surveillance-03302018111415.html)  
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It is difficult to imagine people not having the ability to differentiate domestic 
news from foreign affairs. When people read local newspapers online, they can also 
navigate between the “local” and “international” sections and henceforth get a sense 
of what is going on within both their local community and the global community. 
Therefore, in order to understand whether the Internet and online technologies affect 
people’s political behaviour or participation, perhaps, we need to focus less on how 
the Internet affects society at large, but more on how citizens use the Internet on an 
individual level. Indeed, the Internet represents a new medium for political 
participation with its emphasis on user control, openness, and immediacy. These 
individualized characteristics match the post-material values in which young citizens 
are more self-expressive and innovative in finding ways of voicing their opinions. 
However, the data on the Internet’s impact on participation, while abundant, is still 
somewhat inconclusive (Gibson et al. 2004). As Gibson and her colleagues argue, at 
the individual level, ‘ICTs should be viewed as a tool for political socialisation’, 
particularly of younger citizens. As a result, ‘ICT is shaped by forces of societal 
modernisation that underpin the latest evolution of participation patterns,  at least in 
advanced democracies’ (Gibson et al. 2004: 4-5). 
Many examples show how to use the Internet as an alternative, or at least as a 
supplement, to traditional methods of political participation. For instance, 
Meetup.com, an online community that utilises Foster Putnam’s idea of social capital 
is just one example of how such online participation has spread throughout the world. 
This site, which was established in 2002, has received a phenomenal growth in the 
number of civil and political groups joining, especially during the month of 
November 2004, just before the American presidential elections. In July 2005, 
Meetup.com had approximately 1.6 million registered members and over 58,000 
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groups worldwide (Margolis, 2007). For a while they became a standard feature of 
electoral campaigns.  
Nevertheless, one should not take the actions of forwarding emails, blog-
browsing, following politicians on Twitter or Facebook as a means to replace social 
power in the ‘real’ offline world. Dissimilarly, the potential of the Internet is 
illustrated on Facebook.com. In Fall 2006, the top ten advocacy groups on Facebook 
included nearly half a million members in total (see in Dalton 2008: 66). The 2005 
CDACS survey found that 17 per cent of American citizens had visited a political 
website during the past year, 13 per cent had forwarded a political email, and 7 per 
cent had participated in other political activities over the Internet. Furthermore, those 
citizens who participated in any of those activities exceeded the percentage of those 
who had donated money to political parties, worked for a political group, or displayed 
campaign material over the same time period. Although the percentage seems modest, 
it is reasonable to argue that online activities might be growing, and that the Internet 
will become the main tool of political activism, especially among young citizens 
(Dalton 2008). 
Perhaps, it is also reasonable to argue that, while some scholars lament the 
decline of political participation as Putnam does, their theories on ‘decline’ only 
capture one side of a more complex social trend. There are scholars who tend to find 
answers in suggesting that new media and the Internet can benefit society politically 
by offering a variety of platforms for citizens to increase their civic participation. 
Some hold the positive view that new media will energize citizenry and create more 
opportunities for the exchange of ideas.  Norris, in A Virtuous Circle: Political 
Communication in Post-industrial Societies (2000) notes that the Internet and 
technologies offer citizens new possibilities to engage in politics, interact with policy 
makers, and engage in public spheres. The space offered by the Internet also 
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encourages more spontaneous forms of self-driven engagement in politics, and 
indirectly reduces the traditional and conventional forms of elite-guided engagement 
(Norris, 2000). This includes possibilities for citizens to obtain information freely on 
mediums such as personal blogs, Wikipedia or Yahoo answers (Bimber et al, 2009). 
In the past, information was controlled by elites or media until the Internet and 
various technologies broke these monopolies. Whereas traditional TV places citizens 
as information receivers, the Internet turns them also into producers and multipliers, 
allowing them to both garner and share information, and to further influence the 
political process.  
One key finding from the more optimistic camp is that the Internet seems to 
have a bigger impact on those who are already active and involved in politics. Norris 
(2001) analyses US and European societies up until 2000, and argues that Internet 
usage is linked to high levels of political participation but that this was largely 
confined to those who were already active offline:    
 
[T]he rise of the virtual political system seems most likely to facilitate further 
knowledge, interest, and activism of those who are already most predisposed 
toward civic engagement, reinforcing patterns of political participation 
(Norris, 2000). 
 
Another interesting finding shows that young citizens can be more easily 
approached by political groups online than other age groups. They are also more 
likely to be engaged in online participation than offline forms, such as voting and 
other active forms of participation (see in Gibson et al., 2004). So, if the essential role 
of citizens in a traditional representative democratic system is, for example, to take 
part in regular elections or town hall meetings to decide public matters or choose 
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representatives who then govern on their behalf, then in the online world the role 
could be potentially described as taking part in online political forums, signing 
electronic-petitions, and sharing their political views from their personal social media 
accounts. 
 
Speaking of dystopia 
As Margolis states, ‘the internet changes nothing’ (Margolis 2007: 780). Political use 
of ICT is just in its its beginning stages. Currently, the Internet is often still treated as 
an extension of the media we are familiar with, and therefore, people use itin the same 
way and for the same reasons that they used traditional media before. It is naïve to 
expect an ‘offline’ person who today does not care about politics to suddenly become 
someone who is interested in politics because she/he has a computer and Internet 
connection. For instance, Dekker and Uslaner argue for a ‘nil’ effect of Internet usage 
on social capital. Their research finds little evidence that the Internet will create new 
communities to make up for the decline in civic engagement that has occurred over 
the past four decades in the United States (Dekker & Uslaner, 2001: 22). 
Moreover, some argue that the Internet’s role in politics is fairly modest. 
Margolis & Resnick (2000) in their research argue that although major political actors 
may engage in online campaign, lobbying, policy advocacy, and so forth, the ultimate 
political landscape still remains pretty much the same. Online campaigning seems 
mainly to attract citizens who are already interested in and engaged in politics.  
It might be important to note that changes in democracy are in relation with 
socio-cultural development, and that alterations in the media landscape contribute to 
such change (Dahlgren, 2009). As Dahlgren puts it, “[D]emocracy today is seen to be 
precariously at a new historical juncture, and in this context, the impact of the Internet 
becomes significant” (Dahlgren, 2009: 161). The Internet itself does not change 
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politics; it serves as an innovative tool in the frontlines of media development and 
thus a resource for political change. Internet, like other technologies, is just a tool. It 
is up to both innovation and the extent to which citizens can improve and wisely use 
these tools that can bring about changes in politics and societies (Diamond, 2010).   
 Today’s citizens have online forums, global networking websites, and 
information sharing sites that continue to expand and multiply. The Internet serves as 
a digital  public sphere. Websites such as Global Voices or the BBC cover global 
information by translating significant blogs around the world in to English and seven 
other major languages. Their integrative work certainly evokes the ideas of global 
public spheres (Dahlgren, 2009). However, in reality, many aspects of the online 
world still cannot be comparable with the idea of public sphere. For Habermas, public 
spheres can be found within autonomous cracks in cafes and pubs, where citizens can 
speak and act as themselves and get to spend time with friends (Coleman & Blumler, 
2009: 165).23 However, the occasional communication that occurs when elections 
happen, such as text-messaging elected representatives, or pressing the “Like” button 
on a politician’s Facebook, does not empower citizenship. For example, any 
individual can enter the White House website and send a message to the President 
saying ‘I think you are an idiot’, and expect to receive an auto-reply message saying 
‘The President thanks you so much for your message’. Such interactions should 




23 As Blumler and Coleman argue, new digital media could be seen as having a vulnerable potential to 
improve public communication in society. They propose for an online civic commons in cyberspace 
and call for the creation of an enduring structure of the Web. This could realise more fully the 
democratic potential of new interactive media (Blumler & Coleman, 2009: 170). As the availability of 
computers, smart phones, and other gadgets become increasingly intertwined with citizens’ lives, so 
has the citizen’s expectation for quick and easy access to information. We are thus becoming digital 
citizens (Mandarano et al, 2010). 
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2.5 Is “digital Citizenship” a potential form of citizenship in the online world? 
Before this chapter moves on to explore the contemporary civic realities of the online 
world, it might be helpful to elaborate the focus of citizenship in this research once 
more. In Kymlica and Norman’s (2000) argument, their definition of citizenship 
includes three main elements. First, citizenship means a citizen’s legal status. Second, 
as a political agent, the citizen demonstrates the notion of citizenship by proactively 
engaging in her/his society’s political institutions. Third, citizenship reflects a 
membership of a political community that endows a unique source of political identity. 
As the legal status is not in the scope of the research question of this study, this thesis 
focuses on the ‘engagement’ of a citizen in the information age and leans upon past 
research that shows that civil society can play a significant role in politics, such as an 
initiator of transition to democracy (Thompson, 1976; O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; 
Diamond, 1999). In the United States, for instance, American civil society in the 60s 
significantly changed civil rights and enhanced women’s rights in politics. As society 
moves forward, technology also advances and to some extent accelerates social 
change. As Daniel Bell (1973) describes, advancement in technology encourages the 
rise of knowledge-based workforces to take on the dominant social position within a 
society. In turn, given the generally higher level of education of such a grouping, their 
way of life tends to lead towards a demand for more openness and liberty, thus 
helping in the reshaping of a society. What Bell describes is essentially what 
happened during the transition between the industrial and the information ages. As 
today’s society demands more professional knowledge-based workers, citizens 
naturally are required to be equipped with new skills and the tools of technology,  and 
also might be required to acquire new civic skills in order to navigate their way in the 
connected online world.  
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The previous sections ask whether the Internet can help create an online public 
sphere for citizens to engage in public events not only locally, but also internationally. 
However, the distinction between public and private spheres can be elusive and 
pertain along the political and cultural developments in a society. As Weintraub and 
Kumar (1997) argue, there is no universal distinction between the vocabulary of 
public and private spheres, due to the concept of “public” and “private” varying 
between different cultures or societies. Regardless, the concept of these two spheres 
can help define people’s action in everyday life. The next section, then, plans to 
undertake a conceptual review with an aim of exploring the boundaries between the 
public and private spheres in the online world, and how such distinctions impact the 
notion of citizenship in a connected society. A particular objective of this section is to 
integrate conceptual and historical debates.   
 
Conceptual Review on Public & Private Spheres 
The concept of the public and private sphere has been contested in different historical 
and cultural contexts. The term “public sphere” implies a boundary between the 
“public” and the “private”. However, the concept of public and private can be 
overlapping and intertwined, depending on the different contexts and theoretical 
languages deployed in the discussion.  
Two traditional schools of thinking on citizenship, namely the Roman 
republican model and the liberal model, offer a conceptual comparison on the idea of 
citizenship. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Roman republican model 
of citizenship was revisited, with social unrest evolving during both industrial and 
post-industrial times (Walzer, 1989: 200). While the Roman republican model 
prioritises civic virtue as the end goal in its concept of citizenship, the liberal model 
assumes that civic virtue will emerge when citizens enjoy the rights granted by the 
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state. In the Roman republican model, citizens act as a major political agent. In the 
liberal model, citizens are more active in enjoying their rights in their own private 
domain, while entrusting the lawmaking process to representatives. On the other end 
of the spectrum, the liberal traditional notion of citizenship, the public sphere in 
modern democracies is generally considered as an arena for citizens to express their 
diverse opinions on public affairs. Such an arena is significant as the essence of 
democracy is based around the inclusion of different values in a society.  
The current look of the public sphere in modern society seems on the surface 
to be rather gloomy, however. As Jurgen Habermas (1991) argues, the public sphere 
allows deliberation through which different opinions are contested and argued. Added 
to this, though, is another key element of the public sphere, which is its apparent 
commitment to openness and inclusiveness for all citizens, who in theory collectively 
form public opinion and political ideas within this sphere. In a society, social spaces 
such as salons, cafes or other public meeting places, have traditionally enabled the 
public sphere to exist. In this liberal model of the public sphere, the role of mass 
media in spreading important aspects of public opinion becomes amplified, but at the 
same time it also opens itself up to the processes of privatisation and 
commercialisation. Indeed, two key points that arise from his deliberations  are that 
the emergence of digital mass media and the emergence of a consumerist culture have 
worsened the quality of the public sphere. He laments that commercial activities have 
caused public space to lose its function as a sphere for meaningful civic engagement, 
and offers as an example the fact that advertising often dominates the public sphere to 
conclude that “[T]he world fashioned by the mass media is a public sphere in 
appearance only” (Habermas, 1991: 170). Such developments have not only eroded 
the political function of the public sphere but, as Habermas argues, have also made 
59	
	
room for certain interest groups or political parties to manipulate public opinion 
during elections.  
In addition to the gloomy image of the public sphere in the information age, 
another critique is posed by Feminism, which argues that the distinction between the 
public and private domains should not be so rigid (Pateman 1989). If any personal and 
private matter triggers a significant event that can only be resolved collectively in the 
public political domain, then the public and private are still intertwined. Feminist 
theory finds that the traditional thinking of citizenship tends to define public life as 
concentrated heavily on males performing public duties, while the private sphere 
becomes one of feminized domesticity. That is to say, both public and private 
domains reinforce the social norm of female and restrict the way gender is enacted. 
  
Hybrid space for both the Public and the Private 
Reflecting on what constitutes modern society today, Charles Taylor proposes a 
reflective description of the public sphere:  
 
The public sphere is a common space in which the members of society are 
deemed to meet through a variety of media: print, electronic, and also face-to-
face encounters; to discuss matters of common interest; thus being able to 
form a common mind.  
Taylor, (2004: 83) 
 
That is, the key elements of the public sphere might revolve around the following 
questions: (a) A common space: Where can citizens meet and exchange ideas, or 
discuss opinions? (b) Media; What medium delivers information in such spheres?  
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With regards to common space, the characteristics for such a space to be defined as a 
public sphere have been becoming increasingly abstract and debatable in the digital 
age. Because of the nature of the Internet and ICT tools, discussion over public affairs 
can take place nearly anywhere and at any time via the Internet. In the process of 
receiving, debating, and elaborating views, such participation made by citizens turns 
the Internet into a “common space” for the public sphere to take place. Taylor’s idea 
of the modern ‘social imaginary’ can be used to describe how the public sphere can 
emerge from rational debate and discussion on public affairs by citizens. Such a 
formation process is similar to the role of the network society on the Internet, which 
puts “together a plurality of spaces into one large space of non-assembly” (Taylor, 
1995: 190) and yet at the same time can be extended endlessly.  
Ideally, when citizens read an article or a political op-ed online, they form 
their own opinion and share their opinion with their fellow citizens both online and 
offline. Such a back and forth process constitutes debate amongst citizens over public 
affairs. As the act of reading and discussion becomes part of the opinion forming 
process, the Internet might encourage more rational deliberation amongst citizens on 
public affairs, a key function of the public sphere. However, it is problematic to gauge 
whether online discussion or participation can fit Habermas’ idea of the public sphere 
as such online discussion and participation can take place at any time and in any place, 






On media, before the Millennium, debates about the role of ICT and new media in the 
public sphere could be summarised into two camps, with one camp arguing that the 
commercialised media erodes rational discourse in the public sphere (Rheingold, 1994) 
and reinforces the already powerful group of people who have been dominating 
Western societies since the beginning of the last century. Gottlieb (2002) holds a 
similar view in that the Internet can only help enhance democratic freedom of 
expression in countries where democracy is already a tradition. Similar to other media, 
such as newspaper or television, the Internet can become a valuable addition in 
helping to promote civic participation. However, Gottlieb argues that the Internet can 
only become a positive tool when the public are well-informed and already used to 
democratic ideas.24  
The other camp argues that new media is part of the public sphere, and one 
should dismiss the democratic potential of new communications technologies 
(Friedland, 1996). Friedland argues that one should leave aside the concerns about the 
relations between privatization and convergence in media. Instead, ICT tools, which 
are termed by Fridland as “new communications technologies”, are used in ways that 
actually extend democratic communication in social networks and movements. 
Communication itself can increase social capital in those social networks created by 
new technologies.  When any kind of technology takes on a central role in the 
mediation of citizens’ social networks, any socially grounded theory of the public 
sphere will have to take into account the new networks and communication 
technologies that bind them.   
																																																								
24 Gottlieb argues that for non-democratic countries like China, it is easy for governments to control 
how the Internet is used to limit political freedom. As long as the government can continue to control 
the Internet, there is little chance for the Internet to lead to real democratisation (p. 28).	
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Nevertheless, under the liberal model of citizenship, the capitalist market 
inevitably commercialises and commodifies media. Such developments, led by 
information conglomerates like Google and Facebook, will only continue to further 
reshape the media landscape of the Internet. Under this development, it is possible to 
see big data analysing and security technology changing people’s online behaviour, 
both public and public-oriented, into entities that could be commodified. In the online 
world, personal data and private information become a commodity which can be 
traded between conglomerates with their perspective economic interests. Papacharissi, 
who borrows Habermas’ public and private binary, argues that “private-sector 
commercial imperatives, having commodified aspects of the public life, which may 
have brought a demise of the public sphere, further appropriate personal activities of 
the private domain” (Papacharissi, 2010: 45). Citizens’ activities online are both 
publicly and privately relevant, making the private sphere increasingly intertwined 
and commercialised, and increasingly difficult to be distinguished from the public 
sphere at the same time. It is especially the case in public and private spheres on the 
Internet. For instance, where an individual goes to an online petition sign off her/his 
name and leaving a comment on the petition on a Facebook page, she/he concurrently 
functions as a citizen (signing an electronic petition and sharing views on a public 
matter), consumer (signing of a social media account), audience (reading other 
people’s comments on the Facebook page), and information provider (sharing a 
comment on the Facebook page). As such, it seems to be problematic to claim the 
online world can be another public sphere, as what used to be public and private are 
now commodified through those online interactions mediated by Internet 
conglomerates and social media firms. Papacharissi (2010) argues, these 
commercially public spaces “cannot be rendered as public spheres”, instead, they 
provide spaces where citizens can participate in some democratic practices, such as 
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following politicians online, or expressing or sharing political opinions (Papacharissi, 
2010). That is, digital media in the visual space only further makes the distinction 
between the public and private increasingly elusive.  As this section aims to discuss 
the meaning of media in the concept of the public sphere, a more in-depth analysis on 
the relations between converged media and modern citizenship will be discussed in 
later sections.  
 
Common interest 
As previous sections show, the Internet and ICTs create new public/private spaces for 
users to personalise space based on their personal preferences. However, when 
personalisation and self-expression are generally the core values celebrated and 
reinforced by the tools of ICT and new media, such trends might have impacted how 
citizens rationalise their relations with their surroundings and public affairs.  
For instance, blogs and vlogs (video blogs) are used by citizens to post content 
as a means of self-identification, as these activities allow them to post self-focused 
content and share with their online audience (Papacharissi, 2007)25. These blogs can 
be popular amongst “netizens”26, a term which is often used to describe citizens who 
use the Internet, and bear a certain degree of democratising potential (Coleman, 2005). 
As such, when citizens express their viewpoints related to public affairs on those 
private online forums (blog/vlog), the act of expression itself challenges what is 
considered public and what is private in the online space.  
																																																								
25 Papacharissi’s research finds that blogging can reinforce an individual’s self-identification. For 
instance, when an individual blogs frequently, such high-level of self-disclosure to an online 
community usually accompanies the blogger’s perception of her/his own identity or even social 
capital, and in the end promotes the blogger’s social well-being. 	
26 The term “netizen” has been commonly used to refer to a person who uses the Internet. Please 




While it is possible to see the content on blog or online media expressed by 
individuals occasionally create impact on public affairs, these forms of expression are 
still self-serving and sometimes narcissistically motivated. As the blogosphere online 
is still segmented and not collaborated, it cannot offer open access to all citizens to 
engage in deliberation, let alone constitute a public sphere (Dahlgren, 2005). That said, 
what in the past used to be discussed in the public sphere is now subject to be 
discussed in the private sphere of the Internet. When discussions on public and private 
matters overlap, as demonstrated in citizens’ online behaviour, the question of what 
matter is public and what is private becomes a continually contested game between 
those who blog and those who are their readers.  
This study follows Bell’s (1973) thinking that information and technology are 
the force behind social changes. Such a scientific impact on society is even more 
obvious in today’s Information Age when nearly everything can be connected online. 
Such interconnectivity, blurs the boundaries between the public and private spheres in 
the online world and also connects nearly every aspect – political, cultural, social, and 
economic – of civic life through online media and ICT tools. The question of how 
such an expanded connection enhances citizens’ ties with their fellow citizens and 
what the converged media tells people about their role as citizens in a contemporary 










2.6 Converged technology, multiplied networks 
The fluidity of information as a commodity places social, economic, political 
and cultural transactions on a plane that is networked and interconnected  
Papacharissi (2010:54)  
 
The growing convergence of different medium (print, TV, radio) on the Internet 
creates an architectural environment which enables citizens to engage in different 
media use. This may produce a combination of social and political impacts which 
cannot be measured easily. Through these different usages, citizens are not only 
passively receiving or reading information, they also simultaneously produce or 
provide instant feedback via various online media or ICT tools. For instance, a citizen 
can instantly tweet her/his views while watching a live-streamed political event on 
other devices (Vaccari, Chadwick and O’Loughlin, 2015). Converged media 
architecture not only displays mediated information provided by politicians or 
individuals from the private sector, but also allows a multi-layered space for “uncut” 
voices to be heard. In addition, the action of, for example, “tweeting an opinion online” 
not only conveys an individual’s political tendency, but also indicates a degree of 
social tendency as the tweet is mostly directed at the individual’ “followers” online.  
In a converged media, ICT tools are “rooted in a greater convergence of social, 
cultural, political and economic tendencies which enable and are enabled by 
technological convergence” (Papacharissi, 2010: 53). As such, in the digital age, 
citizenship is embedded in a “multiplied space”, or what Dahlgren (2005) calls, 
“multisector online spheres”, which includes different layers of social, cultural, 
political, and economic functions. On the Internet, one can find different kinds of 
social media or Websites to fulfil various purposes. For instance, Facebook or Twitter 
allow people to socialise with one another; YouTube allows people to learn and share 
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different cultures with others; a sea of political forums and blogs allow people to 
share political views with others; and Websites like eBay or Etsy allow people to 
make transactions with other users. Based on the different tendencies behind their 
online behaviour and interactions with other users or organisations, online users are 
called citizens, netizens, consumers, or content producers (Lewis, Inthom, Wahl-
Jorgensen, 2005). The converged behaviour is possible because of the interconnective 
nature given by new ICT tools. Through the greater complexity in converged media, 
citizens are enabled to have several different networks of people with differently 
structured relations, while at the same time, they are also exposed to different 
information transactional opportunities via various media outlets.  
As there is a massive amount of data that is being transmitted on the Internet 
every day, to look into questions of how the online world can be theoretically 
understood, it might be useful to borrow the “micro, meso, and macro model” 
proposed by Schement and Curtis (1997), who try to make sense of the information 
society by taking an equilibrium model. In the context of public affairs, micro refers 
to individual factors, such as one’s political leaning, ideologies, or identity; meso 
refers to the social-cultural, and community environments which might affect the 
individual, and macro refers to big actors such as government and its policies. Within 
this context, one can try to make sense of the Internet world using these three 
perspectives. On the micro level of experience, citizens’ personal ties with their 
friends, families and acquaintances are converged by the various tools of 
communication technologies. Some researchers find that converged technologies 
allow people to expand their social capability when interacting with their network of 
friends, and to some extent, pose a positive impact on the social sphere.27 In other 
words, citizens’ personal networks can be expanded horizontally in the online world 
																																																								
27 As discussed and supported by Papacharissi’s research on bloggers (Papacharissi, 2007). 	
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easily and quickly. And with various online channels of communication, the 
converged technology makes citizens’ social contact more changeable, or “fluid” as 
argued by Papacharissi (2010: 63). These technologies allow citizens to use new 
communication tools to deepen the depth of their personal network beyond the 
boundaries of time and space. The convenience of these technologies also means 
citizens can use both new and old communication tools to make their personal social 
connections more flexible.  
The meso level of the online world refers to content providers such as those 
providing content through print and electronic media, and finds that the production of 
information is key for media outlets to increase global competitiveness in the 
converged media environment. On the macro level, the focus is how information can 
be distributed frequently through different mediums available in the digital media 
environment. Elaborating this perspective, Papacharissi (2010: 65) argues that the 
remediation process allows new media to remediate the information they receive and 
redistribute. Converged media makes content or information more open and “readily 
manipulatable for audiences” who are simply used to being the receiver in the 
information distribution process. As such, this remediation process introduces citizens 
to a “bottom-up consumer-driven element” in the converged media environment. In 
such an environment, citizens are enabled to be the information receivers, consumers, 
and producers by flowing through the remediation process along with different media 
platforms.   
The “multiplied spaces” created by technology and new ICT tools not only 
expand and deepen citizens’ relations with others, but also reshape how citizens 
imagine their relations with others. In the previous century, Benedict Anderson 
explained the origin of nationalism by suggesting that a nation is an “imagined 
community”, which was made possible by print media and technology (Anderson, 
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1983). Novels and newspapers help create a sense of “belonging” for people from all 
walks of life. Such a sense of belonging, shared by people who read novels or 
newspapers, is the original form of the imagined community created by mass media. 
In addition to his contribution in elaborating how nationalism can be formed by mass 
media, when there are no clear boundaries defining the public and the private in the 
online world, it is important to continue to theorise and examine the impact of 
technology on community formation and identity. 
As the previous sections argue, converged media creates multiple spaces in 
which technology virtualises and integrates different forms of social, cultural, 
political and economic functions into cyberspace. At the same time, citizens are given 
creativity and autonomy to control the production and performance of the self. In this 
process, Identity becomes a product which not only results in forming the 
environment surrounding an individual, but also how the individual attempts to 
present her/himself. As Goffman (1959) describes, individuals present a planned 
image to others through a “setting”, which is supplied by what can be considered 
“furniture, décor, physical layout and/or other backgrounds” within the “backstage” 
and it is here where one can observe a more authentic identity (Goffman, 1959: 97). 
In multiplied spaces, citizens are given more “settings”, with which they can create 
for themselves a planned identity. Sometimes they can create more than one, possibly 
with greater control of the technology and tools at their disposal. For instance, citizens 
can present an image of an informed citizen by sharing and discussing intellectual 
matters or international relations on Twitter, an image of a more artistic side by 
sharing her/his aesthetic taste and lifestyle on Instagram, and an image of a well-
connected individual by befriending over a thousand people on Facebook. 
When the image of citizens’ perception of “self” is dependent on what kind of 
setting is available, the people-to-people relationship formed between these “selves” 
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in the converged media will inevitably become more difficult to be defined. As a 
result, citizens’ relationship with “others” are not as clear as before, as technology 
allows citizens to manipulate whether their people-to-people relationships become 
thinner or thicker. When it is unclear how to define what relationship is formed in the 
public domain or private domain, citizens’ relationships with what used to be political 
also begins to become elusive.   
Most Millennials have grown up in an environment which sees the increasing 
development of technologies and various ICT tools. For them, these social networking 
sites (SNSs) might be more important to their social networks than the communities 
they join in their offline reality. Some recent research argues that social networking 
sites, like Facebook, can help maintain young people’s face-to-face relationships and 
social trust with each other, as well as enhance their civic skills in political 
engagement (Valenzuela et al. 2009). Young people use these tools to maintain ties 
with their friends, and strengthen ties with acquaintances from outside their friendship 
circles (Ellison, Steinfield & Lampe, 2007). As an individual can join more than one 
SNSs or online group, it is possible for one to hold more than one community 
membership and learn her/his civic skills through interacting with other members 
from different online communities. Without physical boundaries between these 
groups, the idea of an imagined community becomes more elusive than that of the 
imagined community suggested by Anderson (1983). As an individual can in most 
cases easily and freely join or leave a group, it means she/he can easily and (mostly) 
freely strengthen or weaken ties with certain groups by adjusting the degree of her/his 
online participation. Digital tools provide individuals access to local and remote 
spheres of new and old contacts, family and friends, public figures and acquaintances. 
Through the interaction with those online spheres, civic skills are actualised and thus 
multiple identities are formed. 
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As SNSs can be defined as Internet-based services which offer individuals the 
capacity to create a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, the 
interaction amongst individuals makes Web-based spheres privately public, and 
simultaneously publicly private. In this context, not only the boundaries between “self” 
and “backstage” are blurred, but also the boundaries between different “communities” 
in the multiplied spheres on the Internet. The interaction between individuals actually 
allows privately made information to be delivered to a broader public audience, and 
publicly produced information to private and personal networks (Papacharissi, 2010: 
142).   
 
An imagined Community within an imagined community 
As Dahlgren (2009) argues, media allows people to form a “we-ness” identity from 
outlets such as sports or from TV shows. With the characteristic of being borderless, a 
citizen in the online world might find it difficult not to find a “place” – whether on a 
Facebook page or on an online forum – where she/he can to a degree get a shared 
identity. Within these groups/places, individuals can interact with each other in 
various ways provided by the rapid advancement of technology. Such social 
interactions to some extent offer opportunities to create a civil society on the Web.  
Since ICT development has moved forward quite rapidly over the past ten 
years, recent research suggests a more positive view of the Internet through the notion 
of citizenship. For instance, Ho and McLeod (2008) argue that the openness of the 
Internet encourages citizens to express their true opinion in online forums rather than 
in face-to-face discussions. As citizens are exposed to more information and different 
opinions in online groups and forums, the flow of opinion sharing can encourage the 
skills of good citizenship such as voting. In a study by Mossberger and colleagues 
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(2008), it is found that online participation (online forum or exchanging emails) can 
positively increase the likelihood of those participants to vote.28    
 
Digital Social Capital 
While ICTs and SNSs are becoming increasingly intertwined with citizens’ modern 
life, it might also be important to discuss the potential impact of new communication 
technologies on democratic citizenship and social capital.  
Much research already suggests that social capital helps cultivate democratic 
norms, fosters a vibrant civil society, and keep politicians and political 
institutions/parties more accountable (Putnam, 2000; Verba, Schlozman, & Bradley, 
1995). Participating in civil groups can help individuals obtain social and civic skills, 
which are generally essential for a citizen in a democracy. Through a long history of 
social capital research in social sciences, most research indicates that the core idea of 
social capital is the “resources available to people through their social interactions” 
(Valenzuela et al., 2008: 877). In a modern democracy, individuals not only garner 
social capital through face-to-face interaction, but also increase their social networks 
through spending time on SNSs (Ellison et. al, 2007), but of course, people do not go 
online just to spend time on SNSs or social networking apps.  
 As the advance of technology continues to expand the possibility of what 
citizens can do online, such expansion also enhances individuals “virtual political 
activity” (Mossberger et al., 2008) on the Internet. For example today’s citizens can 
easily follow their district representatives online via different platforms, such as 
Twitter, Instagram, or Facebook. However, whilst their political activities on the 
Internet certainly require a certain level of Internet literacy, growing Internet-based 
																																																								
28 Their research finds that the Internet fosters participation in three ways: “by offering information 
to help make informed decisions and promote discussion, by supplying outlets such as chat rooms 
that permit individuals to meet and discuss politics, and by providing interest groups, candidates, and 
parties a means for revitalizing the mobilization efforts of earlier eras through email” (p. 89).	
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activities can also help citizens generate more social capital. Kittilson and Dalton’s 
research suggests an possibility of an “online civil society”, which might also have 
the potential to be a key source of social capital formation as SNSs can be useful for 
citizens’ political engagement (Kittilson & Dalton, 2010). If citizens can get any sort 
of news or information they need from the Internet, then it becomes distinctly 
questionable as to whether it is necessary to have in-person interactions as being the 
only basis for forming social capital. 
While some point out that the Internet renders communicative spaces for 
public affairs discussion widely configured (Dahlgren, 2005; Papacharissi, 2010), 
others point out that this also means there are a wide number of different forms of 
online discussion groups which serve the public sphere online: politicians, political 
parties, activist groups, e-journalism, civil society, NGOs, or voter education sites 
(Levine, 2003). When the Internet allows an endless arena for online communication, 
the flip side is the fragmentation created by these online groups and a lack of unified 
structure amongst them, as each platform has its own function and layout. Some 
commentators have further elaborated that these multiplied spaces can help form a 
mechanism of global public spheres (Sparks, 2001). The connectivity of global media 
constitutes the basic structure of the global public sphere (ibid, 76).29 
As Dahlgren (2005: 155) noted, the Internet is essential to the public sphere 
because it creates the necessary space for citizens to conduct “horizontal 
communication”.  In his “civic culture” theory, Dahlgren uses five elements to 
describe how the Internet enacts democracy and citizenship in the online world.30  He 
argues that as the Internet is an evolving public sphere, political deliberation can take 
																																																								
29 However, the argument of a “global public sphere” might seem a little oversimplified within a 
global media landscape in which countries like China have their own dominating media platforms. The 
term also invites questions about forms of cultural homogenisation,	such	as McDonaldisation and 
Westernisation. 	
30 The five elements are values, affinity, knowledge, identities and practices. 	
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part in online spaces in many forms. Online discussion might not always follow the 
Habermasian model, however it still plays an essential role in generating and 
reinforcing civic culture because such interactions are one of the dimensions of the 
public sphere. When citizens are empowered to communicate politically to a bigger 
community, they might be further encouraged to engage with other civic participants 
in the public sphere.  
The Internet not only offers a new arena for citizens to receive information, 
but also enhances the ability of citizens to better monitor the performance of their 
elected representatives and governments. When citizens are also information and 
content creators on the Internet, the relationship between citizen , state, and politician 
changes . For instance, citizens used to be the information receivers in an environment 
when print and TV media were still controlled mostly by the state or larger 
stakeholders, such as political parties. However, the Internet as a borderless arena 
allows individuals an unprecedented “multidimensionality” which they have never 
before experienced. On the Internet, citizens are not only able to replicate offline 
social, economic, or democratic practices, they are enabled to create or construct a 
multiple decision making structure. During this process, they can even create some 
degree of impact on society if a significant number of citizens (the number can vary 
depending on the size of the community or society) in the offline world accept the 
ideas created and shared online. Here the Internet can be used to facilitate a wide 
range of public discussion amongst different group of citizens and achieve 
“multidimensionality” in the democratic practices.  
Citizens’ capacity to impact public affairs is enhanced when their online 
activities can challenge traditional media outlets. For instance, Swanson (2000) finds 
that blogs, vlogs or SNSs to some extent dilute the agenda-setting function of 
traditional news sources. Those personalised ICT tools turn citizens’ privately 
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engaged activities into a form of contribution to the common good shared by the 
public. As such, political communication is not only about publicly made information, 
transactions or exchanges, but, to some extent, relevant to information privately made 
and shared by citizens who may or may not have political tendencies when creating 
information. Citizens’ blogging or broadcasting behaviour thus broadens both private 
and public spheres, which can be intertwined together when the privately constructed 
ideas are widely shared and accepted publicly.  As such, citizens in the online world 
enjoy a certain degree of opinion-shaping privileges, while their roles as information 
receivers and modifiers become enhanced by communication technologies.  
 
A New form of Social Movement, Activism   
Finally, this research considers social movements as another form of political 
engagement. Diani (1992) once described social movements as “networks of informal 
relationships” between individuals and organisation, possibly sharing a certain 
identity, thus mobilising resources on issues concerning them. Social movements in 
the past could be defined by certain physical or cultural barriers (Tilly, 1978).  
In the information age, Diani argues that the Internet plays an instrumental 
role, providing individuals a ‘virtual extension’ when engaging with domestic or 
transnational movements (Diani, 2000: 397). As the previous discussions show, 
Internet and ICT tools stand somewhere between the private and public spheres, they 
provide citizens a larger scaled form of communication and interaction. Therefore, in 
this way, technology liberates activists from the constraints of face-to-face interaction, 
blurs the definition of private and public spheres, as well as affecting how social 




In the civic realm of the internet, large international organisations use SNSs as 
a new arena to organise events or mobilise their supporters to attend protests. For 
instance, Amnesty International and Greenpeace have used Facebook to coordinate 
events within  major cities across the world. From an individual's’ point of view, civil 
society is also taking advantage of the Internet’s openness and connectivity 
characteristics to explore ways of fostering civic engagements with citizens. The 
following section aims to discuss whether the Internet and technology have reshaped 
the nature or formation of social movements in the information age, and further 
identify the broader issues arising from the evolution of activism.  
 
When Activism Becomes Fluid  
Some existing research discusses how social media reshapes a social movement’s 
structure or formation, information flows, outreaching methods, and transnational 
coordination (Earl & Kimport, 2011). They stress that people’s usage of technology 
can change social progress by creating “affordances” which activists can creatively 
leverage in staging protests or a social movements (Kimport, 2011: p.4). 
 SNSs and ICTs are described as an instrumental tool used by activists to 
enhance their momentum and influence. Technology and social media enable activists 
to be more active and effective in the mobilisation process. With simply one click, 
activists can easily share information on movements or social causes concerning them 
via social media tools, which connects them quickly with people both near and far. 
Similarly, some analysts have further explored how SNSs and ICT tools change the 
organisational dynamics in social movements (Segerberg & Bennett, 2011). 
Movements such as flash mobs show that mobilisation in the Information Age can be 
organised spontaneously.  
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Some critics argue that social media and technology may only serve to cause 
activism to become “tribalised” or fragmented (Sunstein, 2001). Cass Sunstein argues 
that as citizens are mostly exposed to online information they would have chosen in 
an offline setting, they might only end up connecting with like-minded citizens. Put 
another way, when social movements become loosely organised gatherings or events 
for like-minded citizens in relatively closed groups, social media and technologies 
will only generate more “enclaved deliberation”.     
It might well be true that the so-called “echo chamber”31 exists in SNSs. 
However, social media platforms, unlike offline communities that all have some form 
of physical boundary, allow participants and members to come together for shared 
causes, without simultaneously creating a controlling unified body out of them. As 
Papacharissi describes, such “contemporary expression of online activism reflects the 
continued distancing from a shared understanding of the common good and an 
emphasis on issue-based politics” (2010: p.158). As previous sections discussed, 
individuals in the online world might create different “selves” for different online 
imagined communities, their various levels of intensity or involvement in the activist 
platforms, such as Change.com, reflects different customised preferences held by 
citizens. Compared with traditional media (print, TV, radio), the Internet offers 
citizens greater flexibility to interact and communicate with others (one to one, one to 
many, many to one, and many to many), using a variety of media types (video, audio 
and text).  As such, activism in the digital age to some extent is more reflexive as 
technologies and social media provide individuals greater flexibility to participate and 
organise social movements in a “fluid” manner. 
With the growth of the Internet, the new generation is far more comfortable in 





conceivable that this generation’s idea of activism could be quite different from that 
of their older counterparts. Such ideas have already been discussed by Howard 
Rheingold. He coins the term “smart mobs” to describe the ways in which younger 
generations use different ICT tools and technologies to mobilise activist campaigns 
(2002). Another similar example is the Occupy Wall Street movement, with the 
hashtag #wearethe99percent being the key word connecting people around the world 
and innovatively mobilising supporters on Twitter. Sandor Vegh (2003) describes 
these Internet-based strategies and tactics as “Cyberactivism”, which means there is a 
range of technology and activities which can only take place online. For instance, 
hacktivism is used by activists to construct a political message through direct 
subversion and defacement technologies. According to Vegh, activists who use 
hacktivism tactics often aim to block access to a website by directing or 
overwhelming the traffic towards the target server, using brute force methods such as 
DDOS attacks. As these Internet-based tactics mostly require a certain number of 
users to take part, raising awareness becomes the foundation of these Internet-based 
campaigns. Vegh uses three categories to describe the formation of cyberactivism: (1) 
advocating and raising public awareness, (2) organisation and mobilisation and (3) 
action. Online activists employ Internet-based platforms and seek public attention and 
visibility, and call for action from like-minded individuals to deliver a political 
message collectively. All these Internet-based tactics can help connect protesters in 
ways that are more spontaneous and flexible, as one protester can attract more 
followers based on her/his personal network in the online world New technologies 







The Internet reshapes contemporary reality. In the online world, the words public and 
private are no longer able to capture the nature of citizens’ online behaviour or 
information distribution as many social media platforms allow their users a special 
space, which is both privately public and publicly private (Papacharissi, 2010: 142). It 
is problematic to use the word private to describe the content posted or shared by 
citizens on their personalised blogs or Facebook pages as part of the motivation 
behind their privately organised opinion is for deliberate public display.  
The preceding sections review and discuss why and how the boundaries 
between the public and private spheres have become increasingly elusive. Technology 
and SNSs create multiplied spaces in which citizens may acquire their civic skills 
through online interaction and engagement which, to some extent, reflect a variety of 
social, cultural, political and economic tendencies. Their online activities  are 
therefore interconnected in this multi-layered cyberspace, which can be described as 
reflexive and fluid. Citizens’ public and private space in the converged environment 
therefore can be customised and flexible.  
In contemporary reality, citizens’ online activities can possess both private and 
public tendencies, communication can be personal or mediated, and their target 
audience can be described as having single- or multiple-issue focuses. If it is 
generally agreed that the public sphere is historically and conceptually situated, then 
today’s public spheres are intertwined with private spheres by the converged mediated 
structure.  
This study tends to argue that the concept of citizenship is becoming 
increasingly personal in the online world, as a lot of civic engagement can take place 
within the private sphere online. That said, citizens in the converged media 
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environment, which can be customised based on individual preferences, respond to 
public issues in overlapping spheres of both public and private activities. With their 
SNSs or communicative tools, citizens’ personal domains are connected to the 
political, and as a result, so is their “self” to society.  
Therefore, citizens are empowered by technology in this digital reality as they 
are enabled to express, mobilise, and communicate in ways which were unthinkable 
in the past. In the online world, the distribution of power is no longer a one-way road, 
but a networked environment containing different communicative paths created by 
various modern technologies. In the converged environment, citizens are information 
receivers, but also journalists, content creators, distributors, and spontaneous 
campaigners. When the essence of political communication is also reshaped by the 
advance of technology, the contemporary notion of citizenship might mediate how 
these multiplied spaces can become transitional environments for individuals to 











Chapter 3- Citizenship in Taiwan, a case study 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the termination of martial law in 1987 offered an opportunity for social 
movements and protests to grow and thrive in Taiwan’s political scene, there has been 
consistent international and scholarly interest in the social movements that have taken 
place on this now democratic island. And yet, social movements in Taiwan 
experienced a period of quiescence after 2000 when the DPP government came to 
power, as the DPP is usually considered more sympathetic towards activists and 
NGOs. Bourdieu said t takes the economic, social and other possible relevant 
conditions for social movements to become possible (Bourdieu, 2000). Taiwan is no 
exception. Since 1987, he social movements seen in Taiwan so far has seen two major 
student-led developments: the six-day Wild Lily Movement of 1990 and the twenty- 
four-day Sunflower Movement of 2014, with the former eventually leading to direct 
presidential elections (Ho, 2010; Wright, 1999) and the latter stopping a trade pact 
between Taipei and Beijing (Rowan, 2015). Both of them took place when the KMT 
government was in power. 
It is not the intention of this chapter to discuss whether the KMT is more 
likely to trigger youth-led social movements. Instead, this chapter will focus on the 
development of Taiwan’s democratisation, civil society, and the current political 
reality, with an aim of exploring how the Internet might have reshaped 
Taiwanese Millennials’ political engagement and their perception of their role as 
citizens in a modern society. Following discussion in the previous chapter on the 
traditional theory of citizenship and how technology has changed citizens’ political 






the concept of citizenship in East Asia, by reviewing Taiwan’s social movements, a 
salient character in the story of Taiwan’s democratisation.  
 
Third Wave Democracies 
According to Samuel P. Huntington (1993), there have been three successful ‘waves’ 
of democratisation at a global level, with domestic and international contextual 
factors being the driving force behind the development of this process. It has also 
been found that in East Asia, economic development and Confucian Asian values are 
the most distinctive characteristics (Shelly, 2005).  
In East Asia, instead of unconditionally adopting the Western political system 
of competitive elections and institutions of civil society or the accountability of 
governance, many countries emphasize “Asian values” as the core proponent of their 
governance. In an “Asian style democracy”, traditional Confucianism concerns for 
securing the basic means of material life have meant that many East Asian leaders to  
become emotionally and intellectually committed to relatively egalitarian forms of 
economic development (Bell, 2006a). Confucian values, generally emphasise group 
orientation, and attach greater importance towards the community over individualism, 
hierarchy over freedom and equality, and consensus and harmony over diversity and 
conflict (Huntington, 1993; Ketcham, R. 2004; Bell, 2006a). These values promote 
the idea that citizens should prioritise their political leaders over themselves. For 
instance, ordinary individuals are not presumed to possess the capacity for substantial 
political participation (Bell, 2006a: 12), it’s common to see countries attach great 










Confucian Asian values also impact the leadership style of many countries in 
East Asia. For instance, Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime Minister of Singapore, 
applauded and advocated the term “Asian values”, and argued that these values make 
Asian cultures fundamentally incompatible with Western liberal democratic values. 
Lee was sceptical about democracy as a political system, saying “the exuberance of 
democracy leads to undisciplined and disorderly conditions which are inimical to 
development” (Allison et al, 2013). Similarly, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
justifies its non-democratic rule and the party’s legitimacy by stressing Confucianism 
as a symbol of Chinese society. The Chinese revival on emphasising Confucianism is 
ironic as it took place decades after the red guards of	the	Mao Zedong-led Cultural 
Revolution smashed the graves and statues of Confucius in 1966. Beginning in early 
2007, the Chinese government officially began sponsoring the ‘worshiping of 
Confucius’ birthday with a nation-wide broadcasting programme dedicated to the 
event. Culturally, Beijing established Confucius Institutes around the world to 
promote Chinese language and culture. Bell (2006b) describes that	Beijing	has	made	
such	efforts in response to the decline of communism, with the aim of trying to 
revive Confucianism as a way to fill the “ideology vacuum” that has	come	to	appear 
in the country. In the name of protecting “social stability” and a “harmonious 
society”, Confucianism allows the CCP to continue its goal of cementing legitimacy 














When the third wave of democratisation hit the shores of East Asian countries 
during the last century, it introduced several new democracies to the world. For 
example, in 1986 the people of the Philippines	removed the dictator Ferdinand 
Marcos during a social movement,	and	in 1987, Roh Tae Woo was elected as 
President.	His	first	act	was	the	pronouncing	of the ‘Declaration of Democratization 
and Reforms’, which included constitutional revision for direct presidential elections, 
the restoration of political dissidents’ civil rights, as well as freedom of the press and 
political amnesty. During the same year, Taiwan’s then President Chiang Ching-kuo 
proclaimed the lifting of martial law, ending the thirty-eight-year-long authoritarian	
rule.33  	
There	are	a	number	of	other	examples.	In 1990, Mongolia became a 
democracy through peaceful democratic revolution. The following year, the October 
1991 Paris Accord offered a political settlement aimed at “ending the tragic conflict 
and continuing bloodshed in Cambodia” (OHCHR, 2011). 1992 saw an end of 
military rule in Thailand and the beginning of democratisation,	and	in	1999 
Indonesia held its first free and fair democratic election since 1955, signalling the end 




















Taiwan’s democracy outperforms its third-wave democratic peers quite 
considerably. In its “World Press Freedom Index 2018”, the French-based non-
governmental organisation Reporters without Borders ranks Taiwan 42nd	overall	and	
as the highest ranking amongst all Asian countries (Reporters without Freedom, 
2018).34 In a	report titled “Freedom in the World 2018” by Freedom House, Taiwan is 
given top scores for its Freedom Rating, Political Rights, and Civil Liberties. The 
report also lists Taiwan’s overall freedom status and press freedom statues as “Free”. 
Overall, Freedom House gave Taiwan a ranking of 93 out of 100, the second highest 
in Asia after Japan and an improvement of two positions compared	to	the a year 
before. So,	as	mentioned	in	the	introduction,	despite Freedom House (2018) 
reporting that democracy seems	to	be facing its most serious crisis in decades, the 
case of Taiwan helps	provide	potential proof that democracy can continues to move 
forward, even in a society which is still generally rooted in what is considered as 










Picture 3-1: Freedom House’s profile report for Taiwan	
 
Before China revived its celebration of the birthday of Confucius, Taiwan had 
already marked the day as “Teachers’ Day”, which is recognised on the 28th 
September by the government of Taiwan. As Confucius’ teaching still places great 
importance on family and social hierarchy, Taiwan’s celebration of Confucius’ 
birthday indicates that “Asian values” might still play a big part in its society. For 
instance, the Confucius Temple in Taiwan’s capital city, Taipei, was first established 
in 1884 during the Qing Dynasty. Under the government of the Republic of China 
(ROC), the Taipei City government has been holding annual worship ceremonies on 
Teacher’s Day since 1970.35 This	may	suggest	that	although the effect of economic 
and political factors often seem to be quite eminent in Taiwan’s democratisation 











Taiwanese	society	and	the	successful democratisation in Taiwan, it might be useful	
to	discuss	why it has	been possible for Western liberal democratic values to take 
root on East Asian soil. So by taking Taiwan as a case study, this research hopes to 
examine whether the democratising potential of the Internet can be realised in an 
Asian Confucian context. However,	before examining the case of Taiwan’s 
democratic citizenship, the following sections will review Taiwan’s democratisation 
process	and	the current state of both	its political reality and its civil society. Later 
sections will then focus on youth-led social movements, which have drawn much 
attention over the past ten years as a starting point to see if this Internet-savvy 
generation exhibits a different set of civic skills and understanding of citizenship.  
 
3.2 Taiwan’s democratisation development	
Democracy is not a given, and nor is is not always created easily or peacefully. This 
case is especially true for those countries in the third wave of democratisation, which 
have benefited from global economic growth and the ideas of human rights and 
democracy that	have	already	had	much	time	to	spread	on	an international level. 
Consolidation of democracy in these countries usually requires several rounds of 
power transition and effort from both the government and general public to achieve a 











democratisation	in	the	region.	In May 2018, The American Institute in Taiwan’s 
Chairman Jim Moriarty gave a speech at Stanford University. He applauded and 
called the democratisation of Taiwan one of the great stories of the 20th and 21st 
centuries. Taiwan’s story, in Moriarty’s words, sets an example to the region and to 
the entire world (Moriarty, 2018).37 And this section is going to review the democratic 
story of Taiwan, and discuss why it matters to the region. 	
	
Taiwan under martial law	
After Japan’s surrender in 1945, the Kuomintang (KMT) sent Chen Yi (陳儀) to 
Taiwan as the first Administrator on behalf of the Republic of China (ROC). Even 
though the KMT administration was welcomed by the people of Taiwan in the initial 
months, its corruption and lack of governance capabilities resulted in mounting 
disappointment amongst Taiwanese citizens. On 28 February 1947, the KMT 
consolidated its control over Taiwanese society by suppressing a native revolt, and 
engaging in island-wide mass killings. The biggest number of mass killings occurred 
in March 1947, under the guise of several martial law decrees announced by Chen Yi 
(Hwang, 2016: 169-170). A report conducted by the Executive Yuan in the early 90s 
estimated the death number toll to	be between 18,000 and 28,000, with the actual 












In terms of societal issues, economic policies introduced by Chen largely 
favoured people originating from mainland China, (they are classed as Mainlanders in 
the rest of this paper) worsening the social divide between mainlanders and 
Taiwanese. Meanwhile, party factional fights, corruption, and the low morale of the 
KMT also weakened its legitimate authority in other parts of mainland China39.This	
was	not	made	any	better	by the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. Bush and Rigger 
comment that his ultimate goal was to return to the mainland, replace the Chinese 
Communist Party state, and re-establish the KMT’s authority over entire China. To 
him, economic means were	merely a tool to mobilise support amongst Taiwanese 
people so they could help achieve his ambition of returning to the home	victoriously. 
Democracy, to the KMT, was only a “lip service” and not a high priority. (Bush & 
Rigger, 2019).40	
Feeling excluded and discriminated by the KMT administration, Taiwanese 
people began to grow strong resentment towards these newcomers from the 
mainland, or as some people called	them, the “49ers”	(ibid.). This feeling grew as 
Chiang’s	party	consolidated	its	position.	Economically, the KMT-introduced a land 
reform policy which severely diminished the status of Taiwanese landlords,	stymying 
a group that could potentially have formed a sizable opposition against the KMT, but 
also causing much anger in the process. At	the	same	time, most important 














discontent (Fell, 2018: 18-19). As	well	as	these	economic	and	political	factors	the 
KMT treated Taiwanese culture as being	both inferior and	vulgar, and set	out	to	use 
education systems for	the	purpose	of establishing a “China-centric” identity. For 
instance, school administrators were replaced by mainlanders, whilst	their Taiwanese 
counterparts were required	to act only	as secondary assistants. Furthermore, whilst	
prior to the establishment of the KMT administration most Taiwanese were able to 
converse in Japanese and other languages41 under the KMT administration using any 
languages other than Mandarin became punishable by law	and	the	potential	use	of	
public	shaming. For instance, students who were “caught” Taiwanese would be 
asked by school teachers to wear signs that displayed “I spoke Taiwanese” in public. 
These measures created a sentiment amongst students that speaking Taiwanese was 
“shameful, ungraceful, and of a lower class” (Chen, 2008: 204).   	
All	this	resentment	led	to	the	KMT	imposing	a	state	of	martial	law	across	
Taiwan,	and	policies	to	wipe	off	the	Taiwanese	culture.	Between the 1940s and 
1960s, the KMT launched a series of policies to culturally assimilate Taiwanese 
people, with measures including prohibiting the performance of Taiwanese opera and 
using TV programmes to promote the Mandarin language. Meanwhile	in	order	to	
gain	support	from	the	Taiwanese	people	towards	KMT’s	goal	of	return	to	
mainland	China,	the	KMT	introduced	some	policies	aiming	at	bettering	the	
economy.	 In the 1960s, Taiwan’s economy began to take off, while society 
continued to experience a high degree of political repression, known as the White 
Terror (Fell, 2018: 35). 	
It was not until the end of 1970 that the political repression began to wane as 






the US agreed to transfer the Senkaku Islands (known as Diaoyutai/釣魚台 in 
Mandarin) to Japan. Then in October 1971 the admission of the People’s Republic of 
China to the United Nations further weakened the KMT’s legitimacy	and	following	
that, the historic visit made by then US President Nixon to Beijing in 1972 was the 
strongest diplomatic setback the KMT had faced. In addition to all this growing 
external pressure, the political system established by the KMT in Taiwan was also 
now appearing to be obsolete, with the average age of parliamentary representatives 
standing	at 63 in the National Assembly, 67 in the Legislative Yuan, and 73 in the 
Control Yuan (Ngo, 1989). Furthermore, most of the representatives were originally 
from mainland China and	had	been elected there before the KMT government fled to 
Taiwan,	bringing the validity of these representatives	under	even	more	scrutiny. 
Economically, the private sector which as mentioned above, had expanded rapidly 
throughout the 1960s, had come to generate about 80 per cent of the total added value 
of industrial production. This	further	weakened	KMT-influence	as	a significantly	
larger private sector meant that the demands and opinions of big business now had to 
be taken into account by the KMT government (Ngo, 1989). During this period, and 
acting as	a	potential sign	of	the	weakening	of	the	regime, a group of elites 
composed of intellectuals and university students braved themselves and criticised the 
authoritarian KMT government for its poor handling of the Senkaku/Diaoyutai 
Islands situation. Though	the movement, called Baodiao Yundong (保釣運動
/Protecting the Diaoyutai Islands Movement), only focused on the territorial dispute 
and rarely on the legitimacy of the KMT government itself, open	criticism	of	the	
government	had	been	quite	difficult	until	this	point 	
Before the 1970s, the term Dangwai (meaning outside the party - meaning	
the	KMT) was used to describe non-KMT candidates in local elections. Slowly, 
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Taiwan saw more and more of	these Dangwais as the 1970s saw more non-KMT 
members organise electoral campaigns and demonstrations to articulate the 
aspirations of a large segment within the middle class and bourgeoisie that had been 
asking for more political participation (Gold, 1996). Later on in the late	1970s, a 
“Dangwai movement” emerged when a group of non-KMT candidates ran for elected 
seats in 1979 local elections with all of them presenting the same policy platform: 
democratisation, human rights, and ethnic justice (Fell, 2018: 27). Altogether they 
were not, they appeared to be candidates representing a unified political party as they 
all	were	running	on	the	same political platform	and	promises, and that	hey did not 
belong to the KMT. The dangwai candidates ended up winning four local executive 
seats and twenty-one provincial Assembly seats, outperforming any other non-KMT 
political group that	had	run	prior	to	that. Such a performance was significant as at 
the time the dangwai were denied any access to mass media, which was under the 
control of the ruling KMT, or under the influence of private enterprises associated 
with the KMT (Rawnsley and Rawnsley, 2001). 	
During this period of time, an important driver of change was due to the 
KMT’s new leadership, which came about after Chiang Kai-shek’s death in 1975. His 
son, Chiang Ching-kuo, who took control of the country from his father, appeared to 
be more pragmatic and flexible. One of the most significant changes he brought into 
the political scene was to appoint Lee	Teng-hui, a first native Taiwanese person who 
has even been appointed such an important position, to be his vice president. . In 1988 
President Chiang Ching-kuo passed away, and his baton was based to Lee.	
The opposition movement gained further momentum in 1980, particularly in 
the wake of the Philippines’ People’s Power Revolution,	and	this	movement	grew	
until	in 1986 the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was established,	becoming the 
first opposition party (still actively considered illegal at the time) in Taiwan to 
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challenge the KMT under the martial law period. On 12th June 1987, the DPP staged a 
protest against the National Security Law in front of the Legislative Yuan. In the face 
of growing public support for the DPP and increasing pressure from the U.S. 
Congress to build a democratic institution in Taiwan, President Chiang Ching-kuo 
lifted martial law on 14 July 1987, and thus Taiwan’s journey towards possible  
democratisation was finally free to begin (Shih, 2008: 102). 	
	
Taiwan’s democracy after 1987	
Yet the lifting of martial law did not change the political climate in Taiwan overnight. 	
Some argue that the political elite in Taiwan did, to a	certain	degree, contribute to 
the democratisation that	occurred	in this era, with the then KMT leaders tolerating 
the calls from then opposition party, namely the DPP, for greater participation in the 
decision making processes by the citizens (Tien and Shiao, 1992).	
In 1988, KMT President Lee Teng-hui further pushed forward liberalisation 
and democratisation reforms despite opposition from the military and conservative 
elites within the party (Tien and Shiao, 1992: 62). Bush and Rigger (2019) argue that 
Lee, despite the fact that he was chosen by Chiang Ching-kuo to be his successor, was 
not liked by the “49er group”. In order to consolidate his support and momentum, in 
the face of the	hostility	coming	from within the 49er-dominated KMT, Lee turned 
towards the island’s Taiwanese majority and accelerated the implementation of 
democratic institutional reforms.	
During this process, economic development played a significant role. When 
the democratisation process began around the 1980s, the KMT was faced with 
mounting pressure from the emerging middle class and other social forces, who 
demanded better representation and participation. However, the rapid economic 
growth and development provided the KMT with the confidence that they could still 
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perform well in democratic elections. For instance, between the 1960s and 1980s, the 
GDP growth in Taiwan was about 8.8 per cent on average, while the GDP per capita 
during the same period increased to USD 3,290 from USD 164, a nearly twenty-fold 
growth in just twenty years. The economic growth provided the KMT material-based 
legitimacy and confidence when facing continued challenges from the opposition 
DPP and the civil society. Certainly, then, the efforts of the elite from the opposition 
should not be ignored,	though	it	should	also	be	noted	that the increased dangwai 
movement during the 1980s, instigated by the DPP, also pressured the KMT in lifting 
its control over political activities. 	
Gradually, as open criticism of the government became possible, student 
activists, who had until	this	point	mainly	concerned	themselves	with	issues	
relating	to	education, turned their focus to politics  when they began	taking	part	in	
movements	connected	to	environmental protection and farmers’ rights. Some of 
them held forums and memorials to commemorate the long-suppressed 228 Incident, 
which took place on 28 February 1947. Momentum was accumulated thanks	to more 
and more student protest activities, including  a series of silent protests. Tieng and 
Shiao (1992) call these activities a “warm-up” for major events to come. 	
The prelude to the major event, the Wild Lily Movement, took place in 
December 1988, when Cheng Nylon (鄭南榕), a pro-independent activist coming 
from a half-Taiwanese-half-mainlander family, published a “draft Constitution of the 
Republic of Taiwan” on Ziyou Shidai Zhoukan (The Era of Freedom Magazine/自由
時代週刊), of which he was editor-in-chief. Despite the fact that Taiwanese society 
was no longer under martial law, there existed no real freedom of speech. The 
government still closely monitored and censored the publication of any print media. 
For instance, publication of Ziyou Shidai Zhoukan (自由時代週刊) alone was 
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suspended thirty-four times between 1987 and 1989.42 Similarly, Cheng’s activities 
were closely monitored by the government and he was summoned to	court on	
multiple	occasions. On 7 April 1989, Cheng again refused to appear in court and 
when police attempted to arrest him at the magazine headquarters, he chose to self-
immolate in a show against the government’s suppression of freedom of speech43. 
This meant that 1989 was a year when Taiwan’s democratisation process did not 
make any substantial progress (Rigger, 1999). It was during this time,	however,, as 
Huntington (1993) points out, that the intervention of the United States contributed to 
democratisation in Taiwan. As authoritarian rulers in the region were eager to have 
their countries become recognised as developed countries within the international 
community, such international variables directly impacted the democratic transition in 
East Asian nations such as Taiwan, as well as the Philippines and South Korea. 	
In January, 1989, the government passed a Law on the Organisation of Civil 
Groups, allowing citizens to form opposition parties for the first time in Taiwan. 
Rigger notes that in the space of one year, over fifty parties had registered (Rigger,	
1999: 32). Parties, some of which were illegally founded before this ruling, were now 
free	to	actively engage in local elections	and Taiwan’s democracy finally saw some 
budding signs of diversity. 	
For instance, the left-leaning Workers’ Party and Laodongdang (勞動黨
/Labour Party) were founded in 1987 and 1988, respectively,	though in the 1989 










cent), and none of the candidates were elected.44 Meanwhile, public support for the 
DPP continued to increase. The DPP’s performance in the national elections of 1989 
and 1992 helped locally-born opposition parties build political foundations for their 
future expansion inside the political landscape of Taiwan. In addition, it might be 
worth noting that the elections in December 1992 was the first time that Taiwan held 
a full election for its highest law-making body, the Legislative Yuan.	
In the elections of 1980, 1981, 1983, and 1985, dangwai candidates from the 
DPP received over 30 per cent of the total votes (Wright, 1999: 991),	and	then in 
1997 the DPP outperformed the KMT for	the	first	time in Taiwan’s local county and 
city head elections (Rigger, 1999). Giving the opposition a majority in local executive 
positions was a considerable milestone, particularly for a young democracy which 
had left a	period	of martial law only era ten years previously.  	
	
	
Taiwan’s first direct presidential election	
On 23 March 1996, Taiwan held its first direct presidential elections, allowing its last 
non-elected political position – the presidency – to be directly chosen by the 
populace. Since	then, Taiwan has experienced three rounds of power turnover, with 
the first one being in 2000, when the DPP won the presidential election for the first 
time since its establishment. The second took place in 2008, with the KMT winning 
the presidency, with the most recent taking place in 2016, when the DPP won the 
































































































































































3.3 Taiwan after 2016	
Meanwhile, Taiwan’s democracy has been taking steady steps in moving forward, 
with the 2016 general elections generally considered by some as a second milestone. 
In the general elections of 2016, Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP won the presidency, and her 
party won the majority of the Legislative Yuan seats for the first time in Taiwan’s 
history. The result is significant as for decades	the KMT’s control over the 
Legislative Yuan machine had hindered the Legislature from accurately reflecting 
Taiwan’s changing political landscape and dealing with controversial policies and 
events that had occurred under one-party rule. An	important	example	being the 228 
incident, a government crackdown (some called it a massacre) that began on 28 
February	1947,	and in which an estimated 2,000 people lost their lives. The KMT’s 
monopoly of the Legislative Yuan since	the	introduction	of	democracy	to	Taiwan	
had resulted in a lack of direct apology and concrete action taken by the Legislature 
to compensate the victims and their families, let alone any open acknowledgement of 
the wrongdoings by the previous KMT administration of	 the martial law era 
(Hwang, 2018: 181).	
Tsai’s administration did not wait too long before they brought about an 
unprecedented change to Taiwan’s politics. In August 2016, the administration 
appointed Audrey Tang, a self-taught programmer who left school at the age of 
twelve to learn coding, as a Minister without portfolio to head Taiwan’s first e-
Rulemaking project. The appointment is unprecedented in Taiwan as Tang, at thirty-
seven years-old (as of 2019), is Taiwan’s first ever transgender Cabinet member (the	
Taiwanese	Cabinet	is	known	as the Executive Yuan), as well as the youngest in 
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Taiwan’s history. Politicians across party lines generally applauded this appointment, 
with former National Development Council Minister Kuan Chong-ming commenting 
that Taiwan needed innovative young people to take the initiative to face the rapidly 
changing digital environment. The appointment is significant for Asia as Taiwan, a 
young third-wave democracy took a bold step forward and embraced Tang, a “civic 
hacker” and an unconventional public figure, as one of its ministers. 
Compared with presidential elections, which generally receive more 
international attention, the 2016 legislative elections should also,	then, be considered 
a second milestone in	the	development	of Taiwan’s democratisation. The 2016 
legislative election saw the DPP winning sixty-eight seats in the 113-seat Legislature, 
terminating the KMT-monopoly and relegating them to becoming the main opposition 
with only thirty-five seats. In addition, the new dynamics of the Legislature were not 
only reflected in the new DPP majority, but also in the number of first-time 
legislators, who are now a relatively younger, more diverse, and more gender-
balanced combination of representatives when compared to those from before (Wang, 
2016).	
Generational Shift	
The Legislative Yuan saw forty-three first-time legislators, many of whom have never 
held public office before. This marked quite a sea change as the nineteen KMT 
incumbents who lost their elections collectively held sixty-eight terms of office	
between	them	and	were replaced by non-KMT challengers who	had	only	six.57 It is 
clear from Table 3-1 that two non-KMT challengers managed to successfully defeat 








had	enjoyed	any prior experience in the Legislature. This	demonstrates	that 
Taiwanese voters were looking for fresh faces and willing to replace veteran 
politicians, even if that	meant	selecting a first time legislator. Public sphere 
participation in these elections indicates voters are moving away from traditional 
Asian thinking, which tends to attach great value to seniority and experience.	
Name Term Successor  Term 
Ting Shou-chung(丁守中) 7 DPP Wu Su-yao (吳思瑤) * 0 
Lin Yu-fang(林郁方) 5 NPP Freddy Lim (林昶佐) 0 
Wu Yu-sheng 
(吳育昇) 
3 DPP Lu Sun-lin (呂孫綾) 0 
Huang Chih-hsiung 
(黃志雄) 
2 DPP Su Chiao-hui (蘇巧慧) 0 
Chiang Hui-chen (江惠貞) 1 DPP Lo Chih-cheng (羅致政) 0 
Chang Ching-chung (張慶忠) 3 DPP Chiang Yung-chang (江永昌) * 0 
Lu Chia-chen (盧嘉辰) 2 DPP Wu Chi-ming (吳琪銘)* 0 
Lee Ching-hua (李慶華) 7 NPP Huang Kuo-chang (黃國昌) 0 
Chen Ken-te (陳根德) 5 DPP Cheng Yun-peng (鄭運鵬) 1 
Liao Cheng-ching (廖正井) 2 DPP Chen Lai Su-mei (陳賴素美) * 0 
Yang Li-huan (楊麗環) 4 DPP Cheng Pao-ching (鄭寶清) 2 
Sun Ta-chien (孫大千) 4 Independent Chao Cheng-yu (趙正宇) 
* 
0 
Yang Chiung-ying (楊瓊瓔) 5 NPP Hung Tzu-yung (洪慈庸) 0 
Tsai Chin-lung (蔡錦隆) 3 DPP Chang Liao Wan-chien (張廖萬
堅) * 
0 
Lin Kuo-cheng (林國正) 1 DPP Lai Rui-lung (賴瑞隆) 0 
Lin Tsang-min (林滄敏) 3 DPP Huang Hsiu-fang (黃秀芳)* 0 
Cheng Ju-fen (鄭汝芬) 2 DPP Hung Tsung-yi (洪宗熠)* 0 
Wang Chin-shih (王進士) 2 DPP Chung Chia-ping (鍾佳濱) 0 
Wang Ting-sheng (王廷升)  2 DPP Hsiao Bi-khim (蕭美琴) 3 
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 68  6 
Table 3-1: from “A ‘Green’ Legislature: Taiwan’s New Parliament More 
Different Than Ever”, (Wang, 2016)	
Another aspect of the generational shift is reflected in the election of a 
younger generation of representatives. The average age of the representatives is fifty, 
younger than that of the previous Legislature, which was fifty-two. The youngest 
legislator is twenty-eight-year-old Lu Sun-lin (呂孫綾) of the DPP, who beat KMT 
legislator Wu Yu-sheng (吳育昇), a fifty-seven-year-old veteran politician who was	
seeking his fourth consecutive term. Amongst the legislators aged under-forty, twelve 
were born in the late 1970s when Taiwan was still under martial law. Many of them 
were born around 1977, a year when the KMT lost, for the first time, four city/county 
heads in local elections, also a year described by Rigger (1999) as a “turning point” 
for Taiwan as the election result showed that the KMT did not have absolute control 
of its electoral machine. The victories of these young Legislators, born in the late-
martial law, era shows the possibility that a new generation has risen and is	
potentially	beginning to break the KMT-dominated political landscape. 	
Gender-balanced	
The Legislature saw the percentage of female representative increase to 38 per cent 
(forty-three seats), from 34 per cent (thirty-eight seats) in the previous one. It is the 
highest percentage in the history of Taiwan’s Legislature. The steady increase in 
Taiwan’s female representatives in the Legislature (see Table 3-2) shows that women 
are more active in Taiwan’s political institutions. 
Legislative Election 
in Taiwan 
1995 1998 2001 2004 2008 2012 2016 
Seats of Female 
Legislators 
23 43 50 47 34 38 43 
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Total Seats in the 
Legislative Yuan 
164 225 225 225 113 113 113 
% of Female 
Legislators 
14% 19% 22% 21% 30% 34% 38% 
Tale 3-2: Female representation in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan	
It is worth mentioning that Taiwan’s effort to promote gender equality has 
been recognised by the international community. In World Bank’s 2019 report on 
“Women, Business and the Law”, Taiwan scored full marks in five of the eight 
indexes, and was recognised as the leader in Asia in terms of giving women and men 
equal rights (World Bank, 2019)58. 	
	
Diversity	
Indigenous representation is another new achievement in the history of Taiwan’s 
legislative elections. In addition to the six reserved seats for indigenous legislators, 
two more were elected on the party lists of the DPP and the New Power Party (NPP). 
Even though indigenous people only account for about 2 per cent of Taiwan’s total 
population, the eight seats account for 7 per cent of the Legislature. Such achievement 
shows that Taiwanese people are now more willing to see previously disadvantaged 
groups have a voice in the Legislature. 	
Another aspect of diversity is the introduction of the NPP, a party which was 
established in the aftermath of the 2014 Sunflower movement. The NPP is not, 
however, the first young party to enter the Legislature. For instance, two years after 
its establishment in 1993, the New Party (NP) won twenty-one legislative seats and 
became the second largest opposition party in parliament. In 2001, the second largest 
opposition party was the People First Party (PFP), which won forty-six legislative 





it is the first time in Taiwan that a young party became the second largest opposition 
party in the parliament with all of its legislators being first-time politicians. None of 
them has run or been elected to any official office before. The victory of the NPP 
legislators, three male and two female, shows that Taiwanese voters were using their 
ballot papers to reshape Taiwan’s political landscape.59 	
Nevertheless, as Taiwan’s electoral system tends to favour a two-party system, 
it isn’t sufficient for the NPP to rely on their past cooperation with Sunflower 
Movement student activists to consolidate its support amongst Taiwanese voters. 
Once they enter the Legislature, these first-time politicians are facing the same 
scrutiny as their DPP and KMT counterparts. It remains unknown whether the NPP 
can become the real “Third Force” as is	their self-claim.  	
 
A changing Taiwanese society 	
Apart from the Legislature, today’s demographics in Taiwan also look quite different, 
to the extent that Chiang Kai-shek might not even be able to recognise the country he 
ruled. Today’s Taiwan has over 23 million people, with a population density of about 
650 inhabitants per square kilometre. There are also a total of 287 registered political 
parties (Chen & Chung, 2017).60 In the past, the KMT authoritarian regime banned 
the usage of non-Mandarin languages. Today, it is common to see politicians in 
Taiwan try to engage with their voters more effectively by learning how to conduct 
basic conversation in other languages, such as Taiwanese, Hakka, and possibly even 












evident in recent televised debates amongst presidential candidates in 2016, with all 
of them (then candidate Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP, Eric Chu of the KMT, and James 
Soong of the PFP) using Mandarin, Taiwanese, Hakka, and one kind of Indigenous 
languages as their opening greeting lines.61 Today’s Taiwan has sixteen officially 
recognised indigenous Austronesian peoples, and one-tenth of Taiwanese elementary 
and middle school children were born to a foreign mother, most likely to be from 
Southeast Asia. The growing number of foreign wives results from policies dating 
back to former President Lee Teng-hui, who introduced the “Going South” policy in 
the early 90s, and encouraged more businessmen to increase investment to Southeast 
Asian countries such as Vietnam (Wang and Hsiao, 2002). The enhanced trade and 
economic ties came with an increasing demographic connection. For instance, in 
2010, Vietnamese	women	made	up around 20 per cent of non-Taiwanese wives in	
Taiwan (MOI, 2010). Lastly, Taiwan’s freedom of press even outperformed that of 
the US in 2018 (Reporters without Borders, 2018). Prior to the lifting of the martial 
law, there were only 31 licenced newspapers. According to a report by American 
Chamber in Taipei, Taiwan now has over 2,000 newspapers, over 4,000 magazines, 
and a cable-TV industry which has 277 channels via fifty-six operators (Rickard, 
2016). Today’s vibrant media landscape in Taiwan perhaps is what Cheng Nylon 
would be pleased to see. 	
On the politics front, the KMT in 2016 lost control over both the presidency 
and the Legislature. Chiang Kai-shek probably could not have imagined that one day 
his party, which once dominated and controlled Taiwan with a one-party rule for 
decades, might slowly be losing its grip and popularity in Taiwan. All of this took 






3.4 Key factors behind Taiwan’s democratisation process	
Civil society is often praised as a key element in the democratisation process in 
Taiwan. As Ho notes, civil society can be seen as a realm of voluntary associations 
where citizens are free to pursue their aspirations. In a vibrant civil society, non-elites 
can have the space to challenge non-democratic rulers (Ho, 2012). Based on the 
previous discussion on Taiwan’s transition from authoritarianism to democracy, a 
couple of factors should be taken into account when reviewing the the role of civil 




Existing literature on the relations between the middle class and democratisation 
generally suggest that certain social and economic preconditions will lead to the 
emergence of the middle class, whose political stance can become an important 
element in a country’s democratisation process. In order to protect their individual 
interests and rights over their properties, they tend to favour democratic systems, 
which in principle provides protection over their rights and private properties (Lipset, 
1959; Dahl, 1971). 	
The economic boom in the 70s created a new group of people, whose wealth 
and influence in the market allows	them	to	be relatively independent of the party-
state. It was not until around the time when democratisation developments began to 
take place in Taiwan that some members from the middle class began to participate in 
new political debates and started to make political demands. It is mentioned in the 
previous sections that Rigger (1999) described 1977 as a “turning point” in Taiwan, 
as the KMT’s absolute control over local politics began to see fragmentation. It was 
also in this same election that Taiwanese people used their ballot papers to express 
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their dissatisfaction over authoritarian rule. When the KMT’s control of society was 
gradually weakened by both internal and external factors (the rising challenge from 
dangwai and decreasing support from the US, especially in the cases of 
Senkaku/Diaoyutai Island and the CCP’s UN membership), President Chiang Ching-
kuo became aware of the potential political price he would	have to pay if he did not 
consolidate his support among the middle class. In an effort to present himself as a 
reformer to the international community and to the domestic public, in late 1986 
Chiang told Katherine Graham, then publisher of the Washington Post, that he was 
going to lift martial law (Hsiao, 2005). During the process, as Hsiao points out, liberal 
intellectuals and pro-democracy professionals from the middle class actively 
organised social movements, in an effort to demand democracy for Taiwanese people. 
Hsiao goes	so	far	as	to	say, “without this middle class struggle, you cannot have 
democracy” (Hsiao, 2005: 4), highlighting the contribution made by some members 
of the middle class to Taiwan’s democracy. 	
After martial law was lifted, the growing middle class continued to play a key 
role in pushing forward the development	of democratisation  in Taiwan. Tien and 
Shiao (1992) found that the middle class accounted for about 40 per cent of Taiwan’s 
population in the early 90s, and such an increasingly different social structure made a 
distinctly positive impact on Taiwan’s democratisation process (p.59).	Of	course,	this	
impact	still	required	a	good	amount	of	time	to	take	effect	and	so	it	is	best	to	look	
at	democratisation in Taiwan	arriving	as a result of different phases: liberalisation, 
transition, and consolidation. The middle class in Taiwan were favourably inclined 
towards a progressive, liberalised, democratic system, hence they supported these 
values by becoming active supporters (Hsiao & Koo, 1997).  	
Another driving force behind the rise of Taiwan’s civil society was	the	
existence	of non-profit organisations (NGOs). Some argue that the history of 
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Taiwan’s NGOs, starting from the 1980s, is in direct alignment with the progress of 
democratisation of the island’s political system (Hsiao, 2007). According to Hsiao, 
before Taiwan’s democratisation development began, the extent of Taiwan’s NGO 
participation in policy decision-making process had been impossible as during the 
50s, 60s and 70s Taiwan was still under an authoritarianism rule. In his research, he 
analyses the impact of Taiwanese NGOs by studying how their size, focus and 
function grew over the course of the 20th century. 	
The rise of social movements from the 80s onwards offered a democratic 
opening in Taiwan’s democratisation, with quite a number of NGOs operating to 
promote political and social reform. Since then, NGOs have continued to play an 
important role in terms of advocating issues of environmental protection, consumer 
protection, women’s rights, and human rights in Taiwan. As Hsiao puts it, NGOs in 
Taiwan not only help facilitate and foster democratisation by raising public awareness 
in social issues, but also get “benefited and aided” in the consolidation of 
democratisation (Hsiao, 2007: 61). Under the authoritarian rule of the KMT, the NGO 
sector questioned state control by applying pressure where it was possible. The social 
issues advocated by the NGO sector were generally safe to pursue, as no regime could 
really openly stand in favour of abusing consumers’ rights, discriminating women, or 
even polluting the environment. The NGO groups in Taiwan began with a single-issue 
focus which later on evolved into long-term commitments. For instance, the Taiwan 
Association for Human Rights, founded in 1984, has been involved in many major 
political reforms, ranging from the lifting up of martial law to pushing Taiwan’s 
government	to ratify the two UN Human Rights covenants. This association, along 
with other NGO groups, have been closely correlated with the democratisation of 
Taiwan by broadening the range of public opinion that could potentially impact the 
policy decision-making process. The result is that the NGO sector in Taiwan became 
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quite vibrant and robust. According to Hsiao (Hsiao, 2007: 63), there were about 
3,000 NGOs dedicated to all sorts of issues in Taiwan during 2001. Amongst them, 75 
per cent had been established during the 80s.  
Founding Year Associations Foundations Total No. % 
Pre-1949 13 0 13 5.2 
1950-9 7 1 8 3.2 3.2 
1960-9 14 2 16 6.4 
1970-9 18 6 24 9.6 
1980-9 39 23 62 24.8 
1990-9 103 24 127 50.8 
Total 194 56 250 100.0 
Table 3-3: Numbers of NGOs in Taiwan between pre-1949 and 1999	
Source: Hsiao (2007: 65)	
Over the past few decades, the NGO sector has changed the relationship 
between state and civil society and therefore helped consolidate democratisation in 
Taiwan. A more empowered Taiwanese civil society has helped advance democracy 
by equipping its	own citizens with the knowledge and skills required	to monitor 
their elected representatives and engage	more	effectively in the political process. As 
Robert Dahl once argued, if citizens are the real rulers of a democratic country, then it 
is reasonable to ask that the rulers be politically competent (Dahl, 1992: 46). The 
robustness of civil society in Taiwan therefore plays an essential role in encouraging 
citizens to be active in the public sphere, instead of limiting their role to merely 
electing their representatives in the political system. 	
	
Student Activists 	
Another important aspect of Taiwan’s civil society is student-led movement, which is 
also deeply intertwined with the democratisation progress. Before the lifting of 
martial law, the dangwai movement had already inspired and encouraged the rise of 
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student movements and young intellectuals were increasingly more engaged in public 
affairs. On 11 May 1985, university students protested at National Taiwan University 
(NTU)62, calling for “general elections (普選)”. During the early 80s, student 
movement was only limited to unorganised small groups who called for greater 
freedom of speech through underground posters, graffiti and campus rallies and 
speeches. Outside campus, student activists helped dangwai campaigns and activists 
under the risk of being punished should their schools find out (Teng, 1993). As Teng 
notes, the difference between before and after the lifting of martial law was the degree 
of uncertainty and risk facing the student activists, who did not know what would 
happen to them.63  	
The lifting of martial law in 1987 marked a watershed moment for citizens’ 
participation in social movements. Research by Chu Yun-han (1994) finds that in 
1983 there were 143 independent social and political movements. In 1987, the year 
when martial law was lifted, the number jumped to 676. Although Taiwan had only 
just left the martial law era, those movements were already focusing on a much wider 
range of issues, including consumers’ rights, anti-pollution issues, women’s rights, 
Indigenous people’s rights, teachers’ rights, Hakka people’s rights, and property 
ownership rights (Chu, 1994: 99-113). During the post-martial law era, more 
Taiwanese citizens were willing to stand up and speak up for what	they	wanted, 













At the beginning, these movements, due to a lack of power provided by law, 
could not easily achieved what they ambitiously hoped for (Hsiao, 2001). However, 
the political atmosphere saw a change after Lee Teng-hui succeeded President Chiang 
Ching-kuo upon Chiang’s death in January 1988. Lee was the very first bensheng (本
省人/Native Taiwanese) President to hold office since the KMT had arrived in 
Taiwan. A political development of this nature gave the student activists a reasonable 
confidence that their reform movements would be tolerated in a freer political 
atmosphere (Wright, 1999: 997). As such, student journals, newspapers, and student 
groups began to mushroom in various universities and colleges across Taiwan. In 
1989, the Legislature passed the Civic Organizations Law, which meant	the	DPP	
could	become	legalised,	alongside	the	formation	of	many other civil groups. From 
this point onward, these groups and political parties of opposition had officially 
entered Taiwan’s politics. 	
In the few years before and after the lifting of martial law, with	these	new	
actors	beginning	to play key roles in promoting the rights and welfare of the public,	
it did not take long until civil society achieved something big. Inspired by Cheng 
Nylon’s pursuit of freedom and democracy, on 14 March 1990, Taiwan’s largest and 
most symbolic student-led movement in over a century, Yebaihe Yundong (the Wild 
Lily Movement/野百合運動), was started by a group of NTU students staging a 
protest near the KMT headquarters. Their demands from the government  were as 
follows: (1) the re-election of the National Assembly; (2) to abolish the old 
Constitution; (3) to present a schedule for political reform; and (4) to convene a 
National Affairs Conference to discuss political reform. A few days later, more 
student protesters joined the movement and staged an open-ended sit-in at Chiang 
Kai-shek (CKS) Memorial Hall. The sit-in was in turn supported by students from 
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other universities and professors,	but the KMT government still gave no response. In 
the face	of this silence from the government, on 19 March, a group of students started 
a hunger strike. By 20 March, over five thousand students had gathered at CKS 
Memorial Hall, and another group of nearly sixty students had joined the hunger 
strike. On 21 March, Lee Teng-hui was elected president by the National Assembly. 
In the same day evening, Lee met with student movement representatives at the 
Presidential Office, agreeing to convene a National Affairs Conference to discuss 
political reforms. On 22 March, protesting students ended the protest and left the CKS 
Memorial Hall. The Lee government kept its promises made to the students and held 
the National Affairs Conference in June and July in the same year, and in 1991 
amended the Constitution and re-elected the representatives of the National Assembly 
(Wright, 2001: 3-4).64 Examining the results achieved by the Wild Lily Movement, 
Fan Yun (2004) commented that the Wild Lily Movement represented the “first time 
in Taiwan’s post-war history that a social movement group had emerged as a 
negotiator for the opposition to the ruling government” (Fan, 2004: 170). According 
to Fan, those protesting students did not just go back to school after the movement 
concluded,	they continued to promote the welfare of the citizens, and focused on 
issues including crime prevention, community security, and youth education. 	
Perhaps it is safe to argue that one of the achievements of the Wild Lily 
Movement was the injection of  new blood into Taiwan’s civil society, as many 
students decided to get involved and engage with public affairs after the movement. 
Many of them held their first elections for campus representative groups later that 










Movement. Wright (1999) describes the year 1999 as the time when a civil society 
had “finally risen in Taiwan’s universities” (p.1999). At this point, schools became 
what Habermas called, a “public sphere” in which people engage in discussion over 
issues concerning their community, and form opinions that could help keep their 
government accountable. 	
From the aforementioned discussion, it is worth nothing that it took years for 
Taiwan’s civil society to take root in schools and campuses across the island. This	is	
because change not only requires political elites or leaders to embrace it openly, but 
also sustained effort from the ground up. A civil society is not a foregone by-product 
of the political transition from authoritarianism to democracy,	and	the rise of a 
vibrant civil society in Taiwan’s campuses is, perhaps, a force that emerged from a 
democratic opening only possible under certain political and economic conditions. 	
Compared with other types of social movements, the	thrust	of this research 
attempts to argue that student-led movement is deserving	of more attention in the 
analysis of Taiwan’s democratisation. As previous sections point out, Taiwan’s 
continued celebration of Confucius’s birthday and other traditional “Asian values” 
means that on the surface Taiwanese society appears quite similar to other East Asian 
countries. However, the growing public support for student-led movement in Taiwan 
shows a drastic contrast from Confucian teaching, which often stresses the importance 
of “respecting teachers and cherishing virtues” (zunshizhongdao/尊師重道). If 
Confucian teaching is still deeply rooted in the thinking of the Taiwan, society would 
not have seen a strong surge in the continuation of student-led social movements 
during the Chen Shui-bian administration of the DPP (2000-2008), or under the most 
recent KMT government (2008-2016). 	
During the first DPP administration, an NTU student led a group of protesting 
students from other universities, following the format used	by	the WildLily 
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Movement, and staged a peaceful opened-end sit-in at the CKS Memorial Hall on 2 
April 2004. They called the movement “Amaryllis Movement” (Hu, 2005). The 
protesting students demanded the Chen administration investigate the “319 shooting 
incident”, which accused	Chen  of staging this incident in order to garner support and 
win re-election in 2004. They also demanded the government pass an act governing 
ethnic equality, and asked both the ruling and opposition parties to apologise for 
causing political turbulence over the past four years. However, the Amaryllis 
Movement did not receive enough public support and only lasted one month and three 
days. Compared with their predecessors, both its scale and public support were too 
small to generate any change in politics. And no big scale movement	took	place	
between	this	point	and	the	end	of	the	DPP	administration.	
After Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT came into power	another,	much	bigger,	
student-led social movement occurred, with students from universities and high 
schools taking to the street to voice their opinion on the issue of freedom of assembly. 
As discussed in previous sections, three factors contributed to the revival of social 
movements: the KMT government’s conservative agenda, the closing of government 
policy channels to social movement activists, and the DPP’s alliance and support of 
the activists (Ho, 2014). In 2008, the first year of Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency, students 
staged the “Wild Strawberry Movement”. And in the following years, student-led 
movements took place across Taiwan, demanding a more open, just and inclusive 
society.  	
The student activists under the Ma administration, received more popular 
support, both physically and financially, than their predecessors during the 1990s. As 
Cole noted in his essay collection on the resurgence of youth-led social movements in 
Taiwan, since 2008, people from all walks of lives pledged their support for the 
student activists by donating money, renting tents, providing shelter, food, and 
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spiritual encouragement (Cole, 2015). The growing public support for student-led 
social movement was	unimaginable	during	the	1990s. 	
Hsiao’s (1997) research explores Taiwanese people’s attitude toward different 
kinds of social movements, which were led by different groups ranging from 
environmentalists, students, farmers, feminists, labourers, Indigenous people, people 
asking for judiciary reform, handicapped people, and NGOs asking for consumers’ 
rights. His findings show, however, that the student-led movements were less 
understood by local Taiwanese people,  with little support coming from the 40-49 age 
group.65 	
But,	throughout the eight years of Ma’s	tenure, the demands made by the 
student activists, who	provided	support	for	many	of	the	movements	mentioned	
above,	to some extent, reflect their vision of how a democratic Taiwan should look. 
Their action, similarly, reflects their perception of what does it means to be a citizen 
in a democratic society. 	
	
Political Communication in Taiwan	
In many ways similar to the development of the NGO sector in Taiwan, the evolution 
of political communication in Taiwan has been engaged closely with the island’s 
democratisation process. Such a trend is similar to Blumer and Kavanagh’s (1999) 
research which finds that political communication in democracies generally advances 
through three stages: (1) party-controlled media, (2) television-based communications 








political communication to progress through all three stages. First of all, the media 
landscape has changed substantially since Taiwan’s democratisation. 	
Democratisation also acts to reshape the power dimension of political 
communication between the Taiwanese government and its people. When the source 
of politicians’ legitimacy comes from the voting ballot papers, the general public is no 
longer the powerless one in the existing political communication ecology. It seems	
most	likely	the	case	that	the 1996 presidential election revolutionarily shifted the 
power of political communication from the state to the public, as the very first direct 
general election marked arrival of the third stage of political communication.  	
During the martial law period, print media was the main source of political 
information in Taiwan (Wang, 1972). Wang’s (1972) survey found that nearly 90 per 
cent of voters in central Taiwan’s Chia-Yi city took newspaper as their main news 
source during the 1969 election campaigns. After 1987, media proliferation saw 
television (TV) rise	to	become	the	main medium for political communication. As 
the growing media outlets around that time intensified the competition between 
different media outlets, the content of news coverage also became more likely to 
publish critical commentary from political opinion leaders and public opinion 
surveys. 	
After the third stage took off, the rapid growth of cable TV and the Internet 
penetration rates in Taiwan changed the media environment and political 
communication dramatically. For instance, during the 1998 legislative elections, 
candidates in cities were more likely to set up a website than those in the rural areas 
(Chuang, 2000). Since then, the importance of campaign websites have only become 
bigger and bigger in	line with the growing population of Internet users in Taiwan. For 
instance, Wang’s (2003) research found that candidates during the 2000 election 
campaigns generally used their Web sites to offer political content, whereas in the 
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2002 election campaign they tended to engage with voters more actively on their Web 
sites. 	
In the past ten years, with the growing number of social media users in 
Taiwan, especially on Facebook, social media platforms have become increasingly 
important for politicians and public figures to communicate with their target audience. 
Consequently, development of ICT and proliferation of social media transformed the 
political communication process in Taiwan. Wen’s (2014) analysis of political 
communication on Facebook found that Taiwanese politicians also strategically used 
Facebook posts to communicate, attack their opponents, or defend themselves. An 
interesting finding of Wen’s research on the 2012 presidential election shows that 
most Facebook posts made	by both President Ma, and his challenger, Tsai,	 delivered 
positive messages, while only around 20 per cent of their posts were used to attack 
others. After Ma won the 2012 race, their Facebook communication strategy changed, 
with Ma significantly reducing his attacks on his opponents while Tsai continued to 
increase her criticism over Ma. Another research on European politicians also found 
that politicians mostly post “informative” rather than “personal” content on their 
social media pages as a way to broadcast news (Grčić, Babac & Podobnik, 2017).	
A lot of political communication studies looking	at	Taiwan mostly focus on the 
interpretive analysis on empirical materials,	which may well result from the rapid 
development of the media landscape in Taiwan. However, as political communication 
and democratisation development were closely correlated with each other in Taiwan, 
this study hopes to take the research scope towards a higher level. That is, exploring 
the impact of ICT tools on citizenship through the current political communication 
process in Taiwan. In addition, as there is already a rich body of literature on political 
communication during the election periods in Taiwan, but significantly less from 
non-election periods, this research hopes to bring about more analytical insight into 
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political communication during social movements, with a special focus on how young 
Taiwanese young people enhance their influence via ICT tools. 	
 
ICT tools and their place in Taiwan	
Another aspect of change in Taiwan’s politics is the diversity and speed of political 
communication. This change  has largely	been	triggered by the development of 
information and communication tools (ICTs) and the fact that the Internet penetration 
rate in Taiwan is quite high compared with other Asian countries. According to the 
Internet World Stats (2013), Taiwan is listed as number 34 in a report titled Top 50 
Counties with the Highest Internet Penetration Rate, 2013. Over the past ten years, 
Internet usage in Taiwan has grown fourfold.  
	
Year Internet Users Total Population Percentage 
2004 12,200,000 22,794,795 53.5% 
2006 14,500,000 23,001,442 63.0% 
2014 18,687,942 23,359,928 80.0% 
2016 19,666,364 23,464,787 83.8% 
Table 3-4 Internet Users and Population in Taiwan 2004-2016	
Source: Internet World Stats (2014)	
	
In 2016, Google’s Consumer Barometer report found that in Asia-Pacific, 96 
per cent of Taiwanese people surf the Internet on a daily basis, falling  behind Hong 
Kong	only, which sees 97 per cent of its population browsing Internet web pages 
every day.66 In addition, Google’s research found that smartphone penetration rates in 
Taiwan reached a record high of 82 percent. Amongst these people, the 25-34 age 
group registered a smartphone penetration rate of 100%, meaning that every young 
respondent had a smartphone. Within this heavy Internet usage among Taiwanese 






Taiwan Network Information Centre’s (TWNIC) June 2015 research, which reports 
that 68.8 per cent of Internet users use their smartphones as the main device to access 
to the Internet.67 Such high Internet and smartphone penetration rates in Taiwan likely 
indicates people’s strong reliance on ICTs and, thusly, online media as a major source 
of news consumption, such as	the	information	provided	through	the	platform 
Facebook. In an article titled “Facebook still dominates Taiwan’s social media” 
released by the American Chamber in Taipei (AmCham), it is found that Facebook is 
“unusually dominant” in Taiwan, with a penetration rate of 82 per cent, higher than 
anywhere else in the world (AmCham, 2017)68. 	
In terms of young people’s media usage, social media platforms on the 
Internet seem to have overtaken traditional media outlets, such as TV, as top news 
sources. With the Internet becoming people’s major news source, such trends 
inevitably pose a challenge for traditional media outlets, which have been the main 
channel for political communication between state and civil society. Such a challenge 




As the beginning of this chapter stated, this research hopes to explore how the Internet 
might have reshaped Taiwanese Millennials’ political engagement and their 
perception of their roles in a democratic society. As such, citizens who were born a 
few years before 1987 and after 1987 are the focus of this research. With most of 









versed with technology and social media, along	with their creative usage of ICT 
tools, and the way they communicate with other age groups during social movements 
might be helpful in terms of indicating their understanding and expectation of the 
democratic system of their country. 	
A multiple-case design is going to be used to study the dynamics in different 
social movements under the previous KMT government. The advantage of doing a 
multiple-case design is that the material derived from the cases could offer a broader 
picture of a trend in a particular time frame. Furthermore, the strength of a multiple-
case design is that the analysis can be more convincing, compared with solely relying 
on one event or single case. The following chapters will proceed to discuss major 
social movements which took place between 2008 and 2016, under the Ma Ying-jeou 
administration of the KMT.  	
	
Analysing data	
With the aim of exploring the impact of the ICTs on Taiwanese people’s perception 
of citizenship and political engagement, this research attempts to find out the answer 
with three main research methods- (1) an analytical review of Taiwanese student-led 
movements from 2008-2016 when President Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT was in 
power, (2) a discourse analysis of the official blogs of several major social 
movements taking place in the past eight years, and (3) semi-structured interviews 
with three sets of actors – politicians, activists and media professionals – to determine 
their assessment of the notion of citizenship, as well as their observation of the 
Taiwanese youth’s political participation. The	following	chapters,	then,	to	offer a 
more detailed outlook of the development of citizens’ participation in Taiwan’s social 
movements, will take separate reviews of the two terms under former President Ma 
Ying-jeou. As quite a number of the movements were mainly initiated or led by 
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university or college students in Taiwan, this study hopes to sketch an accurate 
outlook of the notion of citizenship in the minds of Taiwanese young people. 	
It is difficult to apply one singular research method to analyse all social 
movements, as each movement has its own social media and communication strategy. 
Some of them only used blogging to generate support, some of them used both 
blogging and other social media sites which are less well-known amongst Taiwanese, 
and some of them used a wide range of social media tools to engage with the public at 
home and abroad. In an effort to accommodate these various social media strategies,  
different methods were	applied	to explore and analyse each movement, depending on 
which one was the main digital tool used during the mobilisation and organisation 
process. 	
For instance, in Chapter 4, the author uses discourse analysis to explore the 
political messages conveyed by nearly 200 blog entries of the Wild Strawberry 
Movement official English blog. In order to gauge the material carefully, the author 
uses Nvivo, a computer-aided qualitative analytical tool, to analyse the first student-
led social movement which heavily relied on blogging to communicate with 
Taiwanese people and the international community. Each piece of the blog post was 
coded as a descriptive node, for instance a phrase meaning “democracy in Taiwan” or 
a sentence meaning “human rights being violated”, a paragraph of “how to mobilise 
and spread the words”, or a slogan shows “discontent with the ruling government”. 
These descriptive codes are used to help provide a closer outlook of each event or 
each statement issued by certain social movement participants.	
The originality of this study comes from the first-hand expert-insider 
perspective concerning political communication and citizenship. This original 
material is	presented and discussed in chapters 4, 5, and 6. The materials gathered 
from this study’s semi-structured interviews, and detailed documentation of how 
124	
	
different ICT tools were deployed during the movement, are expected to offer useful 
data and deep insights into the subject of the investigation.  	
The author also conducted semi-structured interviews with people who took 
part in the social movements occurring	in	the	years	from 2008-2016, as well as the 
two most recent elections in Taiwan - the 2014 November local elections and the 
2016 January presidential and legislative elections. The interviewees include 
university graduates, student activists, journalists, news reporters, and scholars. 
Furthermore, the interview method of this study allows the interviewees to do most of 
the talking, after a short introduction of the purpose of this research.	
In order to supplement the research material, this research also relies on 
printed and digital media as alternative sources to obtain documented information, 
direct quotes from protest participants, or analyses from scholars and experts. Overall, 
this research aims to offer a broad and engaging outlook of a vibrant Taiwanese civil 
society, particularly regarding	the	phenomenon	of student-led social movements. As 
the study of social movements remains a multidisciplinary intellectual project (Ho 
Huang, and Juan, 2018), it is noteworthy that this study should	be no exception. This 
study has benefitted from prior scholarly research focusing on a wide range of topics: 
sociology, democratisation, social media, social movement, Taiwan studies, 
communication studies, and e-democracy. Although qualitative-driven research forms 
the bulk of the study of social movements, most of their research questions are about 
why	social	movements	took	place	and	what	impacts	movements	had	on	








Over the past three decades, Taiwan’s democratisation development has been 
consolidated through a series of political events, including student-led social 
movements, direct elections. Within these events, two major factors often come into 
play: political communication, which in this study refers to how elites receive 
feedback from citizens as well as responding with further information; and citizens’ 
participation in politics. ICT tools and social media platforms to some extent have 
reshaped Taiwanese people’s political engagement	and,	related	to	this, the impact of 
ICT tools on the notion of citizenship can be viewed from two perspectives: one point 
of departure is how citizens use the ICT tools, with the other side of the equation 
being the nature of	the political communication between the political elites and the 
public. As there is growing literature about how ICT is adopted by activists to 
organise social movements, and the need for an overarching theory to address it 
(Hess, 2005; Klein, 2012), this study hopes to take a small step by contributing to this 
demand by exploring the following question: what effects do ICT tools and social 
media have, compared with traditional media, on the interaction between political 
elites and the general public? The research method of this study relies on an extensive 
literature review, material gathered in semi-structured interviews, which were 
conducted with a focus on political agents and civil society, and secondary data 
garnered from extensive media monitoring of Taiwan’s recent political events and 
changes over the past five years.  	
The contribution of this study is to synthesise what is known to date about 
digital media in Taiwan within an analytical and systematic review of Taiwan’s social 
movements and the interaction between the political elite and the public on social 
media platforms. It might be worth emphasising the potential contribution of this 
study, as there is a current gap not only in data available in non-Western examples, 
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but also as a framework that can identify the changes that have taken place by means 
of historical analysis of political communication and citizenship as a whole. And the 
last potential this study wishes to achieve, is the niche focus of how social media 
changes or reshape citizens’ participation in the events of social movements.	
Furthermore, this research hopes to offer a relatively in-depth outlook of the 
development of democratisation in Taiwan. Over the past 30 years of, Taiwan’s 
society has progressively become more open, diverse, and free. Shirley Lin, a 
professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, once called Taiwan’s democracy 
“the first in the Chinese-speaking world”. By taking Taiwan as a case study, a young 
and vibrant democracy with a majority of Chinese-speaking people in its society, this 
study hopes to shed new light on whether democratic values can take root in an East 
Asian society. Through vigorously analysing the social movements of	Taiwan's 
recent past, this research hopes to contribute to the understanding of how Taiwan has 
evolved into the most successful example of third wave democracy in Asia. To do so, 
the findings of this study, hopefully can help further the understanding of the	current 
young generation in Taiwan and reflect whether East Asian societies are really like 
Singapore’s former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew once claimed, not compatible with 
















The preceding chapter discussed the roles played by Taiwan’s civil society, its middle 
class, and students in the democratisation process. This chapter will take a closer look 
at young Taiwanese people’s participation and engagement in student-led social 
movements, as their behaviour may offer a useful indication of their perception of 
citizenship and their corresponding patterns of communication patterns the influence 
of ICT. The focus of this chapter will take civil society and student-led social 
movements as a starting point to gauge the collective activities that facilitate the 
political engagement of citizens, such as forming a rally or online mobilisation for a 
public cause. This chapter will also discuss what has changed or not changed in the 
student-led social movements within a digital context. This chapter asks how the 
growing convergence of ICT tools and social media may affect the patterns, methods 
or behaviors behind student-led social movements in Taiwan. It also aims to offer an 
analytical review of the extent and narrative of the social movements during former 
President Ma Ying-jeou’s first term, of 2008 to 2012, by extensively concentrating on 
written sources, both in English and Mandarin, and supplementing them where 
necessary or possible with interviews.  It will subsequently implement a discourse 
analysis on the narrative of the movements as a means to understand the arguments 
held by the participants, as their arguments might reflect Taiwanese citizens’ 
perception of the relations between themselves and the government. Furthermore, this 
chapter will also explore the use and effectiveness of ICT tools and social media sites 
during the movements.   
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  It might be worth noting that although Taiwan has its own cultural and 
historical features in its democratisation movement and governmental organisations, 
many of the challenges and frustrations facing its civil society may also be shared by 
other democracies around the world also.  
 
4.2. Resurgence of Social Movement during Ma’s first term 
Shortly after the KMT came to power in May 2008, its neoliberal oriented policies 
such as legalizing casinos, strengthening state control over public television and 
cutting pensions for farmers put civil groups firmly into opposition with the 
government (Hsiao, 2012). The first notable and large scale student-led movement 
was the “Wild Strawberries Movement”, which took place in November, only six 
months after Ma Ying-jeou took office. Following this particular movement, there 
was at least one major social movement every year that took place during Ma’s first 
term (2008-2012), and a number of others that can be considered noteworthy. The 
focuses of those movements might vary, but they all centred around the essence of 
democratic values: social justice, transparency, and freedom of speech. A common 
characteristic shared by these movements is that they were all initiated and organised 
by students. The Wild Strawberries Movement was significant as it indicated a 
resurgence of social participation in public protest, and a sign of the changing shift in 
terms of how Taiwanese young people perceive their role in the society. The shift also 
indicates that it would be wrong to describe Taiwan as a traditional society which is 
deeply affected by Confucian thinking. As Confucius prescribes that one must act in 
accordance with their ascribed public role69 (e.g., ruler, father, son, teacher, student), 






The following table lists major large-scale social movements that occurred 
during the four years (May 2008 – April 2012): 
Year Movement  
2008-2009 The Wild Strawberries Movement, led by university students to 
protest the KMT government’s deployment of the police force during 
the visit by Chinese negotiator Chen Yunlin (陳雲林) to Taipei in 
November. 
 
2010 The Losheng Sanatorium Preservation Movement, led by students to 
preserve the Losheng Sanatorium Institution from being forcibly 
relocated.70 
 
2010  The Da Pu Incident, led by students to protest against illegal grabs of 
farmland.71 (The movement continued until 2013 when the 
government dispatched police and officials to forcefully demolish the 
Dapu Borough). 
 
2011 Anti-Kuokuang Petrochemical Movement, led by students to protest 
the company Kuokuang Petrochemical Technology Co. in building a 
refinery project that might have damaged the environment. 
 
Table 4-1 Major social movement in Ma’s first term 2008-  2012(made by author) 
The following sections will first discuss how activists used social media sites 
and ICT tools to engage with the public, spread messages amongst society and 
























2008 Wild Strawberries Movement (November – December) 
In November, Chen Yun-lin (陳雲林), the Chairperson and negotiator of China’s 
Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), was headed to Taiwan 
for negotiations regarding an effort to forge a direct flight agreement with Taipei. 
Prior to Chen’s arrival, the Ma administration prohibited public demonstrations and 
ordered police to remove all national flags of the Republic of China (Taiwan) near the 
hotel where Chen would stay. 
Ma’s order infuriated the Taiwanese people and triggered public irritation with 
hundreds of citizens staging a protest,72 and on 3 November, Chen’s visit was met 
with protesters led by the then opposition party, the DPP.  In response to the protest, 
the government deployed riot police to handle the protesters and, in doing so, turned 
the protest into a violent confrontation between protesters and police. During Chen’s 
five-day visit, around 10,00 police officers were dispatched across Taipei City to 
ensure there were no displays of national flags (Cole, 2017). According to a report by 
Amnesty International, a total of 149 police officers and between 200 to 300 
Taiwanese were reported injured along with the occurrence of 18 arrests.  
Following the violent clash between the protesters and the police, hundreds of 
students staged a sit-in in front of the Executive Yuan (Taiwan’s Cabinet) on 6 
November, condemning the police’s response and handling of the protests during 
Chinese negotiator Chen’s visit, and opposing former President Ma’s rapprochement 
with Beijing. The students called themselves the Wild Strawberries (see photo 4-1), in 
reference both to the derogatory connotation of Taiwanese young people as 








also to the student-led Wild Lily Movement of the 90s. According to interviewee 
Chang Sheng-han (張勝涵, coded as A2 in the remaining paper), a participant at the 
time and a student at NTU (National Taiwan University), there were about 500 
protesters involved in the sit-in. Of this group, around one-fifth were students from 
NTU. A1 said:  
 
A lot us (protesting students) already knew each other as many of us came 
from different student clubs which focused mostly on public affairs. Back then, 
we argued a lot. (author: about what?) Over everything. Because we didn’t 
have an organisation structured in a strict hierarchy, so we had to vote over 
every single issue… also as we wanted to avoid anyone taking advantage of 
the protest and [making] her/himself a public figure or some sort of celebrity, 
we were quite critical over whoever behaved like a spokesperson and spoke to 
media. 
 
The protesting students had three demands: (1) amending the Assembly and 
Parade Act, (2) punishment of all the police officers who acted inappropriately during 
the DPP protests and the resignation of government heads in charge of national 
security and the police agency, and (3) an apology from then President Ma for the 
police repression and transgressions of human rights. In response, the KMT 
government deployed police enforcement against the peaceful protesting students 
(Hsu, Zong, & Hsiao, 2008). During the eviction, many students live-streamed the 
event, allowing anyone on the Internet to witness first-hand what was happening in 
front of the Executive Yuan. The response in return brought the protesters even more 






Taiwan. Around 7 o’clock pm, protesters and their supporters moved to CKS 
Memorial Hall to continue their sit-in. In the space of a just few days, the sit-in turned 
into a nationwide movement (Wang, 2008), with universities across Taiwan joining 
forces together and adopting the moniker “Wild Strawberries Movement”. Between 8 
and 12 November, cities including Tainan, Taichung, Hsinchu, Kaohsiung, and 
Chiayi also saw students stage sit-in protests, in a show of support for the protesters in 
Taipei. Many of them used Yahoo! Live to livestream the protests, and used Mandarin, 
Taiwanese, and English to explain the protest and their cause online. During an 
interview with Lin Fei-fan (林飛帆, coded as A2 in the remaining paper), then a 
protesting student at National Cheng Kung University in Tainan, he described how he 
ended up joining the event: 
 
So when the police [were] removing the protesters from the sit-in, I was 
watching the live-broadcasting and stunned by how police treated the 
protesters who were just sitting there peacefully. And I thought to myself, 
‘should students in Tainan also do something?’ And I remember around 6pm 
on the same evening, someone on the Internet said ‘if you are in Tainan, let’s 
meet in front of the Student Activity Centre in front of the Cheng Kung 
University!’ And that was how the protest in Tainan began. We didn’t know 
each other. We briefly introduced ourselves, discussed an action plan in case 
the police came and evicted us, and started to stage a sit-in protest. 
 
The efforts of the students won them support from their professors. 484 
professors from NTU and 50 other universities across Taiwan also openly pledged 
their support for the protest, calling on the Ma administration to respond to the three 
demands raised by the protesting students. At a press conference, Professor Hung 
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Cheng-ling of NTU Journalism Graduate Institute further pointed out that the protest 
had helped raise public awareness of the necessity for amending the Act on Assembly 
and Parade (Hsu & Yang: 2008). 
 
Picture 4-1 Snapshot of a news clip on YouTube74 
 
This was a very student-led movement, as well as the very first social 
movement in Taiwan to adopt multiple digital tools, including bilingual blogs to have 
its voice heard not only domestically but also internationally. An article by state-
owned online media outlet Taiwan Today comments that Taiwanese youth “employed 
technology they were already adept at using, to get their message across, and in the 
process, sidestepped any barriers, such as newsworthiness, that traditional media 
outlets might put in their way”.75 According to Tang Chih-chieh, an assistant research 
fellow at Academia Sinica’s Institute of Sociology, a characteristic of Taiwanese 










engage in public issue debates based on reason rather than any specific attachment to 
party affiliation. He further notes that the heavy usage of blogging by the movement's 
participants, online streaming sites, and other ICT tools was recognized and 
applauded by local media, which then announced the arrival of the “Web 2.0 social 
movement”.76  Tang added that these young protesters are seen to be more open-
minded and ready to take into consideration those who hold different opinions. For 
instance, Tang noted, these protesting students who had never met each other before 
could work together remotely for a common goal. They adopted the idea of 
deliberative democracy into their decision making process even though it could make 
the group less effective. To Tang, that the protesting students managed to work 
together while preserving their respective differences is unimaginable for his 
generation who grew up under authoritarian rule. 
The next section will introduce how ICT tools or social media sites were used 
by protesters involved in the Wild Strawberries Movement, and analyse the role role 
and function of these digital tools during the protest. 
 
Blog  
Three days into the sit-in event, the protesting students launched an English blog 
titled “Taiwan’s Wild Berries Movement”77, in an effort to complement another 
official Mandarin blog for a bigger audience. In addition to the two blogs, the young 
protesters shared live broadcasts of the protests on Yahoo Live, uploaded videos of 










joint photo group on Flickr, an online photo sharing Web site.78 Between the first 
photo uploaded on 10 November 2008 and 2009, nearly 3,000 photos were uploaded.  
What makes the usage of blogs particularly interesting in the case of the Wild 
Strawberries Movement is that for the first time in Taiwan, blogs were chosen by 
protesting students as a mobilising tool to generate more public support and to engage 
with the international community.  
 
 
Picture 4-2 Snapshot of the official blog of the Wild Strawberries Movement  
Outside Taiwan, blogs had already been used by politicians and political 
parties in election campaigns starting around the early 2000s. A study by Kerbal and 
Bloom on Howard Dean’s campaign blog, “Blog for America”, during the 2004 US 
Democratic presidential primary found that Dean’s blog successfully mobilised 
politically disaffected American voters, especially the youth, by using ICT tools, and 
blogging turned out to be the key tool for doing this (Kerbal & Bloom, 2005). Their 
research, finds that many supporters of Howard Dean became interested in politics for 






community through participating in discussion on Blog for America. However, 
Kerbal and Bloom also note that the key for a blog to succeed in a campaign requires 
a cause about which people feel strongly, and functions that allow blog members or 
visitors to initiate events by themselves.  
The findings of Kerbal and Bloom can also be applied to the blogs maintained 
by the Wild Strawberries Movement. The role of blogging here had multiple functions. 
First, it helped generate greater public support and participation, including amongst 
foreigners living in Taiwan. On its launch day, a blog entry titled Movement needs 
your help to be heard openly asked people to help translate their Mandarin statements 
into other languages:  
If you can read Mandarin and you know any of the languages other than 
Mandarin and you are willing to help, please email us: 
taiwanstudentmovement2008@gmail.com. I will assign you an article to 
translate to avoid double translation. Or if you can please write your feedback 
and observations on this movement and send it to me as well.  
 Thanks a lot!!79 
 
In less than a day, three bloggers replied in the comment thread asking for 
more information. One of them was a long-term Taiwan affairs observer, Michael 
Turton, who in his blog titled “The View from Taiwan” has been rigorously 
discussing political, social and economic affairs in Taiwan since 2005.80 
Second, blogging plays a role as an information hub, which provides the 
public and the international community with official statements published in different 







steadily increasing supply of updates or statements on the protest and took advantage 
of the blog format to facilitate discussion with blog members or visitors online.  
  Third, blogs also share media reports from foreign media outlets, some of 
which are internationally known, including Reuters and the South China Morning 
Post (SCMP). Sharing reports from well-known international media outlets helped the 
Wild Strawberries Movement receive even more attention from local media as the 
protest became a big event under the spotlight of foreign media and drew international 
attention to the domestic movement taking place on an island in East Asia.  
Fourth, the protesting students used blogs and the Flickr group to broaden 
their outreach. Occasionally, the Flickr group shared news releases from English 
blogs in an effort to deliver their message to a different Web site. For instance, a 
discussion on the Flickr group shared a statement in many different languages, 
including English, Japanese, Korean, and German.81  
 
Live streaming site  
Within the first couple of days after the launch of the Wild Strawberries Movement 
blog, a blogger used Y!Live, an online social media site programme – to livestream 
the development of the protest via his laptop (Chen, 2012).82 The blogger also 
explained the development of the movement throughout the livestream in Mandarin, 
and at the same time he asked another student to introduce the development in 
English (Chen, 2012: 26). Interviewee A1 said that at first, he didn’t understand why 











I saw some people using both English and Mandarin to introduce the event 
through a webcam, and I had no idea why they did that. And I didn’t get 
involved (in their live-broadcasting) either. 
 
According to the media outlet Taiwan Today, an estimate of 3,000 to 4,000 
online users logged on during peak hours to follow the live broadcasting of the 
event.83 Online streaming, along with messages transferred through various social 
networking sites such as bulletin board systems (BBS), Facebook and Twitter, were 
instrumental to the protesters’ innovative mobilization methods and garnered attention 
from students across Taiwan in just a couple of hours. Meanwhile, other students used 
their laptops to conduct interviews with the movement’s participants.84  
 
Other Social Media and ICT Tool usage 
Moreover, the protesting students of the Wild Strawberries Movement also made a 
theme song, “Voice of Wild Berries”, and uploaded it to many YouTube channels as a 
way to broaden outreach. The protesters even made an English song, “Idealism”, to 
convey their message to the international community.  
The information of the movement was delivered and transmitted via different 
social media sites. As such, protesting students on different social media sites 
altogether created a complicated and multi-layered network which enhanced the 
outreach of the protest with multiple layers of personal networks. Mainstream media, 
on the other hand, picked up the information, which went viral across the Internet and 
re-delivered or re-distributed it through their mediums.  The way information from the 
Wild Strawberries Movement was delivered to the general public was more 






and ICT tools to share information with people from their personal networks. Even 
though the protesters never received a response from the Ma administration to their 
three demands, their creative and innovative mobilization methods impacted later 
social movements, such as the Losheng Sanatorium Movement in 2009-2013, which 
also heavily relied on blogging to generate public support.  
Quotes from protesting students 
This section will collect quotes from students as supplement to enrich research 
material.   
 Freedom, democracy, and human rights mean our way of life, as we 
(Taiwanese) make a collective decisions on what kind of country we want to 
live in, what kind of life we want to lead. Even if we can ensure that everyone 
is fed and given a chance to lead a good life, we are still nothing but like 
animals if we can’t even defend our basic freedom. It (defending freedom) 
defines what human being are, and differentiate human beings from others. In 
particularly, intellectuals including (university and college) students should 
bear some social responsibility (to defend democracy and freedom). 
Student named Lin Yi-hsuan/林邑軒 (Epochtimes, 2009)85 
 
The name ‘Wild Strawberries’ was decided by students at the sit-in protests 
across Taiwan… a lot of people in the society call us born after the 80s 
“generation of strawberries”,  saying that we are just like strawberries 
growing up in a greenhouse, and that we not tough enough to bear any 
pressure. We want to challenge such stereotype and show people that we are 
not only strawberries, we are WILD strawberries! 





We share the same stance on the values of freedom and human rights. Perhaps, 
we have different political opinions. But now since we are here, let us leave 
aside the differences, as we are fighting for a very important value, which is 
human rights. 
Unknown student at the Wild Strawberries protest (Chiang, 2011)87  
 
4.3 Anti-Kuokuang Petrochemical Movement (October 2010 – April 2011) 
 
 
Picture 4-3 Snapshot of the official site of the National Youth Alliance Against 
KuoKuang Petrochemical Project 
 
The case of Taiwan’s anti-petrochemical protest does not receive as much 
internationally scholarly attention as the island’s anti-nuclear movement. Perhaps it is 
because the nuclear energy issue has been a much more high profile environmental 
issue for Taiwan over past decades. However, since the emergence of Taiwan’s 







industry have received increasing attention and support in Taiwan (Ho, 2014). As 
such, understanding Taiwan’s recent anti-petrochemical industry movement could 
help shed some light in the understanding of the mobilisation capacity of local NGOs 
in a digital context and introduce why the key factors to the success of protests rests 
in the hands of NGOs.  
Petrochemical investment in Taiwan has incurred local resistance since the 
1980s (Ho, 2014). Since the Kyoto Protocol became effective in 2005, local NGOs 
and environmental groups stepped up efforts in opposing the then DPP government’s 
support for petrochemical expansion and argued that the DPP failed to take into 
account the impact on climate change when assessing its petrochemical industry 
policy. When state-owned China Petroleum Corporation and some private companies 
co-launched an investment project to form the Kuokuang Petrochemical (guoguang 
shihua 國光石化) Company in January, 2006, there were only five active members 
taking action to oppose the Kuokuang project around that time (Ho, 2014: 9).  
Starting in 2008, however, many local bloggers began to closely monitor and 
report the development of the Kuokuang project in Chang-Hua County in central 
Taiwan. Their efforts were noticed and promoted by local NGOs, who shared the blog 
articles on their own web pages. (Chen, 2012:27). One of the bloggers, Zhu Shu-Juan, 
used to be a journalist for the United Daily News (UDN), one of the three biggest 
major newspapers in Taiwan, before she became a citizen journalist. Her blog, 
Huanjing Baodao (環境報導/reports on the environment)88, has focused largely on 
the impact of the petrochemical industry on the environment, particularly in non-
urban areas of Taiwan. As of 2016, since her launch of the blog in 2009, Zhu’s 





Before 2010, most protesters in the anti-Kuokuang petrochemical movement 
were environmental activists or journalists like Zhu herself. It wasn’t until 2010 when 
a group of university students decided to form a “National Youth Alliance Against 
Kuokuang Petrochemical Project”, the anti-petrochemical movement began to benefit 
from the mobilising potential of ICT tools and social media sites. Following in the 
footsteps of the Wild Strawberries protesters, the students also launched an official 
blog, “National Youth Alliance Against KuoKuang Petrochemical Project”89, to 
mobilise young people across the island to join forces in opposing the petrochemical 
industry in Taiwan. It took them seven months to successfully convince President Ma 
to terminate the controversial project. In the end, Ma went even further and pledged 
his support to build a wetland conservation in Chang-Hua County instead of a 
petrochemical plant. The following section will review how ICT tools and social 
media sites became part of the recipe for this movement’s success.  
 
Google Online Group 
According to Chen (2012), the protesting students launched a group titled the 
“National Youth Alliance Against KuoKuang Petrochemical” and used a Google 
online group for internal communication and to conduct their decision-making 
process. They mainly communicated with each other via e-mail in this closed group.  
 
Facebook Group 
For core members and their friends, a Facebook group was created for them to share 
information, discuss timely issues, and foster bonding among members (Chen, 2012: 
11). In this online group, members engaged with each other without any physical 





group also helped coordinate efforts coming from students attending different 
universities and colleges.   
 
Blog 
The blog, “National Youth Alliance Against KuoKuang Petrochemical Project” was 
used as the official Web page of the movement. Given that the issue of the anti-
petrochemical movement did not receive widespread public attention from all of 
Taiwan, the blog chose to use Mandarin as the main language to communicate with its 
only target audience, the Taiwanese public. In the space of seven months, they had 
published a total of 90 blog entries and attracted over 182,000 viewers as of 2016. In 
addition to their official statements, the blog also shared information on public 
seminars on topics related to the petrochemical industry, online petitions, videos of 
the protest, and impact of the industry on the environment, as well as live stream 
events.  
 
 Live Streaming Tools 
Diverging slightly from the Wild Strawberries Movement, which live streamed the 
protest events through ICT tools, the anti-Kuokuang petrochemical movement used 
these tools to live broadcast public hearings and meetings between environmental 
groups and government agencies. When the government became the subject in the 
live streaming videos, they consequently received greater public scrutiny and pressure 
throughout the live streaming process (Chen: ibid). The officials not only had to face 
pressure from activists and protesting students at public hearings and meetings, but 
also through greater “public scrutiny” coming from online viewers who could remain 




Other ICT tools and social media sites 
The blog movements also featured other social media sites, such as Facebook and 
Google online data pages, to encourage visitors to take action and engage with protest 
members via different online platforms. Chen summarises the different usage and 
roles of the ICT tools and social media sites as per the following picture:  
 
 
Picture 4-4: Internet-based platforms used by National Youth Alliance Against 
KuoKuang Petrochemical (Chen, 2012: 28) 
 
The group “National Youth Alliance Against KuoKuang Petrochemical” used 
different online platforms to extend the range of participatory action in an effort to 
engage with a bigger audience and the public. In picture 4-4, the inner circle is used 
for core members’ internal communication, the middle mobilization, and the third for 
outreaching purposes. One element which makes the group interesting is that there are 
clear boundaries between these circles. An individual is considered a core member 
when she/he helps make a YouTube video. A core member can also be moved to the 
















inner circle (Chen: 2012: 30). The membership of the group is not clearly defined. For 
instance, when asked about the total number of the groups, a member simply replied: 
“we are all netizens” (Lu: 2012: 73). The comment shows the flexibility of the 
membership as the core group allows its member to stay or leave freely, and such 
flexibility might indicate a key strategy in encouraging more political participation 
from the general public.  Furthermore, such flexibility not only helps reduce the cost 
of participation (time, money, or labour), but also the transaction costs (which can be 
the time travelling to sign a petition or the effort spent in acquiring information about 
an environmental group) between the actual participation and the preparation before 
taking actions (Margetts et al., 2016: 52).  
 
4.4 Unfold the Events, Unwrap the Political Communication  
As earlier sections demonstrate, ICT tools and social media – particularly blogs – play 
a significant role in mobilising participants in social movements within Taiwan. As 
university and college students made up the majority of protesters during the Ma 
administration this should not be such a great surprise, but, since the Wild 
Strawberries Movement of 2008, what is of interest is that the ICT tools utilized have 
become a powerful mobilizing weapon for the young generation to mobilise people 
beyond their age group and friend circles in social movements. With the help of 
technology, protesters no longer need to rely on handing out leaflets on the streets or 
giving “soapbox talks”, as today’s social media sites and blogs can offer better, 
cheaper, and faster tools to mobilise participants.  
The previous discussion also reveals that blogs were one of the main 
mobilizing tools in the student-led movement during former President Ma’s first term 
(2008-2012). The aim of the following section, then, is to examine the use of blogs in 
mobilization, with a special focus on how events are framed by protesting students in 
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their blog entries. Through these blog entries, it can be seen how the protesters made 
the cause of each movement relevant to the audience, often managing to reach a 
general public outside Taiwan.  
With the aforementioned aim in mind, discourse analysis shall be used as a 
tool here to explore the political meaning, which lurks behind the language and tone 
used by the protesting students. The findings and evidence derived from the two 
major events of President Ma’s first term (2008 – 2012) may help offer an outline of 
Taiwanese youth’s perception of citizenship.   
 
Why use Discourse Analysis in this Study 
In many societies, citizens and civil society are part of political activities and political 
processes, in which participants make sense and reproduce reality through discourses. 
To understand what is being discussed throughout the discourses and the changing 
dynamic context, some researchers explore changes in social ideas by adopting 
discourse analysis as a method in their research (Schmidt, 2011). In the same fashion, 
the subject of this chapter is the protesting students, who take part in the political 
process and henceforth are proactively engaged in political discourse. In the study of 
social movements, there are different levels of discourses, with one of them focusing 
on the individual production of text and speech by participants and activists (Johnston, 
2002:68). Such qualitative discourse analysis on social movements therefore is 
usually defined as an intensive focus on movement-related context to identify 
communication patterns and structures of ideas.  
As such, a critical discourse analysis (CDA) method is applied to examine the 
meanings and context generated throughout the political process. This section hopes 
to follow the CDA method in obtaining further understanding of citizens’ engagement 
in social movements within a digital environment. By critically reviewing the 
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engagement through the use of ICT tools and social media sites, the findings of the 
discourse that took place during the movements can hopefully shed new light on how 
citizens think of their role as a citizen in a democratic society.  
Another reason why discourse analysis can help understand Taiwanese 
people’s understanding of citizenship is that discourse is a form of language involved 
in the context of social interaction or social situation. The outcome of discourse, 
therefore, can be seen as part of the process of building meaning, which may result in 
a form of action. In Habermas’ theory, the foundation of public discourse is forging 
mutual understanding. Following a mutual understanding, individuals can collectively 
take other social activities, or become involved in the organisation of social actions 
(Habermas, 1989). As ICT tools help citizens easily discuss matters related to the 
public sphere (social, political, economic or cultural issues) anytime and anywhere, 
communication discourse becomes essential in terms of forging mutual understanding 
or agreement on public matters. After the formation of such agreements, citizens then 
take collective action to achieve the shared meaning which is then forged through the 
discourse enabled by ICT tools.  
 
Decoded Discourse and its Implication by CDA analysis 
As the aim of this chapter is to understand the meaning forged through the process of 
discourse taking place on social medias, the CDA method is used to understand the 
use of language and its implication for emancipation. This study hopes to achieve 
what has been described by Bastone (1995): 
 
“Critical Discourse Analysis seeks to reveal how texts are constructed so that 
particular (and potentially indoctrinating) perspectives can be expressed 
delicately and covertly; because they are covert, they are elusive of direct 
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challenge, facilitating what Kress calls the “retreat into mystification and 
impersonality” (Bastone, 1995: 198-199). 
 
Material and Data Analysis 
Based on the aforementioned goal, this section will analyse the Wild Strawberries 
Movement by studying their 193 blog articles which were published in the space of 
two months on their English official blog. As this blog’s main language is English, 
the author created word documents of the articles posted on the blog and reviewed the 
post extensively to gauge a certain familiarity and understanding of the event. Then, 
the official statements and messages posted by protesting students were selected for 
further analysis. They were copied and pasted on a word document and then imported 
into Nvivo software for qualitative analysis. Like other commuter-mediated discourse 
Analysis programmes, Nvivo allows qualitative analysis to be conducted through text, 
videos, pictures and graphs.  
 
Unveiling the narratives behind the Wild Strawberries Movement 
To analyse the narrative and rationale of the student-led Wild Strawberries Movement, 
this research analysed 193 blog articles published between 6 November 2008 (when 
the sit-in took place) and 31 December 2008. In this period of time, these articles 
documented protesting students’ statements, event information, and demands made of 
the government. As most of the articles were written in English with a few exceptions 
published in German or French, all blog articles were created as Word documents and 
imported into the NVivo program for further qualitative analysis. Some researchers 
comment that NVivo, a computer assisted qualitative data analysis software 
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(CAQDAS) can help categorise data, producing more accurate data analysis and in 
turn providing a reliable outlook of the data (Welsh, 2002).90  
 
Analysis process and approach of the Wild Strawberries Movement’s narrative  
To explore the texts of the citizens’ demand for political change and/or social change 
during the Wild Strawberries Movement, this research used NVivo to analyse and 
code the messages delivered by the official blog of the movement. The author coded 
each article comprehensively with an aim of searching for any descriptions that have 
appeared repeatedly in the blog. As has been previously set out, this research aims to 
find out a communication pattern which might mirror the protesting citizens’ idea of 
citizenship. The official statements issued by the protesters will receive further 
analysis, as they represent the key message the protesting students hoped to deliver to 




Out of the 193 articles, two were contributed by scholars (one is a retired college 
professor living in the US, and the other is a professor at the National Taiwan 
University), two from bloggers (both non-Taiwanese), ninety-four were from 
protesting students, twenty-seven were news reports from local English paper the 
Taipei Times, ten were from local English news platform Taiwan News, two were 
from English articles from Radio Taiwan International (RTI), two were translated 






from the oldest English paper in Taiwan the China Post91, twelve were derived from 
foreign media news reports (such as Reuters), thirty-six were articles re-posted or 
translated from other sources such as NGO Freedom House statements and one article 
from Hong Kong-based news agency South China Morning Post (SCMP). 
In their seventeen posts categorised “wanted”, the protesters sought support 
from the public in areas of mobilisation, event promotion and translation. They 
actively sought people to help translate their posts into English, as well as translate 
foreign news reports from other foreign languages into English. Such a strategy to 
some extent can be regarded as effective, as the movement drew attention from 
several Western media outlets, including Reuters, Huffington Post, as well as the 
SCMP.  
The ninety-four articles posted by students accounted for about 48 per cent of 
total posts, whereas the rest were mainly from other media outlets or statements from 
international NGOs. The ninety-four articles were mainly first-hand reports on how 
the event developed (such as what happened when the police forced eviction) or 
arguments/rationale of the movements. Two of the official statements were in foreign 
languages (one in French and one in German). It might be worth noting that some of 
these posts included YouTube videos, Wikipedia pages or links to podcasts as 
alternative ways to provide detailed information on the event. They even asked 
viewers to help update several relevant Wikipedia pages relating to the Wild 
Strawberries Movement.92 Showing reciprocal appreciation, the protesting students 
lent support to exiled Tibetans in Taiwan as some Tibetans and Tibet-focused NGO 
members previously also expressed their support by joining the demonstration. A blog 








support from the Taiwanese government.93 In addition, many posts also mentioned 
participation from Tibetans at the event, including an event where the police forced 
the protesters to be removed from the Ketagalan Boulevard in front of the presidential 
office. The police officers reportedly told the students that “if only you (protesting 
students) had not given them support, we wouldn’t have even touched a finger on 
them” (Civil Media, 2008). The mutual support between a student-led movement and 
a foreign activism groups might indicate that Taiwanese young activists are capable 
of  reaching out to a larger audience including not only Taiwanese people but also 
foreign communities based in Taiwan.  
 








The finding from picture 4.5 shows that the words “Taiwan” and “police” tops 
the list of those used the most in all blog posts. The frequency of the usage of the 
word “police” in the posts reflected that the protesting students were targeting the 
police’s management of the event (for instance, forced eviction) and the authorities 
behind them. As the post94 dated 10 November stated: 
 
Police are supposed to be civil servants charged with protecting the people. 
Yet under the outrageous requests issued from above, they have become thugs 
restricting and punishing the people from expressing their opinions. We have 
no intention of blaming individual police officers who can only obey orders 
issued by their superiors. Rather, we solemnly demand that the highest 
authorities in the government bear the largest share of political responsibility 
for these abuses.  
 
Those police related articles also highlighted some of the following words – 
“brutality”, “forced removal”, “police overreaction”, “mob”, “thug” or “excessive 
power” – in the same posts. Throughout the month-long event, protesters, activists 
from civil society and academics argued that the police were given inappropriate 
power, which invaded people’s human rights, especially those connected to the act of 
assembly. As such, one of the main demands of the movement was to amend the 
“Parade and Assembly Law”, which contradicted the right of assembly as stipulated 
in the Constitution.  
Similarly, fourteen local NGOs issued a joint press release, which was also 
posted on their blog, arguing that when peaceful protesters were “brutally served by 






critical point that tended towards a dire situation.95 A mood of urgency, such as that 
described in this press release, was frequently mentioned in other movement 
statements or reports.  
In their three statements published in November, protesters demanded 
President Ma to openly apologise for the inappropriate handling of the situation by the 
police during the protest. Their narrative mostly centred around how the police 
enforcement during the visit of Chinese negotiator Chen Yunlin had threatened 
human rights. As the right of assembly was stipulated in the Constitution, the people 
of Taiwan should be allowed to stage demonstrations without any intervention by the 
government or any authority, particularly by the police who, in this instance, were 
also instigating violent behaviour.  They demanded the government to amend the 
Parade and Assembly Act to ensure that the right of assembly would be protected and 
upheld, as well as calling on the President and Premier to offer an apology to the 
protesters who were injured by the police. In addition, they further demanded that the 
then heads of the National Police Agency and the National Security Bureau step down 
as a gesture to shoulder the responsibility. They reasoned their demands by stating 
how precious Taiwan’s democracy is: 
In a mature democratic society, any unreasonable violence should be 
condemned; at the same time government forces that hold the power given to 
them would be wise to consider policies discreetly to avoid restraining the 
citizens’ basic rights. The Taiwanese democracy did not fall from the sky, thus 
we insist the heads of the National Policy Agency and National Security 









The quoted sentences were the main narratives used recurrently in different 
statements issued at various stages of the movement.  
The CDA Analysis 
The critical discourse analysis can be used to explore the relationship between the 
discourse and social change that occurred in the aftermath of this movement, 
especially in relation to how events and texts reflect the social institutions within 
which people live and function. The aim of conducting the CDA in this research is to 
capture the perception of citizenship amongst the Taiwanese public, especially the 
youth and the citizens that were engaged in social movement during the first term of 
former President Ma. With this aim in mind, the following sections attempt to 
interpret the relationship between the discursive process and the text, as well as the 
development of the Wild Strawberries Movement.  
Overall, amongst the sixteen statements issued by the protesters, the word 
“police” emerged as the ‘champion’ from the word count (see Table 4.2) with its 
absolute number of occurrences having reached 140. This could well be attributed to 
the police enforcement that led to the injury of a number of citizens. This is in turn 
followed by the word “student”, a word which exhibits an image that could be placed 
in this context in opposition to the word “police”. A student is considered powerless 
compared with the power authorised to the police. Subsequently, during the 
movement, the students were the ones targeted, arrested, or beaten by the police. The 
constant mentioning of police abuse and the peaceful protesting of the students 
delivered a narrative of unbalance in power relations between the two main players 
during the movement.  
In addition, NVivo finds that the term “Parade and Assembly Law” saw a 
density of 0.93 per cent, which means this term was also more heavily used than other 
terms. The protesters acknowledged the main problem lay in this imperfect law, 
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which did not ensure people the absolute right of assembly and demonstration. 
Therefore, the students argued that the problem would require a major change in the 
legal system. And, being as how such a change still relies on the government to take 
action, the word count of the word “government” closely follows that of the word law.  
Interestingly, words relating to the value of democracy or civic rights did not 
receive as much attention as the other four words - police, student, law, & government 
- discussed in preceding paragraphs. “Human Rights” was mentioned thirty times, 
slightly higher than other words; including liberty, freedom and democracy. It would 
seem at this stage that the protesters were putting more effort in condemning the 
police and the government, rather than elaborating their belief in democratic values.   
 
Word/phrase Word count  Density  
Police 140 2.24% 
Student 80 1.28% 
Parade and Assembly 
Law  
58 0.93% 
Government 39 0.62% 
Human Rights 30 0.48% 
Liberty 29 0.46% 
Freedom 16 0.26% 
Democracy 13 0.13% 
 
Table 4.2 Keyword density report for protesters’ statement (made by author, 




Five days after the violent confrontation between the police and the protesters 
outside the hotel where the visiting Chinese negotiator stayed, a statement dated 10 
November argued that Taiwan’s democracy and freedom should not be compromised 
at the cost of closer cross-Strait exchanges.97 It states:  
 
We must ask: does increasing Cross-Strait exchange require Taiwan to lower 
its standards of freedom and democracy in order to achieve the same level of 
repressive authoritarian rule that China has? 
 
The problem addressed by the protesters is not new to the Taiwanese society. 
Since the 1990s, there had been a demand for the right of assembly. However, as Fell 
(2014) comments, the government failed to respond to the demand that would have 
required the updating of the Parade and Assembly Act. Chinese negotiator Chen 
Yunlin’s visit triggered the rebirth of such demands in 2008 and the resurrection of 
the pro-democracy movement against the KMT government’s anti-democratic 
policies.   
As the ultimate demand of the students though was to protect Taiwan’s 
democracy and freedom of assembly, the protesters shifted their main emphasis to the 
amendment of the Parade and Assembly Law. This was marked by the introduction of 
the slogan “Parade and Assembly Law is unconstitutional, human rights are vanishing” 
in statements published during the second half of the protest. The slogan attempted to 
frame the confrontation as a constitutional crisis and helped the movement attract 







Following comments from then Premier Liu Zhao-xuan (劉兆玄) who said 
that he would not apologise “as the movement would end in a day or two”98, the blog 
written on 11 November immediately published an English translation of the news 
report on Liu’s statement.99 A follow-up statement responded to Liu’s comments as 
saying: 
 
Liu’s comments” show that the government has consistently avoided the 
students demand face on. Full of political trickery and calculation, if they are 
really concerned about us, then they should make an effort and reply to our 
demand.  
 
The students not only responded to the Premier’s comments immediately with 
two statements published on both their Mandarin and English official blogs, they also 
seized the opportunity to brand the Premier as an arrogant politician who refused to 
communicate with people. Their statement described the relations between the 
government and demonstrators as a one-way exchange, with one end demanding 
better democratic practices in Taiwan with the other end remaining arrogantly 
powerful and trying only to avoid any responsibility which might force the bringing 
about of political change.    
On the same day, the protesters shared on the Internet a broadcasting channel 
that livestreamed the sit-in event with the aim of to gaining more support.100 The 












of Taiwan’s human rights and civil rights. Following the live stream, more students 
from central Taiwan’s Chia-yi County began a sit-in at a local memorial park in a 
show of solidarity with the Wild Strawberries protesters. On 14 November, some 
twenty students from Hong Kong Polytechnic University staged a sit-in protest and 
livestreamed their event showing the protesting students in Taipei. The unity 
displayed between the protesting students from Taiwan and Hong Kong further 
strengthened the momentum of the movement and attracted more students from both 
sides to join the event. To expand their presence on the Internet, the protesters on 15 
November launched their Wikipedia page in English and Mandarin.101  The 
development following the Premier’s comments and the protesters’ response showed 
that the narrative of the protesting students was effective enough to attract more 
people to pledge their support, including students from Hong Kong.  
To mobilise and engage with more people, the protesting students held a 
“Funeral of Human Rights” in Taipei and welcomed the public to “mourn” the death 
of human rights.102 The statement invited all citizens including international residents 
in Taiwan to take part at the event, encouraging people to “wear black, grey or white 
if possible as a symbol of mourning”. The “funeral” event saw attendance from then 
DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen, who publicly apologized on behalf of her party for 
not amending the Parade and Assembly Law when the DPP was in power (2000 – 
2008).103  
The highlight of the Wild Strawberries Movement was the rally which took 
place on  December 7, the rally also marked the first month’s anniversary of the 










some wearing costumes of ancient Chinese emperors and calling on the Ma 
administration to amend the Parade and Assembly Law. The protesters argued that 
Ma was behaving like an emperor from an ancient history but ironically, he was also a 
democratically elected president in a modern society. The event called on then 
President Ma to face the mounting pressure and criticism of his human rights record. 
NGOs, including Freedom House and the International Federation of Journalists, 
issued pubic statements showing support for the students and expressing their strong 
concern over the state of human rights in Taiwan.104  
 
4.5 Analysis: Understanding Social Movements in a Digital Context  
From the previous discussion, it is evident that the innovative mobilising tools 
adopted by the Wild Strawberries Movement’s protesting students made a significant 
impact on later social movements in Taiwan as many of the techniques deployed in 
this protest can be seen in movements that have followed. Furthermore, the massive 
amount of information gathered for this chapter also proves that a cross-disciplinary 
research is vital in the understanding of the complicated implications for a 
government in the digital context. From the literature cited throughout this study, the 
scope of the research focus covers issues concerning democratisation, Taiwan studies, 
social movement, social media, and even e-democracy. With such a background, the 
analytical review of this chapter is going to respond to the aims set at its beginning: 
reviewing how social media and ICT reshape Taiwanese young citizens’ collective 
actions in social movements and the changing mobilising method of social 
movements.  
In Ketty Chen’s words, the level of activism in the years of the Ma 






of the country’s liberal democracy in Taiwan” (Chen, 2017: 108). Young people are 
able to utilise their skills and knowledge with social media and instant communication 
apps to make social movements more attractive to ordinary people and to increase 
mobilisation more effectively. As a student said in Chiang’s (2011) documentary film, 
“The Right Thing”, the students’ efforts and their cause transcended Taiwan’s 
partisan rivalry between KMT and DPP. Between 2008 and 2012, the developments 
in political activities calling for improvements to democratic and social rights saw a 
resurgence in Taiwan. This resurgence also opened a new chapter in Taiwan’s social 
movement history. The very first large scale student-led social movement which took 
place during the Ma administration, the Wild Strawberries Movement, garnered a 
significant amount of public attention and support with the assistance of social media 
and ICT tools. The protest, which did not even last for two months, still managed to 
bring Taiwan’s domestic issues under an international spotlight.  
In Taiwan, the information for social movements has traditionally been 
distributed and delivered by conventional mediums, such as television, print media, 
and privately owned media outlets. The two protests examined in the preceding 
sections show that young activists in Taiwan utilized the potential of social media, 
and provided the public with first-hand information about the development of social 
movements or political events. Such a strategy increased the perceived visibility of 
the mobilisation both locally and internationally as citizens could easily follow the 
events with their personal gadgets or computers. Furthermore, the example of the 
Wild Strawberries Movement showed that when citizens are exposed to more 
information about a certain movement, even though they might be scattered across the 
country, they would be more likely to grow an attachment to the event. As 
interviewee A2 noted, he was “stunned” when he watched the live-streaming of the 
event in which the police brutally removed peaceful protestors away from the square 
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in front of the Executive Yuan. The “stunned” feeling infuriated and motivated him to 
take part in a separate sit-in over in Tainan, which is 265 kilometres away from Taipei, 
where the Wild Strawberries Movement was taking place.  
Such an effect can also be seen during the live streaming of the protest itself 
and another live stream event co-held by the protesting students from Hong Kong and 
Taiwan. By watching the live stream online, people from Taiwan and even Hong 
Kong were exposed to the narratives and arguments provided directly by the 
protesting students. Such information exposure also increased the incentives of the 
general public, who then decided to participate in or pledge their support for the 
Wild Strawberries Movement. 
An example of this was how the protesting students suddenly received a lot of 
supplies just within a few hours after they live broadcasted the police’s eviction of the 
sit-in. In a magazine article, a student recalled the day when he and other protesting 
students were evicted by the police: 
  
Students used online tools to livestream the forced eviction. Within two hours, 
a flock of people, a lot more than us, went to the CKS Memorial Hall and a lot 
of supplies were sent to the CKS Hall for us. 
(Hsieh, 2009: 284). 
 
This effect was also shared by another protester, who during an interview pointed out 
that many people were inspired to join the sit-in simply because some of their friends 





We are different from the Wild Lily generation. Without sharing a similar 
background, today’s students might have less incentive (to join a protest), 
However, today’s protesters can garner spiritual support through online 
mobilisation, as well as physically support and form a sizable pressure to the 
government by having people to join the protest at certain point of time (Lee, 
2012: 105). 
 
During the Wild Strawberries Movement, each protester’s personal network 
became a potential supporter base. As A1 said: 
 
When we protesting students texted our friends to join us at the sit-in protest in 
front of the Executive Yuan on 6th November, we didn’t know whether they 
would really come as we didn’t have an organisation or a group leader to 
instruct people to come. But somehow, if you added up the personal networks 
of all protesters, you can get a big web of network in which people somehow 
know each other and some people chose to come to the event simply because 




Because technology makes sharing information in the online world a lot easier 
and faster than in the offline world, mobilisation henceforth becomes easier, faster, 
and cheaper for activists. The unique nature of an online world makes the 
boundaries between the public and private sphere elusive, and also allows a greater 
audience to “access” events easily. When the protesters reveal their activities by 
making their social media updates “visible” to strangers, such open information 
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becomes available in ordinary people’s private sphere, including their personal 
blogosphere (blogs they subscribe to) or news feeds on their personal social media 
sites. People can then use the information that appears inside their private spheres to 
decide whether they want to take part in the activities within a public sphere. 
Therefore, it might be safe to argue that such contemplation activates people’s civic 
skills. Through developing their civic skills by pondering on other people’s 
activities, people then further examine the necessity of spending their time and 
effort on such collective activities for a public cause.  
The design of social media allows protesters an option to turn their activities 
into a special “life event”. If people choose to make the participation photos of a 
protest or YouTube videos open for the general public on the Internet, they are not 
only sharing their life events with friends but also with strangers online. Naturally, if 
a person gets more “views” (and thus a viewership) and “likes”, their incentives to 
share such information will be stronger, and their motivation to take part in social 
movements will in turn become bigger. However, it does not mean that people who 
use social media will tend to participate in social movements more. As Fan (2003) 
notes, deciding whether to take part in a social movement is not a one-off decision. It 
is, instead, a constant stream of choices about being part of it or being an outsider like 
most people are (Fan, 2003: 157). Or, some people may not want to easily disclose 
their social movement participation on social media, because they do not want to be 
labelled as an “activist”. These decisions reflect an individual’s constant self-
reflection of her/his role as a citizen, and how she/he perceives social movements and 
its significance in a society. 
Moreover, the action of sharing her/his activities in a social movement on a 
personal blog or a shared social media account reflects a tendency to personalise 
political stories, and at times, a self-satisfied activity (Kerbal & Bloom, 2005:34). 
164	
	
In the case of the Wild Strawberries Movement, many protesting students shared their 
photos on the Flickr group or uploaded footage of the sit-in events to their personal 
YouTube channels. Through these activities, the protesters personalise the event, at 
the same time they also further enhance the outreach of the protests through multiple 
social media sites.  
As the thresholds for mobilisation become lower, the need for a traditional 
charismatic leader might become less essential in the Internet-based mobilisation 
process. As a result, the protesting students even took conscious efforts to avoid 
anyone from being labelled as the face of the Wild Strawberries Movement and 
stealing the spotlight away from the protest itself. As A1 noted: 
 
 
We didn’t want to have a leader or a face for the protest. Somehow we ended 
up having issues of trusting people during the event, as we tend to question the 
motivation behind the person who was willingly speaking to media or 
journalists. 
 
During the development of these movements, people can contribute to its 
momentum by sharing an image, clicking “like” on a photo or a Facebook page, 
choosing “join” when asked to join an event on Facebook invite, or retweeting a 
political opinion. As the preceding sections argue, the momentum of the Wild 
Strawberries Movement was an accumulated effort resulting from hundreds of blog 
articles, thousands of photo shared on Flickr, songs and footage posted on YouTube, 
and live streaming events watched by viewers from any part of the world. The need 
for an active figurehead then is significantly reduced, and perhaps a noteworthy effect 
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can be identified, whereby more effort is put into the avoidance of identifying a 
specific leader than is perhaps necessary. 
If leaders play less essential roles in the movements, it means online 
collective action can play an important role in policy agenda settings. One month 
after the Wild Strawberries Movement, the momentum accumulated through the 
social media sites was undeniable. Seeing the protesting students actually have the 
upper hand, the DPP decided to weigh in and stand by the protesting students by 
promising that they would take action to ensure that human rights and democratic 
values would be protected and upheld in Taiwan. Similarly, the Ma administration 
also decided to hold public hearings on the amendments of the Parade and Assembly 
Act.105  
In general, the development of the Wild Strawberries Movement demonstrates 
how citizens can use ICT tools such as blogs, Google Groups, or YouTube to 
encourage other citizens from different parts of a country to participate in 
communication discourse and social movements. A new generation of technology-
savvy activists has emerged in Taiwan and demands changes in political and social 
affairs by participating in social movements via more creative, innovative, and non-
traditional methods.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
In the online world, people are constantly exposed to a massive sea of information, of 
which some can be contradictory or overlapping. Facing this huge body of online 
information, individuals are now living in a sphere which offers different arenas for 







collectively demand the government to respond to calls for political change, as well as 
form pressure to challenge the government’s narratives or arguments. Also in many 
ways, the cost of participating in these online campaigns is being reduced. During the 
1990s, people had to go on the streets and stand on “soap boxes”, a confined public 
sphere in the offline world, to share their views with their fellow citizens. In today’s 
online world, the definition of activism is getting blurred through activities like the 
sharing of photos at a social movement or following a blog dedicated to a political 
issue. That is to say, the individual, in a way, is taking part in promoting and 
advocating the causes behind the movements. It should be argued that today’s citizens 
are not taking smaller actions when engaging in political events, but are actually 
making smarter choices when they want to show different degrees of support to a 
cause.  
Nevertheless, social media sites do not necessarily reinvent the Habermasian 
public sphere or lead to a completely new form of a deliberative. Instead, it is actions 
such as clicking “Like” or “share” on Facebook, sharing campaign slogans on their 
personal social media sites, or retweeting a politician’s tweet that blurs people’s 
boundaries of their private and public lives, and hence the public and private spheres 
as whole.  
What might have been created, in the online world, is a new sphere for 
citizens to engage with public affairs at their convenience without being constrained 
by time and space. With the growing convergence of ICT tools, citizens in Taiwan, 
especially the youth, are ready to adopt ICTs and social media sites as their new 
mobilisation tool. The available information on social movements and public affairs 
in the online world to some extent helps close the gap between the public and politics, 
as well private and public spheres. For people living in Taiwan between 2008 and 
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2012, the resurgence of social movements indicates a new phase of civil society, as 
citizens became equipped with better mobilising capacities with the help of ICT tools.  
Cole (2017) once pointed out that the initial wave of protests during Chinese 
negotiator Chen Yunlin’s 2008 visit was a “one-off affair” sparked by deep suspicions 
about China and the high-level exchanges between Taipei and Beijing. This claim was 
made due to the fact that during President Ma’s first four-year tenure Chen made 
repeated visits to Taiwan with the size of protest reducing with each visit. In hindsight 
however, these social movements in fact reflected Taiwanese young people’s 
expanded focus on public affairs, ranging from cross-Strait affairs (Wild 
Strawberries), freedom of speech (Wild Strawberries), human rights (Losheng 
Sanatorium), and land rights (Da Pu incident). The size of these protests may have 
been relatively small, but their focus was not. They were paying strong attention to a 
wide range of social justice issues, which had been unfortunately ignored by the 
























Starting with the Wild Strawberries Movement of 2008, large networks of Taiwanese 
young citizens began a new phase of social movements and in doing so also provided 
considerable force in bringing these movements under the spotlight of the 
international community.  The previous chapter offered an analytical review of major 
social movements under Ma’s first term (2008 – 2012), and discussed how social 
media sites and ICT tools played an important role in the mobilization process of 
those movements. The ICTs were instrumental in mobilising people to join social 
movements and creating new arenas for citizens to show their support and voice their 
opinion creatively and spontaneously.  
The resurgence of social movement in the period between 2008 and 2012 was 
triggered by a conservative and Beijing-friendly KMT government. As Ho argues, the 
Ma administration’s policy agenda did not allow activists a chance to influence policy, 
and was  at odds with the goals of those who participated in the social movements 
(Ho, 2014). As such, the resurgence of social movements during Ma’s first term 
reflects how democratic values have taken root in Taiwanese society, especially if 
seen from the perspective of some who argue that the KMT government’s 
conservative agenda might have been eroding Taiwan’s democratic consolidation 











As Buechler (1993) notes, the way a social movement is formed reflects the 
culture and social context of that particular time when the movement is taking place. 
Following his line of thinking, this chapter is going to take a closer look at several 
major social movements and discuss whether and how they reflect Taiwanese 
Millennials’ perception of citizenship under the KMT administration. By studying 
youth-led social movements, this chapter and the following one hope to find 
indicators as to Taiwan’s democratisation consolidation, and discuss whether 
democratic values have taken root in Taiwan, which is a Mandarin speaking society, a 
young democracy, and a country that is on its way to transform itself into a more open 
and diverse society.107 
Despite the resurgence of social movements under President Ma Ying-jeou’s 
first term, he still managed to win re-election with 51.6 per cent of the vote in 2012.108 
The table (5-1) below lists all the major social movements which took place during 
Ma’s second term (May 2012- April 2016). This chapter will continue to deploy the 
same approach as the previous chapter to further analyse the social movements of 























Year Movement  
2012  July – 2013 
June  
The Anti-Media Monopoly Movement, led by students to protest 
against a pro-Beijing conglomerate’s attempt to purchase local major 
media outlets 
2013 July-August The White Shirt Movement, led by the group Citizen 1985 to protest 
the case of a young soldier who passed away at a military detention 
centre, and advocate human rights in military 
2013 Da-Pu Movement, rural social movement in Taiwan’s Miaoli County,  
was supported by people from all walks of lives, such as local 
farmers, students, scholars, and artists. They joined forces and protest 
against the government’s brutality in land appropriation.  
2014 The Sunflower Movement, led by university students to occupy 
Taiwan’s Legislature to protest the government’s hasty passage of a 
trade pact with China  
2015 The history textbook protest, led by high school students to protest 
the government’s amendment of high school textbook guidelines, 
which were described by protesting students as “too China-centric”. 
 
Table 5-1 Social Movement under Ma Ying-jeou’s Second Term (2012 – 2016) 
*made by author 
 
5.2 Anti-Media Monopoly Movement 
The six-month-long Anti-Media Monopoly protest was a series of events focusing on 
media ownership, press freedom, and the China factor. According to Rawnsley & 
Feng (2014), this movement was more than a “second wave of democratisation”, 
which attempted to change Taiwan’s political system, and also a “second wave” of 
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media democratization, which called for a better and freer media environment.109 As 
the movement lasted for about six months, the following section will first introduce 
the background and political context of the movement, and then how participants used 
ICT tools during the movement. 
 
Background  
In late July 2012, only a few months after Ma’s re-election in May, then Academia 
Sinica legal scholar Huang Kuo-Chang (黃國昌) and a group of scholars and students 
staged a protest calling on the Ma government not to allow a Taiwan-based food 
conglomerate, the Want Want Group (旺旺集團), to acquire Taiwan’s second biggest 
cable operator China Network Systems Co. (CNS) for NTD 76 billion.110 Huang 
criticized the acquisition as a harmful media “monster” which would monopolise 
Taiwan’s media market and undermine Taiwan’s freedom of press (Hsu, 2017; Fell, 
2017). The protesting students’ concerns over the acquisition derived from the strong 
China-friendly stance adopted by the Want Want Group Chair, Tsai Eng-meng (蔡衍
明). Previously, Tsai, the Taiwanese billionaire and media mogul, said to the 
Washington Post in an interview published on 21 January, 2012, that, “not that many 
people died” during the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, stressing that the infamous tank 
incident displayed the Chinese military’s “humanity”.111 In addition, Tsai’s huge 














compared with 6,000 in Taiwan) also raised some eyebrows, with many Taiwanese 
people taking it as proof that “he is loyal to China”.112 
Tsai’s Beijing-leaning attitude had already been underlined by his acquisition 
of the China Times, a Taiwanese local paper, in 2008. A Wang Want Group internal 
newsletter published in December 2008 reportedly stated that Tsai told Wang Yi (王
毅), then head of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, that he acquired the China Times 
Group “in order to use the power of the press to advance relations between China and 
Taiwan” (Enav, 2013). Tsai’s long-standing pro-China stance intensified worries 
expressed by Taiwanese academics and students, who then called on people to join 
forces and stop Tsai from further expanding his media empire in Taiwan.  
In 2012, Huang and the protesters expressed their strong concern over the 
“China factor” behind the planned acquisition, protesting against media monopoly 
and any media owner with enormous business interest in China (Harrison, 2012; 
Rawnsley & Feng, 2014). Should the acquisition succeed, they argued, the Want 
Want Group will become a powerful proxy for the authoritarian CCP and the China’s 
territorial claims over Taiwan.  
In response, the Want Want Group media outlets circulated reports spearing 
Huang and the protesters. For instance, one report stated that a woman allegedly 
distributed money to the protesting students as payment for pretending to be 
protesters.113 Outraged by the smear reports from the affiliated media outlets owned 














island started a protest called “I am a student, I do not want Want Want China Times” 
(我是學生，我反旺中) and formed a group called the “Youth Coalition Against 
Media Giant” at a demonstration against the Want Want Group on 31 July. Despite 
the challenging weather (a typhoon called Saola was approaching Taiwan on the same 
day), over 700 students showed up and joined the demonstration in the rain. The 
protesting students gathered together and chanted slogans: “unprofessional media, go 
back to making biscuits” (媒體不專業，回去做仙貝), “defend news freedom against 
media giants” (拒絕媒體巨獸，捍衛新聞自由), “defend freedom of speech against 
chilling effect” (拒絕寒蟬效應，捍衛言論自由).114 However, their protest did not 
draw a lot of attention from local media at the initial stage of the movement. Out of 
seven of the biggest cable television news channels, only three of them reported the 
event.115  
Soon after the demonstration, many seniors editors and staffers left the China 
Times citing a move by management towards a Beijing-leaning stance and erosion of 
media freedom.116 That included Deputy Managing Editor, Ho Rong-hsing (何榮幸), 
Deputy Editorial page Editor Chuang Pei-chang (莊佩璋) and Junior reporter Yo 
Wan-chi (游婉琪). Ho on 9 August shared on his Facebook that Taiwan’s hard-














when its report failed to reveal the truth.  Both Ho and Chuang had been working for 
the China Times Group for over 20 years (Shan, 2012).117 
A month later it was proven that the Want Want Group fabricated the 
smearing reports. The company on 29 August finally issued an open apology to 
Huang.118 However, their belated apology did not pacify the angry Taiwanese people. 
The public anger resulted in nearly ten thousand people taking part in a rally titled 
“901 Anti-Media Monopoly Alliance” on 1 September 2012. The rally, which took 
place only about 100 days after Ma’s second presidential inauguration, attracted 
students, scholars, as well as civil and media reform groups to join forces. Interviewee 
A1 (who also participated in the Wild Strawberries Movement and shared his insight 
in the previous chapter) said they were quite surprised the Anti-Media Monopoly 
Movement went from a 600 to 700-people protest in July to a large scale social 
movement in September. A1 said:  
 
The Anti-Media Monopoly Movement received a lot of attention from media 
because it is something [the freedom of the the press] they also cared about. A 
journalist from Apple Daily told me that this protest is probably the biggest 
student-led social movement since the White Lily Movement in the 90s, and a 
turning point which changed people’s perception of social movements. I 
agreed with him as since the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement, more and more 
young people began to place social movement or demonstration in a positive 
light. And more and more young people agreed that if we cared about the 








The protesting students demanded four things from the government: (1) media 
monopolies should be stopped, and all media owners should respect journalistic 
professionals; (2) the Want Want Group should publicly apologise to the public for 
eroding the freedom of the press, and; (3) the NCC should step up efforts in 
regulating the media conglomerate. It might also be worth noting that the rally did not 
involve any political parties (Chou, 2013).119  
In November, 2012, the Want Want Group announced another acquisition 
plan saying that it planned to purchase Next Media, a Hong Kong based media group. 
As  Next Media had been advocating its pro-democracy and anti-Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) stance, many Taiwanese students worried that such a deal would allow 
Tsai and his affiliated companies to control more than 50% of news media by market 
share. They also argued that the deal would make Next Media lose its independence 
and henceforth erode Taiwan’s media environment.  
On 26 November, a group of Taiwanese students decided to stage a sit-in in 
front of the Executive Yuan with the aim of raising public awareness of this matter. 
Three days later, they staged another protest in front of the Fair Trade Commission 
and asked the commission to scrutinize the deal. Between then and January 2013, the 
youth alliance initiated a series of events, including a sit-in in front of the Presidential 
Office, events on New Year day, and a protest on 11 January, with forty Alliance 
members gathering at the Legislative Yuan to call for an explanation from two 









On 4 April, the NCC passed a draft Anti-Media Monopoly bill, which was 
later approved by the Executive Yuan.121 The then Premier Jiang Yi-Huah (江宜樺) 
said the aim of the bill was to promote the healthy development of a diverse society, 
with regulations on mergers and acquisitions within and across the broadcasting and 
newspaper industries. Under the bill, mergers of radio stations boasting a local 
listenership rate over 15 per cent or national listenership exceeding 10 per cent would 
not be permitted. However, the bill never passed the Legislative Yuan before the 
KMT lost the presidency and legislature in 2016.  
 
5.3 Usage of ICTs and Social Media  
This section will examine the tactical social media usage by the activists during the 
Anti-Media Monopoly Movement. According to a series of interviews conducted as 
part of Wong’s (2014) research, protesting students generally agreed that the usage of 
social media sites was important, particularly given the poor local media coverage of 
the media monopolization issue. Among all social media platforms, Facebook was the 
prime platform for the movement’s participants to discuss their goals, timely issues 








Picture 5.1 A snapshot of the Facebook page of “901 Anti-Media Monopoly 
Movement”122 
 
Major Social Media Site- Facebook 
As Harrison has analysed, the main function of their Facebook page was to share 
relevant media reports, videos, op-ed and ‘likes’ (Harrison, 2012). The function of 
Facebook during the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement was similar to what Bennett 
and Segerberg (2012:38) describe as the “political impacts of emerging technologies 
reflect[ing] the changing social, psychological, and economic conditions experienced 
by citizens who used them (social media)”. The Facebook page allowed the activists 
to share posts and formulate their arguments through discussion in the comment 
threads. Ketty Chen, then a visiting scholar at the National Taiwan University (NTU) 
and now the Vice President of the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, also notes that 
the protesting students used social media sites, mainly Facebook, to communicate and 
mobilise supporters (Ho, 2013).123 She told the Taipei Times, “when I was there, there 






phones. As time progressed, more and more people started showing up”. The activists 
also use their Facebook page to announce their action plans and mobilise people 
through the multiple-direction communication channels on social media sites. 
Supporters could express their endorsement by clicking ‘Like’ on posts on the page. 
The accumulated number of ‘Likes’, in a way, also displays public support for the 
Anti-Media Monopoly Movement.  
To further engage with more supporters, several alliance members based in 
Europe designed a template (see photo 5.2) which stated “Opposing Media Monopoly; 
Rejecting the black hand of China, I safeguard Taiwan’s media freedom at (a place, 
filled out by supporters who download and print out the template)”.   
 
 




They invited people to share photos of themselves holding the template on the 
Facebook page “What’s Next”.124 The page received hundreds of photos with some 
taken in front of famous spots around the world, including the Tiananmen Square in 
China. The campaign received snowballing support and inspired students in Taiwan 
to launch more similar campaigns displaying photos being taken at different campuses 
across the island. 
Interestingly, interviewee A1 pointed out that he believed this photo campaign 
was first started by a group of Taiwanese students studying in Japan. Those overseas 
students on Facebook told A1 that even though they were not in Taiwan, they wanted 
to take part. Instead of flying back to Taiwan, they sent photos of themselves to A1 
holding signs saying “I support Taiwan’s freedom of the press”. According to A1, 
their gesture “changed the definition of social movement participation”. 
 
In the past, you had to physically go to the protest to show your support. But 
now with the Internet and social media, as long as you show your support via 
posting photos, comments, or joining a fan page of a certain movement, you 
can be somewhat considered a part of a social movement. 
 
To increase the media exposure of the event, some supporters even asked 
public figures to lend their support and then received positive responses from Noam 
Chomsky and Chinese artist Ai Weiwei. Endorsements from different campaigns 
were collected and shared on the movement’s main Facebook page. The photos of 
supporters created both an atmosphere and a digital community, which shared the 
same goal, “stopping media monopoly”. Social media sites also allowed people to 





demonstration. As more interactive and self-configurable communication made the 
social movements’ organization less hierarchical, and at the same time more 
participatory (Castel, 2012: 15), social media therefore created new channels for 
people to take part in the social movement. With different ICT tools and Facebook 
easily accessible online, the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement in the end spread far 
beyond the geographic space of Taipei and reached different corners of Taiwan.  
Finally, another key element in the organisation of the movement were the 
existing personal networks, formed by people who had previously joined the 2008 
Wild Strawberries Movement. In a report by the Taipei Times, many interviewees 
from the movement revealed that they had participated in previous movements such 
as the Wild Strawberries Movement or the Losheng Sanatorium movement during 
President Ma Ying-jeou’s first term (Ho, 2013).  
 
5.4 Analysing the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement 
Writing in an article, Chen Wei-ting, one of the key organizers of the Anti-Media 
Monopoly movement, expressed hope that the anti-media monopoly youth alliance 
could unify efforts from the 700 people who joined the 31 July rally, the 2,000 
supporters of their “901 Alliance petition”, as well as the 20,000 people who clicked 
“attend” on the Facebook page of the 31 July rally (Chen, 2012).125 For activists like 
Chen, the boundaries of personal and public were disappearing as they began to pay 
more attention to the potential momentum they could garner on social media sites, 
which are a tool for people to maintain and expand their networks personally, 
professionally, and publicly. Social media sites also allowed supporters of the Anti-
Media Monopoly movement to express their opinion and share relevant information 






Facebook pages, for example, helping to display and generate more public support 
with posts and photos contributed by people from different parts of Taiwan and 
around the world.  
One key argument of the movement was to ensure and preserve the freedom of 
the press. According to an annual “Freedom of the World” report issued in February 
2016 by the US-based Freedom House, Taiwan has been classified as “free” for 18 
years in a row and Taiwan’s media is usually considered as being amongst the freest 
in Asia. However, during the eight years under the Ma administration, Taiwan’s 
freedom of the press score gradually declined   from 20 in 2008 to 27 in 2015 
(Freedom House, 2016).126  
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 






















6 7 8 9 8 8 8 8 
Table 5.1 Taiwan in Freedom House report- 2008-2015 (made by author) 
The decline of Taiwan’s freedom of the press can be traced back to 2008, 
when the Beijing-leaning Want Want Group purchased one of Taiwan’s major local 






threatening to file lawsuits for their criticism of the company’s pro-Beijing political 
stance. The concern expressed by the local journalists was shared by international 
NGOs. For instance, a report from Freedom House (2016) stated that “indirect 
Chinese influence somewhat limits the variety of opinion represented in mainstream 
media” in Taiwan. It further noted, “advertising from Chinese companies or business 
groups with significant interest in China has taken on an increasingly important role 
and also contributes to self-censorship” (Freedom House, 2016).127 
With a skeptical view over Chinese investment in Taiwan’s media sector, the 
Anti-Media Monopoly Movement did not receive a lot of coverage from traditional 
mainstream media at the start. Despite this small media exposure however, the 
momentum garnered by the protesters through Facebook successfully transformed this 
movement into both an island-wide movement, and an international event. Meanwhile, 
scholars from both public and private colleges and universities in Taiwan pledged 
their support for this student-led movement via a petition. Their creative usage of 
social media paid handsome dividends and helped connect Taiwan’s social movement 
with the global community. For instance, the Overseas Taiwanese students as well as 
some internationally well-known figures including Ai Weiwei lent their endorsement 
to the movement.  
As A1 said, the Anti-Media Monopoly was a milestone in the history of social 
movements in Taiwan, with people calling it the biggest student-led social movement 
since the White Lily Movement in the 90s. Compared with the Wild Strawberries 
Movement, A1 noted, young activists of the Anti-Media Monopoly showed how they 
sophisticated and improved their mobilisation and organisation skills  Together, these 
movements  opened a new stage for social movements in Taiwan and impacted later 





5.5 White Shirt Movement in 2013 
On 4 July, only three days before Corporal Hung Chung-Chiu was due to complete 
his obligatory military service, the twenty-four-year-old soldier died of internal 
bleeding and multiple organ failure (Cole, 2013). Hung’s death sparked public outcry 
and a major political storm, resulting in the formation of a movement called the White 
Shirt Movement, which saw thousands of Taiwanese take to the streets in solidarity 
and demand the military reveal the truth about Hung’s death (Hou and Lee, 2013).128 
The following sections will provide an analytical review on the background and 
political context of the event, as well as the usage of social media and ICTs by the 
organisers and protesters. Semi-structured interviews of key movement organizers 
and relevant stakeholders were also conducted in an effort to offer in-depth insight of 
the mobilisation process and their opinion of citizens’ political engagement in Taiwan.  
 
Background- Formation of Citizen 1985 
Shortly after the tragic death of Hung Chung-Chiu, 39 netizens, who originally did 
not know each other in real life prior to the event, formed a group called “Citizen 
1985” (Gongming 1985 Liangmeng, 公民 1985 聯盟) and demanded that the 
government disclose the truth of Hung’s death (Li, 2013).129 They argued that Hung 
was punished by his supervisors in an inhumane manner, pointing out that Hung 
passed away in hospital after being subjected to days of demanding exercises under 














series of push-ups, sit-ups, and other exercises under extremely humid and high 
temperature environment. In addition to that, Hung was not given any water while in 
detention for the ostensible crime of smuggling a mobile phone into the military base 
(Cole, 2013).  
Initially the military explained that Hung’s death was a pure accident caused 
by normal physical training requested by standard military routine. However, the 
family of the victim refused to accept the explanation and requested the government 
to investigate, and publish a report of the case.  
To pacify public outrage against overly rigorous discipline in the military, 
President Ma said the death of Hung was a result of “absolute power leading to 
absolute corruption” and instructed the Ministry of National Defence (MND) to 
thoroughly investigate the case (Hsu and Chang, 2013). Despite the fact that military 
prosecutors did launch an investigation into the case following Ma’s comment, the 
group Citizen 1985 demanded the MND agree allow a third and independent party 
also take part in the investigation. Facing no direct response to their demand, on 20 
July, members of the group mobilised over 30,000 people to stage a protest in front of 
the MND in Taipei (Chen, 2015:70). Many of the protesters took to the streets for the 
first time in their lives. They did so in an effort to force the government to disclose 
the truth behind the death of Hung and ensure human rights in the military. On 24 
July, nearly ten days after the news of Hung’s had been broken, President Ma visited 
the soldier’s family, apologised publicly and reassured that the government would 
launch a complete investigation into the tragedy (Hung, 2014).  
As one commentator’s (Lin, 2013)described, most of the rally’s participants were 
young men wearing white t-shirts showing solidarity with the protest which lasted 
about one and a half hours, The protest, was  organised purely through 
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communication taking place on social media.130 They took to the streets asking the 
government to improve the military system and offer better protection over the human 
rights of all men and women in uniforms.  
According to an interview with Chen Yu-An (coded as A3 in this study), 
spokesperson of Citizen 1985, they did not expect to see such big turnout when the 
thirty-nine founders planned the 20 July protest at a café in Taipei. He pointed out 
that to start with his group was barely discussed or mentioned by any local 
mainstream media outlets. In order to obtain more media coverage and public 
attention, they used social media and ICTs to communicate and mobilise supporters:  
 
At the beginning, we were aiming for 5,000 people to join us. We did not 
expect to see so many people (Note: 30,000) show up in the end because it is 
unprecedented for ordinary people to organise a protest in front of the 
Ministry of Defence. No one in Taiwan has ever done that. We thought if 
nobody shows up, at least we still had thirty-nine of us to stage the protest… 
Because no mainstream media cared to report about us, Liu Lin-Wei, one of 
our founding members, called a meeting at a café and distributed tasks 
amongst the group members…Afterwards, we used Facebook, PTT and LINE 
to communicate and people used those platforms to express their anger 
(towards the event). Later on our efforts were paid off as we began to draw 
attention from mainstream media (A3). 
  
Regardless of the importance of social media in their internal and external 
communication, Chen noted that mainstream media still played a significant role in 






to attend television political talk shows nearly everyday since local media had begun 
to discuss group Citizen 1985. Gradually though, the mainstream media lost its 
interest in the group. After the 20 July rally, Chen found that public attention began to 
wane and he did not receive any further invites to talk shows for days.  
Their momentum was revived after the military offered no convincing 
explanation of why all recorded footage from the sixteen closed-circuit televisions 
(CCTVs) at the base displayed nothing but black screens (TVBS, 2013).131 The best 
reason the military could offer was that the CCTVs would automatically turn off 
when they sensed pouring rain or thunder. Such an explanation only further infuriated 
the public and triggered the second wave of this White Shirt Movement. An 
interviewee who  was in charge of issuing press releases on behalf of the movement 
revealed that the ill management of the military in this case angered many Taiwanese 
people and helped the movement generate more momentum (A4). Out of frustration, 
the family of Hung on 1 August said they had lost all hope in the military prosecutors’ 
capacity in bringing justice for their lost family member (Cole, 2013). Their sentiment 
was shared by a large segment of Taiwanese people, with more than 250,000 people 
attending the rally on 3 August on Ketagalan Boulevard in front of the Presidential 
Office.   
 
Outcome 
The White Shirt Movement did lead to significant political changes in Taiwan. Apart 
from the resignation of then Minister of Defence Kao Hua-Chu (高華柱), three days 
after the second rally, a modification of the “Code of Court Martial Procedure” was 






procedure system in Taiwan” (Chou, 2013).132 The MND in the end punished twenty-
seven military officers involving in Hung’s case.  
 
5.5.1 Usage of ICTs and Social Media  
Blog 
Following previous social movements, Citizen 1985 launched a blog titled “Citizen 
1985” to release their official media statements, publish their financial statements, and 
archive their event photos and videos.133  
On the database of the blog, fourteen official statements were published and 
fifty-five YouTube videos were archived. Among the fifty-five videos, seven were 
recorded from the events organised for the White Shirt Movement which focused on 
Hung’s death, ten were about later events calling for constitutional reform, eight were 
about government officials statements and public hearings on reforming the military, 
twenty-five were related to the 2014 Sunflower Movement, and the remaining five 





132 See Chou, Huan-Jung (2013) ‘The Young Stand Up, Pursue Hope and Reform’, Taipei Times, 20 






Picture 5.3 A snapshot of the official blog of Citizen 1985 
 
It is worth noting that they published very detailed statements of their income 
and expenditure during every event. They even published a complete list of donators 
(without disclosing their full names) and the total amount of their donation (see Photo 
6.3). The transparent statements deepened the public’s trust towards the activists and 
the movement itself. 
 






Their Facebook page was mainly used for mobilisation and sharing relevant news 
reports on the White Shirt Movement. For instance, 23,000 people on the event page 
said they would attend the 3 August rally, and some seven thousands people said they 
were interested in the event. As NTU professor Hou Han-Jyun commented, protests 
are usually mobilized by political parties, however the organizers of the White Shirt 
Movement “just posted something on Facebook” and such action required “nothing” 
at all (Wan, 2013).135 It was with the help from Facebook and reports from 
mainstream media that Citizen 1985 in the end mobilised far more people than what 
they had expected.  
Facebook also provided a space for people to engage in political discussion. 
As A4 noted, she observed that more and more people began to show interest and 
engage in the discussion of Hung’s case since Citizen 1985 launched its Facebook 
page:  
 
Slowly, more discussion and debate were happening on Facebook… social 
media allows the public to express their opinion and receive opinion from 
other people at the same time. (Social media) becomes the biggest news 
source for people. (A4) 
 
The comments of A4 echoed that of A3, who said that Taiwanese youth 
mostly do not trust mainstream media, especially those favouring the KMT or 









other social media sites are generally critical of the KMT government, suggesting that 
Taiwanese young people aged 18 – 35 were exposed to this anti-KMT atmosphere on 
the Internet.  
According to A3 and A4, social media and mainstream media play 
complementary roles in the mobilisation of a social movement. When people were 
called on to join the protest, their momentum attracted the attention from traditional 
media, which is always after eye-catching news reports and updated its audience on 
the event with a series of reports. In Liu and Hu’s (2015) interview research, it was 
found that there existed positive correlation between the mainstream media’s reports 
on the White Shirt Movement and the number of participants. The more media 
coverage of the event from traditional mainstream media (such as TV, paper, radio), 
the bigger the number of participants who turned out to join the movement. 
 
Other ICT tools 
The thirty-nine-people group held meetings at cafés in Taipei or online via Skype. 
When they conducted votes on major decisions of the event during the Skype meeting, 
the participants typed in “+1” or “-1” (Wan, 2013).136 Separately, the participants of 
the movement edited a Wikipedia page Hung Chung-Chiu’s case and collected a total 
of 220 sources from news reports and government announcements.137 The Wikipedia 
page is an outcome from a group of editors who share a common goal (which is to 
disclose the truth behind Hung’s death) and created by an “order” in which “everyone 
is the editor” (McGrady, 2009). In the creation process of their Wikipedia page and 










New Organization of Social Movement, New Mobilization, New Citizenship? 
Following the preceding sections, it might be safe to say that one of the distinguishing 
characteristics, and also one of the more remarkable perspectives, of the two 
movements was their success at keeping political parties, politicians or their affiliated 
groups away from them. In fact, the movement’s participants considered the then 
ruling party and other political parties as the main source of negative forces facing 
both Taiwan’s media freedom and military human rights. Another key characteristic 
is the nature of digitally mediated organization (Chadwick, 2011) demonstrated by the 
two movements’ organisations, as such nature had rarely been seen in Taiwan’s social 
movements in the past. Even during the Wild Strawberries Movement, the mediated 
coordination between protests held in different campuses was in a minimal level. The 
two major actors of the movements – Anti-Media Monopoly Youth Alliance and 
Citizen 1985 – heavily relied on the ICT tools and interpersonal social media sites for 
internal and external communication.  
Thanks to the fact that ICT tools and social media are generally interactive and 
easy-to-be-personalised, the organisation of the two social movements discussed in 
this chapter, can arguably be described as “successful”. The Anti-Media Monopoly 
Movement saw a draft bill on anti-media monopoly pass the Cabinet, whiles the 
White Shirt Movement led to a de facto abrogation of martial procedure system in 
Taiwan. In Bennett and Segerberg’s (2012) research, they identify two organizational 
patterns which can be used to characterize the increasingly common digitally 
mobilized and enabled movements: 1) interactive digital media and personal action 
themes for citizens to spread the word over their “personal networks”; 2) political 
demand could be conveyed and shared via various technology platforms and 
applications (p. 742). For instance, the slogan used during the Anti-Media Monopoly 
Movement, “I am a student; I don't want Want Want China Times”, easily helped 
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illustrate the main argument of the social movement and was quickly adopted by the 
ordinary public. The slogan then went viral on social media sites in Taiwan, and parts 
of the world where a considerable number of overseas Taiwanese were residing, such 
as in the US. The photo campaign also conveyed a powerful message, which was 
delivered by thousands of images shared by students and people around the world. 
Such digitally mediated action and messages scaled up quickly through different 
layers of personal social media accounts that were used to share, post, and re-post the 
campaign. In the end, the campaign multiplied itself through a massive web 
composed by hundreds of thousands of personal networks.  
In the case of the White Shirt Movement, the announcement published on their 
official blogs and Facebook fan page often got picked up by mainstream media outlets 
in Taiwan as the protest helped local media generate higher viewership. An 
interviewee, who is a news anchor and also a political talk show host from one of the 
biggest cable television channels, SETTV,138 said that as the Internet accelerates the 
speed of news report cycles, most conventional journalists had to turn to social media 
sites for breaking news in an effort to keep up with the speed with which information 
circulated online (M1). She further notes that Taiwan’s new media environment has 
entered a very competitive stage, with many cable TV stations trying to grab a bigger 
share of the pie by using social media as a source for breaking news. As a result, the 
digitally mediated action of sharing and posting information about certain social 
movement not only generates a considerable collective outcome, but also forces the 
mainstream conventional media outlets to keep up with the sweeping speed of the 
development of a movement.  
Similarly, NTU Professor Tao Yi-fen, notes in a paper that the potential of 





compared the White Lily Movement and the White Shirt Movement, saying that the 
former had attracted a maximum of 10,000 people to join the sit-in at the CKS hall, 
whereas the latter garnered over 300,000 people to take to the streets in protest. The 
Internet helps reduce the coordination costs of a demonstration, and makes it easier 
for people to follow an event remotely and creatively.   
Another example is the Facebook photo campaign, “What’s Next” during the 
Anti-Media Monopoly Movement, which invited people to copy the message (to 
download a premade PDF template) and personalise (to include the location of the 
individual who downloads the template) the message and share via social media sites. 
The accumulated photos coming from thousands of young students built up a network 
and connect different individuals into an imagined community which crossed physical 
borders. In that community, people come together as they shared one common idea, 
which was opposing media monopoly and safeguarding the freedom of press in 
Taiwan. They repeated the same action by taking and sharing the photos which 
conveyed and reinforced the message of such idea. The photos travelled 
interpersonally, transmitting through Facebook, international media (such as Epoch 
Times, 2012)139, local newspapers (Liberty Times, 2012)140, blogs (Zhang, 2013)141 
and other social media sites on the Internet. Through these personal actions, people 



















personalization, that is to say the message and sharing a message of a certain idea 
online, collectively the messages posted online become a strong voice in the online 
world, forging a considerable force pushing forward the idea in real life. 
As one of the functions of social media sites is to allow users to share their 
activities or life events, and receive feedback, such tendencies cause people to follow, 
imitate, and share information about a protest and then find satisfaction from other 
people’s re-posting in the cyber-community (Chen & Liao, 2014). This process of 
personalising, sharing, and communicating with one another enables the supporting 
base for a social movement to grow organically through countless multi-layered social 
media accounts on the Internet.  
 
Visualized argument, visualized information, visualized movement 
According to A4, chief press release drafter and news content curator of the White 
Shirt Movement, infographics were used to convey simple event slogans and also 
helped simplified information as the main strategy of the organisers was to draw 
ordinary people’s attention. The also used catchy phrases or slogans to encourage 
people to share event information through their personal social media sites or tools, 
such as Facebook or LINE. A4 and the press team used Prezi, an online cloud-based 
presentation software, to create eye-catching YouTube videos to visualise the reason 
why they started the movement, as well as their arguments and demands. 142  
This kind of all-in-one video mentioned above provides viewers or outsiders 
with easy-to-understand information about the development of certain events or 
movements and is usually referred to as a “lazy people package” in Taiwan. This kind 
of information pack, which can come as a collection of infographics,pictures, 





not have time to collect and analyze a huge amount of information. It does not take 
too long for people to obtain a basic level of understanding of certain events or 
movements by reading the lazy people pack or watching the video.  The three-minute 
long “lazy people pack” video of the White Shirt Movement attracted a total of 
14,660 views.143  
What makes this visualized data so important is that in the information age, 
nearly everything can be turned into a piece of digital information transmitted on the 
Internet. The information can be the background or historical context of a certain 
social movement, the demands of the protesters, as well as, in one of the cases above, 
a demonstration of the public support coming from thousands of overseas Taiwanese 
students who joined the photo campaign and took photos with a slogan and shared 
them on their personal Facebook pages. The examples from the cases presented in this 
chapter demonstrate a significant level of technology-enabled networking (Livingston 
& Asmolov, 2010) which can make personalized information and digitally mediated 
communication processes “fundamental structuring elements” in the organisation and 
mobilization of a movement (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012: 749). 
 
Protesting without an Absolute Leadership 
Similarly to the previous social movements already discussed in the preceding 
chapters, the cases in this chapter saw a declining need for a traditional charismatic 
leader to take a lead in the digitally enabled mobilisation process. The White Shirt 
Movement surprised Taiwanese society by successfully mobilizing hundreds of 









social media and ICT tools. Thirty-nine people, who had never led a social movement 
before, successfully organised and mobilised significant numbers of participants 
during the two rallies during the White Shirt Movement. In addition to the 
characteristics of avoiding associating with any political parties, lacking a well-known 
charismatic leader, and the heavy reliance on online sources to mobilise people, the 
White Shirt Movement managed to attract supporters across party lines and led to a 
real political change. 
Movement Spokesperson A3 said that at the very beginning of the movement, 
every member of the thirty-nine-people Citizen 1985 always turned their back to 
camera or wore face masks when being interviewed by local media outlets. A3 noted 
that “the movement is for the people; therefore, we do not want to have any 
charismatic leader. We want to show people that we (members of Citizen 1985) are 
like every ordinary citizen, who only wants to know about the truth of Hung’s death” 
(A3). To mobilise the Internet-based movement, a new type of leadership with both 
technology skills and political knowledge will be needed in the organization process 
(Chen & Liao, 2014). Separately, a member of Citizen 1985 affirmed that the 
protesters avoided to have a distinguishable leader during the whole event:  
 
We don’t support any side or leader. We are for civil rights, common values, 
democracy. And we make it very simple to join. You just put on a white shirt 










His comment shows that today’s citizens, including those non-political actors, 
are willing to and capable of initiating a movement or large-scale demonstration, if 
their civic rights are being challenged. In the case of the 2013 White Shirt Movement, 
39 individuals without any political party affiliation successfully organised rallies by 
mobilizing on Facebook, online blogs, and other ICT tools. In order to gain 
movement legitimacy, the 39 movement initiators avoided involvement from political 
parties and politicians. Their efforts resulted in 30,000 participants coming out 
showing their support for the first demonstration at the Ministry of Defence in July, 
2013. In less than two weeks, they further mobilised over 250,000 people to stage a 
second demonstration in front of the Presidential Office in August. It might be worth 
noting that the success of the Citizen 1985 proved that a social movement does not 
necessarily require a charismatic leader to gather momentum, as their momentum was 
built upon the accumulated and collected efforts of hundreds of thousands of 
unknown individuals who pledged their support online. During the White Shirt 
Movement, a multi-layered cyberspace became a public realm for citizens to 
broadcast their opinion on military human rights through various digital tools and 
channels.  
It is hard to identity the true leaders of the Citizen 1985, and it is also difficult 
to pinpoint the main leader of the Anti-Media Monopoly Facebook photo campaign as 
the outcome derived from a vast network of multi-layered personal social media 
accounts. Although leaders are not an essential element of the two cases presented in 
this chapter, a group of leaders or ‘starters’ taking initiative are still important at the 







could be better to argue that the role a leader plays during a social movement is 
different from those in the last century.   
Perhaps, then, it is safe to borrow the idea of Bennett & Segerberg (2012) that 
movements can be defined into three different connective and collective action 
networks. In their proposed model “connective action organizationally enable 
networks”, a movement can be mostly organized by loose coordination of action, with 
organizers offering social technology outlays for participants to spread the word of 
the event. The communication process of the movement generally centres around 
organisationally inclusive person action frames, with mild organizational moderation 
by personal expression travelled through social media sites (p.756). Take the White 
Shirt Movement, for instance, the founding members of Citizen 1985 generally stayed 
behind the scenes with one simple task, providing supporters and the public rally 
details and simple-to-understand information for people to share. Meanwhile, 
different social media sites such as various Facebook campaign groups also helped 
amplify the network and henceforth the scale of the support base. The ICTs allowed 
individuals who did not belong to the Citizen 1985 to participate in the social 
movement without committing to every engagement.  
All the information shared and transmitted throughout multi-layered social 
media sites created a loose public sphere for people to engage in public affairs in their 
private capacity. The vast personal networks of participants became a new semi-
public and semi-private sphere for people to express their views on the movement 
with a tendency to copy other people’s engagement within the same movement, while 
at the same time expecting to receive feedback on their view from their followers. In 
one of the “lazy people packs” of the White Shirt Movement, a video calls on citizens 
from all walks of life to support and participate in the event, and argues that as 
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citizens, no matter whether they are soldiers or not, people want their tax money to be 
spent wisely, and corrupted officials to be sacked from the system.  
 
Picture 5.4 Snapshot of “lazy people pack” of Citizen 1985 
 
As Inglehart (1997) argues, young citizens exhibit individualism in their social 
and political orientation. Since the decline of membership in traditional social groups 
and clubs, citizens have begun to show individual-focused orientation when 
expressing their political views. As a result, the major component of societies has 
gradually moved from social groups into individualized and personalized networks. 
The shift might also impact the way citizens evaluate an event and whether to engage 
in public affairs. Perhaps a part of the speech at the 3 August White Shirt Movement 





We are all parts of the civil society  
Therefore when we begin to organize this event 
Our goal is to emphasize equality  
We hope this society 
Starting from today  
Will not only allow politicians  
But also ordinary people like you and me  
With the citizenship given by the Constitution  
To initiate an agenda.146 
 
The aforementioned speech shows that contemporary Taiwanese citizens in 
contemporary democratic society are calling for the autonomy and power to initiate a 
political agenda. When citizens are enabled digitally to communicate in their own 
terms with each other and with their political representatives, they are no longer at the 
receiving end of the political policy making process. Instead, they are rejecting fixed 
political agenda determined by politicians, and at the same time they are using social 
media to make their political demands heard by their elected representatives and the 
government.  
 
5.6 Conclusion  
This chapter attempts to give a close-to-complete picture and an exploratory review of 
the development of social movements under the second term of former KMT 







carefully examines two social movements with a special focus on their 
communication patterns amongst its followers and outsiders through a digitally 
enabled mobilisation process. Reviewing the social movements analytically helps 
provide an opportunity to examine new forms of movement mobilisation and how 
people’s engagement in a social movement reflects their view on their role as citizens 
in a democratic society.   
Compared with other social movements which took place during Ma’s first 
term, social movements in his second term saw more sophisticated usage of ICT and 
social media tools. As discussed in the preceding sections, ICTs and social media 
enable people to personalise the mobilisation and formation process of a large-scale 
social movement. The multi-layered personal networks on the social media sites also 
allow individuals to develop flexible political identifications while partaking in an 
event (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012: 744). In 2008, The Wild Strawberry Movement 
managed to gain attention from the foreign community in Taiwan through its English 
blog. Four years later, social movements such as the White Shirt Movement deployed 
more sophisticated social media strategies and organised various contentious 
collective actions to mobilise people more effectively.  
In the case of 2012, the calling for the freedom of the press was demonstrated 
in the rise of the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement, which used social media sites to 
reach out to the public and connect with the global community more effectively. 
Moreover, the White Shirt Movement, following the tragic death of a young soldier, 
intensively campaigned for military reform and gathered their momentum by  relying 
heavily on digital coordination. The success of the White Shirt Movement is also a 
good example to show how a group like Citizen 1985, which does not have any 
charismatic leaders, managed to use ICTs to successfully mobilise hundreds of 
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thousands of supporters and form a large variety of social groups through the creation 
of movement networks.  
Under former President Ma Ying-jeou’s eight-year tenure, Taiwanese students 
took to the streets en masse, scuffling with police, and forcing their way into 
government buildings. In 2008, they protested against the KMT government’s 
Beijing-friendly policies and argued the government were promoting closer cross-
Strait economic ties at the cost of people’s freedom of assembly. During Ma’s second 
term, students scaled up their actions and argued that media owners with massive 
businesses interests with China should not be allowed to acquire or have control over 
any media outlets as their interest might lead to erosion of press freedom in the 
country. They also mobilised citizens to demand the government improve human 
rights policies and practices in the military. All these movements with different 
focuses happened in the space of only five years. Amongst the social movements 
discussed so far, the recurring theme is all about freedom and human rights, with the 
overlying argument being that the Ma administration failed and disappointed the 
ordinary people.  
The in-depth interviews from key members of  Citizen 1985 show that social 
media sites and ICTs allow people to express their opinion in a liberal manner which 
is disconnected from hierarchical structural positions. People do not necessarily need 
to become a well-known activist or public figure, and yet people can still broadcast 
their voice through various digital channels. In addition, in the organisation and 
mobilisation process of a social movement, it is not a must to have a leader like Che 
Guevara. Instead, cases of contemporary social movements show that momentum can 
be accumulated by a series of collective action from lots of unnamed individuals with 
one or a few key main actors who intentionally stay behind the scene. Like the 
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Hollywood film, V for Vendetta (McTeigue, 2005)147, most of the participants did not 
need to have a name, Instead, they and a few “initiators” can share one identity when 
promoting political or social change.  
Up until the first half of 2013, social media sites played an important role in 
agglomerating civic participations in Taiwan. The social movements discussed in the 
preceding sections showed that Taiwanese citizens were paying more attention to 
democratic values – freedom of speech, assembly, and press, as well as human rights 
– and were willing to stand up and take action if these values were being eroded or 
challenged by a democratically elected government. These social movements also 
help illustrate a clear generational gap.  
In an article published by the Washington Post, a scholar from NTU 
commented that the White Shirt Movement activists simply posted comments on 
Facebook and then successfully mobilised enough people to join the movement. He 
said, “it required nothing”.148 His comments reflect a generational gap. The gap can 
be found when some older Taiwanese lament the decline of social capital and citizens’ 
political participation, whereas many younger Taiwanese are actually to be found 
creatively engaging in public affairs in unconventional ways, and in ways which 
sometimes can be difficult to grasp by their older counterparts. The gap also reflects 
the different understanding and perception about what community means to people, 
how to measure social capital through online and offline people-to-people relations, 
as well as the way people mobilise supporters to join an event for a political cause. 
The gap, perhaps, can indicate the resistance of some older citizens, who often refuse 









The underlying analytical concepts in this chapter are citizens’ usage of ICTs 
and the new nature of social movement. Technology is the backbone of the 
organisation and mobilisation in these social movements, with Facebook and blogs 
becoming crucial tools which empower and enable supporters and participants to 
enhance their influence across boundaries of time and space. Some existing research 
points out that ICTs enable and strengthen civil society to mobilise grassroots 
democracy (Jensen, Danziger & Venkatesh, 2007) and thusly that increasing political 
engagement in the online and offline worlds can consolidate democratic values and 
transform them into practices in the political arena. In the cases of the Anti-Media 
Monopoly Movement and the White Shirt Movement, ICT and social media 
encouraged citizens to engage, debate, and participate in public affairs in a modern 
democracy. For instance, Taiwan citizens who took part in online discussion and 
debate over the tragic death of Hung Chung-Chiu exhibited a strong awareness of the 
issues of human rights. They applied ICTs in their political engagement and forced 
their political representatives to look squarely into the eye of the island’s new “civic-
oriented social movements” (Hung, 2014: 69). As the entire White Shirt Movement 
was initiated by a total of just thirty-nine people who had never led any civic 
movements before, their success in challenging the long-standing military court has 
led some to refer the movement as the ‘Taiwanese Spring’ (Lin, 2013: 8). As key 
members of Citizen 1986 stated in separate interviews that the event was mostly 
initiated and organised on the Internet (A3, A4), it might be safe to argue that the 
White Shirt Movement officially introduced a new page in the social movement in 
Taiwan for ‘civic renewal’ on the island (Hung, 2014: 72). The contribution of this 
chapter lies in the empirical evidence which helps bridge the gap between the 









As has been discussed in the preceding chapters, during former President Ma Ying-
jeou’s first term (2008 – 2012), student-led social movements re-emerged in Taiwan 
and focused on issues relating to different political, social and economic aspects of 
Taiwan. They impacted Taiwanese society by raising public awareness of the 
importance of democracy, freedom, and human rights, and the momentum behind 
these  movements was accumulated by a series of small- or large-scale movements 
which took place between 2008 and 2013. The combined effect of these social 
movements created an undeniably significant force that challenged the Ma 
administration on issues concerning the democratic way of life enjoyed by the 23.5 
million people in Taiwan. These democratic values, including things such as the right 
of assembly or the freedoms of speech and press, have become deeply integrated into 
the daily life of Taiwanese people since the end of martial law. In 2014, Taiwanese 
civil society responded to the hasty passage of the cross-Strait Service Trade 
Agreement (CSSTA) by a legislative committee with the unprecedented move to 
occupy the Parliament chamber for twenty-four days. After a flower shop owner 
delivered flowers to the protesters as a form off support, the media began to call the 
occupation the “Sunflower Movement” by movement . This Chapter builds on the 
methods and approach of previous chapters and proceeds to analyse the Sunflower 
Movement with the aim of examining the digital context behind the usage of ICT 
tools and social media. This chapter will examine protesting citizens’ activities during 
the movement and discuss the implication of their political and civic engagement in a 
modern democracy. It then draws on several interviews with activists, members of 
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ruling and opposition political parties, media, and citizens who voluntarily 
participated in the movement. When the organization and mobilisation process of a 
social movement can be enabled digitally, citizens can easily “join” the movement by 
“sharing” or “clicking” the “Like” button on social media (Chadwick, 2013). The aim 
of this Chapter is to shed new light on how the convergence of old and new media 
outlets might have changed the way citizens participate in, organise, and perceive 
social movements. 
 
6.2. Sunflower Movement: the origin and implication  
In 2010, President Ma inked the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement 
(ECFA) with the Chinese government in an effort to normalise the already vibrant 
trade and economic relations between Taiwan and China.149 Article 4 of the ECFA 
stipulated that both governments would negotiate further agreements on service trade 
in the following years. After several rounds of negotiations and discussions, Beijing 
and Taipei finally reached an agreement under the ECFA framework and signed the 
Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) on 21 July in 2013 in Shanghai, 
China.   
 
Background  
Before the Executive Yuan sent the CSSTA to the Legislative Yuan for ratification, 
the government held sixteen public hearings, which raised growing concerns from 
scholars and civil groups. They argued that the agreement may cause negative impact 











dependence on China. In addition, some Taiwanese business representatives also 
argued that the signing of the CSSTA showed procedural controversies as many of the 
SME representatives were either not invited to attend or only received invitations to 
those public hearings at the last minute, making  their participation impossible.  
Despite the mounting public concern, on 17 March, then ruling KMT legislator Chang 
Ching-Chung (張慶忠), in his capacity as convener of the Internal Administration 
Committee of the Legislative Yuan, took all of thirty seconds to read out the draft 
CSSTA and then announced the completion of the review process (Cole, 2014). 
Straight after Chang’s announcement, the Executive Yuan (Taiwan’s Cabinet) in an 
official statement expressed appreciation and congratulated Chang for completing the 
committee review of the agreement.150 With sixty-five members in the 113-seat 
Legislature, the KMT was confident that the CSSTA could be implemented as early 
as June 2014.  
 
The sudden announcement and the procedural controversy surprised and 
antagonised the public, with students accusing the KMT legislative caucus of 
manoeuvring and manipulating the review procedure at the committee. They said the 
KMT legislators purposely avoided a proper clause-by-clause review of the CSSTA 
and expedited the ratification process of the agreement. They also criticised and 
blamed the ruling party for a lack of transparency during the review process of the 
committee. That evening, a group of students staged a sit-in protest right next to the 












on 18 March. At this protest some 300 people consisting of students, academics, 
activists, and people from other sectors broke into the Legislature and staged another 
sit-in protest, and then broke into the parliament building, and then, by around 21:00, 
managed to occupy the Floor. A few hundred others stayed outside the building to 
protect those in the compound.  
The protesting students used chairs and furniture to block the entrances to the 
Floor of the Legislative Yuan. According to interviewee A1, they were quite lucky as 
a there were already piles of chairs at the compound when they broke in. The chairs 
had been left by opposition members of the DPP, which had been planning to block 
the next day’s sitting by using the chairs and furniture to fill entrances into the 
compound.  
Shortly after, the National Police Administration dispatched the police force to 
evict the protesters. But the police were too late to stop the protest and when they 
arrived at the Legislative Yuan, the Floor was already occupied by hundreds of people. 
Cole observed that young people, who accounted for about 90 per cent of the entire 
group, used various kinds of social media to live broadcast and share photos and 
videos of the protest. On 19 March, the number of protesters swelled to 12,000 (Cole, 
2014c :256). 
After the protesters had successfully occupied the Legislature Floor for five 
consecutive days, local media dubbed the occupation as the “Sunflower movement”, 
now considered the largest student-led movement since the Wild Lily movement in 
1990 (Wang, 2014a). Many key student members (some of them are interviewed in 
the following sections) of the protest were called “seasoned veterans  social 
movements”, as a lot of them had taken part in previous social movements such as the 




“Sunflowers” Occupy the Parliament  
The protesting students expressed worries over Beijing’s growing influence on 
Taiwan’s economy and argued that the CSSTA would further endanger Taiwan’s job 
market and increase Taiwan’s economic reliance on China (VOA, 2014).151 As of the 
morning of 19 March, the number of the protesters had swelled to several thousand. 
They occupied the Floor and live broadcasted the event via Facebook.152 In the 
evening of the same day, live streaming brought the protesters to an approximate 
number of 12,000 (Cole, 2014).  
At the beginning, the student organisers did not expect to see so many people 
support the occupation movement. Lin Fei-fan (林飛帆, coded as A2 in the remaining 
paper), later widely recognised as the “student leader” of the Sunflower Movement, 
told the author that a day before the occupation, 17 March, he and other organisers 
were still discussing how to make more people aware of the potential damage the 
CSSTA could cause the society. A2 said: 
When KMT Legislator Chang took the advantage of being a committee 
convener, expedited the review process and passed the draft CSSTA at the 
meeting, the public seemed to be rather aloof to the outcome. There were some 
NGOs planning to start a petition and trying to raise public awareness of this 
matter… and then on 18 March, between 5 and 7 pm, we contacted our friends 
and asked them to come to the Legislative Yuan. As the police were guarding 











some of us at the Floor checked in on Facebook, we started to see more 
people join us.153  
 
As they began to see their momentum grow, the protesters announced their 
four demands to the government: 1) withdraw the CSSTA and send it back to the 
Executive Yuan; 2) legislate a scrutiny mechanism to monitor all cross-Strait 
agreements; 3) host a Citizen Constitutional Conference (gongmin xianzheng huiyi/ 
國民憲政會議) to discuss matters about Constitutional, electoral and party systems 
and 4) all legislators to support that the CSSTA should be left aside until a scrutiny 
mechanism is legislated. The students believed that the government could be held 
accountable only through a transparent negotiation process with China. After a long 
six days of inaction an international press conference was finally convened at which 
Ma said the protest had to end, so that “other countries would not start to question 
Taiwan’s sincerity and credibility in signing further agreements”. A few days later, 
after the momentum of the protesters continued to grow bigger, Ma finally said that 
he would agree to have a clause-by-clause review of the CSSTA and call a National 
Conference on Trade and Economics to address issues of cross-Strait economic and 
trade relations. However, he declined to agree to withdraw the CSSTA from the 
Legislature.   
Ma’s press conference did not resolve the deadlock, but only further 
intensified the tension between the government and protesters. His statement also 
generated more support, not for the government, but for the occupy movement. 
Following Ma’s press conference, fifteen professors from four top universities in 







They called on President Ma to legislate a scrutiny mechanism on cross-Strait 
agreements before the government proceeded to review the CSSTA. As there was 
scholarly evidence showing that the CSSTA could cause Taiwan a potentially 
negative impact, and they argued that the government should face criticism from the 
public otherwise and the government’s attitude could be considered to constitute a 
“democratic crisis”.154     
Ma’s responses, in addition to the statements from the protesting students, and 
the press conference held by the scholars, reflect the fundamentally different concerns 
between the government and the public. The protesters were particularly concerned 
about the transparency issues existing in any negotiations or trade agreements Taiwan 
has with China and other foreign countries. To the students, Ma was a leader who 
only attached importance to Taiwan’s reputation in the international community but 
not the consequences of the trade pact or any negative impact which could be caused 
by the CSSTA. On the other hand, for Ma, the trade pact was just a follow-up deal to 
the ECFA, which had been signed four years before. He argued that the ECFA had 
successfully helped Taiwan sign free trade agreements (FTAs) with New Zealand and 
Singapore, respectively. As such, he was resolute in his intent to ratify the CSSTA 
and felt that the failure of the ratification would affect a future signing of a trade in 
goods agreement with China, as well as other trade agreements with other countries in 
the future. During an interview with the Economist in late March, Ma once more 
argued that failing to ratify the CSSTA at the Legislature would only lead the 
international community to question Taiwan’s “sincerity and determination” to sign a 








One thing Ma failed to notice was that the protesting students did not just 
focus on the controversies surrounding the CSSTA. Additionally, they also aimed at 
calling for a broader public participation in politics so that the general public could 
monitor any future arrangements or agreements between Taiwan and China. Such 
intent was demonstrated in every statement issued by the students, who always placed 
“withdraw the CSSTA” (tuihui fumao/ 退回服貿) as the number one priority of their 
list of demands. The students believed that only by the legislation of a scrutiny 
mechanism to oversee cross-Strait agreements, would it increase the accountability 
and transparency of the government of Taiwan.  
Frustrated by Ma’s response, some protesters attempted to storm the Executive 
Yuan (Taiwan’s Cabinet) on 23 March. However, this time they were forcefully 
evicted by riot police deployed by then Premier Yi-Hua Jiang (江宜樺) within less 
than three hours of the incident. As over a hundred protesters were arrested and 
injured during the eviction, student unions from forty universities across the country 
issued a joint statement pledging their support to the Sunflower Movement, and 
condemning the police brutality during the forced eviction. They announced that the 
students would be dismissed from all classes to protest against police brutality.  
It was found out through an interview that the protesting students did not 
expect to be evicted by riot police. When asked if there was any fear or anxiety when 
the students broke into the Legislature, interviewee A1 said, “no, we thought maybe 
the worse case is that the police will force their way onto  the Floor and drag us out”. 
“We were busy trying to block all the entrances and distributing tasks among 
ourselves anyways”. A1 said: 
That is why everyone was shocked and enraged when the government 
dispatched riot police to evict the protesters from the Executive Yuan. We have 
heard stories from older activists saying that they used to be beaten up or 
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tortured by the police when they took to the streets to fight for democracy. We 
thought that was something which only happened during the martial law era. 
None of us expected that our friends would get beaten up or kicked repeatedly 
by the police, especially when we are living in a democracy.156 
 
The occupation and political impasse further spurred the public’s distrust in 
the government’s accountability and transparency. A poll conducted by TVBS (which 
is generally considered to be a  pro-KMT media station) and Apple Daily (one of the 
biggest local newspapers in Taiwan) found that the majority of the Taiwanese people 
approved and supported the Sunflower Movement’s occupation of the Legislative 
Yuan (Liberty Times, 2014).157 On 30 March, the students organised a rally with 
attracted around 350,000 to 500,000 participants to reiterate their four demands in 
front of the Presidential Office (Cole, 2014b).158  
The deadlock of the situation lasted until 6 April, when then Legislative 
Speaker Wang Jin-Pyng (王金平) of the KMT promised the protesters that the 
Legislature would not put the CSSTA back on the agenda unless a scrutiny 
mechanism of cross-Strait agreements was established (Tiezzi, 2014). In response to 
Wang’s promise, one of the student leaders, Wei-Ting Chen (陳為廷), claimed 


















agreement (CSSTA) and demonstrated that Ma’s administration’s has lost legitimacy” 
(ibid). On 7 April, the protesters announced that as their demands had been partially 
met, they would leave the Legislature on 10 April.  
The momentum of the Sunflower Movement was not only reflected in its 
number of participants, but also in many public opinion polls conducted by local 
media (See Table 6.1). And such support was not only reflected in the polling 
numbers, many of them donated money, provided tents, food, shelter, and even 
spiritual encourage (Cole, 2015).  
Media Poll Date Finding 
TVBS159  31 March 46% said supported students’ 
demands 




31 March 52.2% said the students should not 
leave the Legislature until their 
demands are met 
39.41% said the students should 
leave the Legislature as they had 
expressed their concern.  
TISR161 24-26 March 63.0% said the students’ 
occupation of the Legislature 
helps protect democracy  
19.6% said the students’ 




22-23 March 64.9% said they support the 
students’ occupation of the 
Legislature  
26.5% said they opposed the 
students’ occupation of the 
Legislature  




















6.3. A More Sophisticated Usage of ICTs and Social Media   
It is the cultivation of the students’ effort in the past two years, during which 
they defied conventional views about the younger generation – that they could 
not care less about politics and the world they live in – and showed Taiwanese 
that they do care and they would take action to make the country a better 
place – anytime and anywhere (Wang, 2014a).  
 
While it was not the first time under the Ma administration that citizens had occupied 
a government building – in 2013, some 20,000 protesters occupied the ministry of 
Education for 20 hours to protest government demolitions and land seizures (Wang, 
2013)164 – it was, however, unprecedented for Taiwan’s Legislature to be occupied 
for twenty-four consecutive days. As a quote from a Liberty Times report put it 
(Wang, 2014a), the Sunflower Movement, however, had not just happened overnight. 
The organisational and mobilisation skills demonstrated by the protesting students 
were the accumulated knowledge and experiences from their involvement in the 
previous social movements. From their previous engagement, they polished and 
sophisticated their usage of the ICTs and social media.  
Significantly, the high Internet penetration rate shows that many aspects of 
Taiwanese people’s life can be digitally enabled and connected. For instance in 2014, 
the total number of Taiwanese people who had access to the Internet reached 17 










cent of the entire population on the island.165 With this background in mind, this 
section will review their ICT and social media usage and how technologies enabled 
the protesting students to increase their momentum domestically and internationally. 
In terms of the main research methods, this section will carefully analyse the context 
and development in the Sunflower Movement, with the supplement data from several 
semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders from different sectors of society.  
 
Social Media as Alternative News Channel  
When the students broke onto the Floor of the Legislature, they organised small teams 
with each in charge of different tasks, such as security, press, social media and 
research (Chao, 2014). Those who were too young to have taken part in the Wild Lily 
Movement to obtain mobilisation skills back in the 1990s certainly knew how to take 
full advantage of the ICT tools and social networking platforms now at their disposal. 
For instance, they used social media sites including Facebook and Reddit’s “Ask Me 
Anything” forum to share first-hand information and announcements with both the 
Taiwanese public and the international community, respectively.166 As mainstream 
media’s reports might be affected by their political leanings, the protesters took 
control of how the event would be reported by using social media as the major 
channel to communicate with the public. They also operated twenty-four-hour live 
streaming via twelve online Web sites such as Ustream, livehouse.in, and YouTube, 














streaming video, the general public could obtain the most up-to-date information 
about the development of the protest, and decide whether they should join the event 
by following the real time developments of the event (Guan, 2013).  
In a way similar to the Wild Strawberries Movement, local mainstream media 
did not pay much attention during the initial stages of the Sunflower movement, 
including Tuesday, 18 March, when the students first broke into the Legislature. In an 
effort to make their voice heard, they began to post articles and photos on CNN 
iReport. Their efforts successfully drew the wider attention of many overseas students 
and attracted many volunteers to help translate articles and statements, and post them 
on various foreign media platforms. Starting from 19 March, Taiwanese local media 
picked up foreign media reports and began paying much closer attention to the student 
movement.  
With a 65 per cent rate of penetration in Taiwan, there are about 15 million 
active Facebook users in Taiwan every month.167 The protesting students and citizens 
who supported the Sunflower Movement spontaneously set up several Facebook 
pages in both Mandarin and English to publish information about the movement and 
update their mobilisation plans. For instance, two Facebook pages “Occupy Taiwan’s 
Parliament Action” and “Taiwan Voice” frequently shared English information and 
foreign news agencies’ reports on the movement. It might be worth noting that the 
group “Citizen 1985” from the 2015 White Shirt Movement also used its Facebook 
page to publish first-hand information from the Legislature and the development of 
the event. Lastly, the Graduate Institute of Journalism of National Taiwan University 
also set up a Facebook page, “NTU Journalism E Forum” (Taida Xinwen E Luntan), 







Forum” (台大 e 論壇) was originally run by only three students from the NTU 
Journalism Graduate Institute. During the Sunflower Movement, over eighty students 
from different universities joined forces writing reports for the forum together. 
Throughout the event, there were several different Facebook pages managed by 
different groups of people. All of them shared a common aim, which was to help the 
movement generate more public support and media exposure.   
In an effort to have the protest seen on more mainstream media outlets locally 
and globally, students on 24 March organised an online crowdfunding campaign. 
They successfully reached their target (NTD 6,330,000) collecting a total of NTD 
6,947,166 within three hours (Yang, 2014) of launching the campaign.168 The fund 
was used to purchase a full-page of advertising space on the New York Times, as well 
as one full-page in the Apple Daily. It is also the first time in Taiwan’s social 
movement history that protesters successfully raised a substantial amount of money to 
purchase the front page of a major foreign newspaper.  
 
24/7 translation team  
The students formed a translation team which consisted of some eighty people who 
translated the event statements and information into a total of ten different languages. 
Another Facebook page “Taiwan News”, on the other hand, was run and managed by 
several professionals living in Taiwan. The page managers included Taiwanese and 
non-Taiwanese. They offered up-to-date news summary in at least four different 
languages (Mandarin, English, French, and German). One of the movement-related 
Facebook pages, “Sunflower Movement, Taiyanghua Xueyun” (Sunflower Movement, 







their statements into at least six languages (English, French, German, Portuguese, 
Arabic and Korean).169  
 
Political party involvement 
It might be important to note that during the occupation, political parties’ involvement 
remained ambiguous. Although the then opposition DPP did help the activists at the 
Legislature by negotiating with then Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-Pyng of the ruling 
KMT, the DPP politicians were still not welcomed to give any speech at the 30 March 
rally or jointly publish any statements with the protesters. It might be safe to argue 
that, the legitimacy and momentum of the Sunflower Movement came from the fact 
that participants mostly consisted of scholars, students, and activists. As A2 told the 
author, the general public expected the student movement to go beyond the traditional 
“blue and green political rivalry”. As a result, A2 said they made a conscious effort to 
avoid any direct affiliation with political parties and prevent the event from being 
labelled as a “DPP-backed political activity”. 
Support from professionals and scholars also helped the protesters gain greater 
public support. For instance, Chang Hsiu-ling, an economics professor at National 
Taiwan University, in her research had criticised the government’s hasty passage of 
the CSSTA and the potential negative impact the CSSTA could cause.170 Another 
example was the joint press conference held by 15 scholars coming from different 











legitimacy of the movement. Their support resulted in attracting wider support from 
people across the political spectrum.  
 
6.4. Discussion and Analysis 
The previous chapter touched upon how social media and technology can digitally 
empower activists and generate a new form of mobilisation that is called “connective 
action” by Bennett and Segerberg (2013). They identify how citizens can use ICTs to 
personalise information of social movements and digitally share with their personal 
networks through social media sites. What remains unanswered is whether this 
connected action will help generate a form of common ground which can contribute 
to a “collective identity”. The aim of this section is to explore the formation of the 
collective solidarity of the Sunflower Movement and conceptualise the mobilisation 
processes which triggers collective identity formation. In this section, press releases 
and published statements during the Sunflower Movement were supplemented with 
the conducting of several interviews. This evidence and material provides an 
interesting and useful supplement to the oral sources of information in the quest for an 
organizational ‘ideology’ of citizenship.  
 
Conceptualized Framework: CCO and citizenship 
The digitally enabled communication process is more than a process of organising a 
social movement. The communication and mobilisation process is especially 
significant to a social movement as the process to some extent speaks for the “we” as 
a unit, a collective noun (Putnam, Nicotera, & McPhee, 2009). To them, the process 
can be called “communication constitutive of organizing” (CCO), in which “text” or 
“codes” are used to encapsulate the movement’s identity.  Laura Putnam and her 
colleagues take a social construction lens to this idea, arguing that organisation stems 
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from communication. In other words, organisation cannot exist without 
communication. In their CCO theory, communication constitutes organisations 
which also reflect social construction of reality, and organising itself is a process of 
communicating. Such an idea is similar to a theory proposed by Hawes (1974), who 
argues that communication is not only an organisational activity, but also a form of 
creating and recreating social structures. The recreation process could be carried out 
through the use of language, symbols or co-constructed meanings.  
As Langlois, Elmer, McKelvey and Devereaux (2009) note, social media has 
become a site of political communication and action in many other parts of the world. 
The growing political activities taking place on social media sites create a space 
where citizens can be informed and also participate in debates or events about public 
affairs. These social media sites then offer citizens a place where they potentially 
influence the political decision-making process. The Habermasian type of public 
sphere to some extent might be able to describe the democratic potential of social 
media, however, the personalised information and the multilayers of personal and 
public spaces in the architecture of social media makes it difficult to understand how 
citizens perceive and discuss political information through social media sites where 
political communication, political contexts and communication patterns are somewhat 
intertwined altogether. As they argue, ‘there is a need to pay attention on how politics 
mobilises code at the same time as code formalises politics according to specific 
informational logic’ (ibid., p.417). According to their argument, ‘code’ includes the 
software, networks, information dynamics and other relevant elements of digital 
media through which communication takes place.  
This section attempts to suggest that the idea of ‘code’ or ‘text’ could be an 
indicator for one to analyse the underlying perception of citizenship. Such perception 
can be exhibited by the ‘code’ and ‘text’ creators, who can be the participants, 
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activists or citizens who pay attention to a certain event or a social movement. This 
chapter, based on the foregoing discussion, suggests that the idea of “digital 
citizenship” can be potentially conceptualised as the interconnected texts and 
conversations that take place on digitally enabled social media sites on which citizens 
come together to share and discuss public matters. The following section will draw its 
empirical evidence from semi-structured interviews with several Sunflower 
Movement activists, party staff, as well as online material gathered through social 
media sites or other relevant platforms established with an aim of supporting the 
Sunflower Movement.  
 
6.5 When citizens publicity express their private me-centricity  
As previous chapters revealed, many Taiwanese young activists used ICTs and social 
media to harness their collective action and express their views without the support of 
traditional mainstream media outlets, especially when their action was downplayed or 
ignored by traditional media. As such, the rise of social movement, to some extent, 
can be attributed to the rise of ICTs which digitally enable citizens to change the way 
they advocate a political or social issue, and further change the relationship between 
citizens and their democratically elected representatives in the parliament.  
In terms of the usage of Facebook during the Sunflower Movement, their 
English page “Occupy Taiwan’s Parliament Action” by default provided the 
following methods for people to express their support or views on the movement: 
citizens could become “fans” of their page” or supporters of the movement leaders’ 
public Facebook profiles, citizens could create or join a Facebook group or page, or 
citizens could share their political views on their personal Facebook account.  These 
methods thus helped any one who expressed interest in her/his Facebook page 
become part of the members of the social movement. When one clicked the “like” 
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button on the Facebook fan page, she/he would begin to receive updates in the news 
feed of her/his personal account. She/he then would be exposed to the narratives and 
arguments posed by activists calling for the government to respond to “our demands”.  
As this multi-layered cyberspace creates a new arena for individuals to express 
the “self” and recreate the territory of “self” through different expressive tools,  
technology has reshaped citizens’ communication and the definition of “public” and 
“private”. By liking a fan page about the Sunflower Movement, or following some 
activist’s personal page, these collective actions help reinforce a collective voice, 
and then a collective identity, “we”, which is used repeatedly by the activist. On 
many occasions, the activists used “we” in their narratives and created a sense of 
belonging for their followers, both offline or online. One of the movement’s related 
Facebook fan pages “Sunflower Movement Taiwyanghua Xueyun” (Sunflower 
Movement, Sunflower Student-led Movement) in its press release dated 4 April stated: 
 
We are in the process of discussing and planning what is next for the 
movement. We aim to dig roots around the country, using speeches, marches, 
grassroots forums, Internet-based civic movements, and monitoring of the 
Legislature, to augment our dual goals of resisting CSSTA and the 
legalization of the oversight mechanism.  
 (4 April, 2014, published on Facebook 
https://www.facebook.com/sunflowermovement/posts/322737267851435)  
Similarly, the concept of “we” was repeatedly reiterated in the cover photo of 
another Facebook fan page “Occupy Taiwan’s Parliament Action”. In its cover photo 





With the protest now on our fifth day, our demands include: 
1. Send back the cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement 
2. Pass a bill to monitor cross-Strait agreements 
3. President Ma must answer our demands 




Similarly, the word “we” was used twenty-six times in the speech by one of the 
student leaders, Lin Fei-fang, at the 30 March rally: 
 
 Now, we must give direct orders to a government that has lost self-control… 
We have made this very clear since day one: Taiwan’s representative system 
and democracy has been thoroughly destroyed by an autocratic and dominant 
authority. (Lin: 2014)171 
 
The texts above show that the idea of “we” was created by the statements issued on 
the Facebook pages, as well as the Sunflower Movement leaders in their speeches. 
And such an idea was recreated and reinforced when supporters shared or “liked” the 
posts on social media sites. Lin’s speech and the Facebook page cover photo created a 
distinction between “we” and those who were not part of the Sunflower Movement, 
meaning the Ma administration. The protestors claimed that they spoke on behalf of 









the people in a democracy. As a journalist told the author, the younger generation was 
calling for a “dialogue” between the people and the government during the Sunflower 
Movement (M2): 
  
The new generation wants dialogue directly with the government. However, 
the Ma administration was seemingly defending the corporates. In the past 16 
years, Ma has been quite popular in Taiwanese society as a mayor of Taipei 
and then as president. However, the Internet allows people to challenge such 
popularity and forces god to leave his altar (M2).  
 
That the Internet provides social movement activists a new public sphere to 
call for direct communication and dialogue with politicians helps the common people 
elevate their position in the relationship between citizen and politicians. As M2 argues, 
during the Sunflower Movement, people formed a collective voice which basically 
called for direct communication and dialogue with the government.  
This elevated position also helped further reinforce the idea of “we” – the 
public – vs. “them”, which is the Ma government. The emphasis of this collective “me” 
could be found in the activists’ usage of “we” in their social media posts and 
statements published on other platforms at different social media sites. The distinction 
between the activists and the government was therefore reinforced by the personal 
networks between movement participants, who via the various social media sites saw 
their friends occupy the Legislature and henceforth decided to take action to join their 
friends, as well as the Sunflower Movement. A key member told the author that the 




Before we broke into the Legislature (note: on 18 March), the period of time 
between 5pm and 7pm was quite critical because many people began to share 
with their friends on social media about the break-in plan. We assigned some 
people to gather near the Legislature’s entrance near Qingdao East Road to 
distract the police. Meanwhile, another group was assigned to gather at the 
other entrance near Jinan Road and force into the Legislature building.  When 
we broke into the Legislature, some journalists also came along with us. I 
think there were about 100 to 200 people inside the Floor. A lot of us checked-
in on Facebook, took photos and selfies, and then shared the photos on 
Facebook. Our sharing activity attracted more people to come join us in the 
Legislature (A5).  
 
As an outspoken member of the Sunflower Movement, A5 was invited to debate with 
politicians and public officials on various live televised political talk shows during the 
twenty-four day of occupation. The level of the user interface was described by A5 as 
an important element in the organisational process of the movement. Of course, such 
an organisational process did not rely on digital network alone. It began with a few 
people who knew each other and shared certain level of mutual trust. His comments 
echoed that of A1, personal networks became the supporter base of a protest or 
demonstration, particularly during the social movements of recent years in Taiwan. 
While people invite their friends to join a protest together, such an invitation makes 
attending a protest look like going to a big gathering where all your friends are 
probably there already.  
 Another interviewee, who is currently an aide of a then ruling KMT legislator, 
told the author that the Sunflower Movement was initiated by a closed group in which 




On 18 March, I think there were about nearly 100 people who closely 
communicated with each other through their personal LINE messaging groups 
or Facebook groups. Those groups are usually exclusive for invited members 
only. And my friend who joined the movement told me that they have been 
organising the event for a long time since previous social movements (P1) 
 
 The personal networks reinforced this me-centric focus by transmitting images, 
texts and video of the movement through multi-layered social media sites. As A5 
mentioned, the first thing they did when they broke into the Legislature was to take 
selfies and check in on Facebook. The interviews with A5 and P1 reaffirm the role of 
Facebook in the organisational process, as the popular social media site enables 
people to spread relevant information and their political demands through their 
“personal networks” embedded in the interactive digital media environment (Bennett 
& Segerberg, 2012: 742). As A5 notes, the protesting students’ activities on Facebook 
turned the social media platform into the most important “medium” in the 
organisational process. The activists not only shared the event with their instant 
contacts on social media, but also with people they did not know by changing their 
account privacy setting from “personal” to “public”, and thus allowing people 
including their friends’ friends or strangers to see what was posted on their personal 
Facebook accounts. It is through the action of “turning privacy setting from private to 
public” that protesters turned their private social media account into a public avenue 
for outsiders to receive updates about their personal activities. During the process, a 
common identity, “we” was forged, particularly if other people also liked or shared 
their posts about the protest. Here, the boundaries between what is private and what is 
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public become elusive, the identities between “me” and “we” also become blurred in 
the digitally enabled social movement. 
 
Crafting an Imagined Community and Social Movement  
In digital space, everything is transmitted in the form of data. In a digitally enabled 
and organised movement, activists communicate with each other through countless 
data transmission on the Internet, in which their demands, statements and views to 
certain degrees reflect the movement’s identity, and how the participants understand 
their role as citizens in a society. The preceding section argued how citizens’ personal 
networks provide a rich network to be analysed, reviewed the communication through 
which political-information dynamics are presented, and discussed the 
communication taking place in the online world.  
 In the same vein, this section aims to explore how social media, especially 
Facebook, personalises the digitally enabled representational interface as the 
communication process taking place on the Internet may affect the way people 
perceive themselves and others as members of a public, as well as the way they 
experience their social and political world online. The challenge facing the pursuit of 
this section is the growing interactive functions and multiple-layers of convergent 
social media sites. A post on Facebook can be the recreation of posts from other 
social networking sites, such as Twitter, LinkedIn or Instagram. Therefore, the 
proliferation of social media sites makes it quite difficult to gauge all communication 
flow online. However, by taking an analytical view over the informational dynamics 
of Facebook during a social movement, this section hopes to contribute to the existing 
research of the social and cultural assumptions about social media.  
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 According to an interview with Huang Shou-da172 (coded as P2), then 
director of the Department of Youth of the DPP, during the Sunflower Movement 
Facebook created an online and collective identity, which is similar to Anderson’s 
(1983) notion of “imagined communities”: 
 
Facebook creates an imaginary space in which people share an illusion that 
they think they are being progressive altogether. Take recent social 
movements (note: in Taiwan) for instance, Facebook opened up and extended 
every Taiwanese personal network. For example, I knew A so I can learn 
about A’s personal network through her/his social media account. A person’s 
private network can be shared and extended to a national scale. (P2) 
 
 When one followed the Sunflower Movement through a Facebook fan page, 
she/he would be provided with information about the number of participants who 
expressed interest in a certain event, pictures or updates about the participatory 
behaviour of her/his fellow followers of the same page, and comments made by active 
contributors to the page.  The individual could also express her/his views or share 
information on the page. It is these “easy actions”, such as sharing, clicking the “Like” 
button, following, tweeting, or retweeting on social media sites, that facilitated closer 
ties amongst members or followers of a certain online social media group. The ties 
might not be as strong as some created by face-to-face interactions (Kavada, 2015), 
however, in the digitally enabled and created community, the nature of interpersonal 
ties might be fundamentally different from that of the offline world. As Gladwell 
(2010) in a New Yorker article argues, the platforms of social media are mainly based 






big enough to challenge reality.173  Despite the fact that it was the “small acts” which 
helped Sunflower Movement activists successfully raise NTD 6.33 million in less 
than three hours and mobilize over 500,000 people to stage a rally in front of the 
Presidential Office, weak ties are still central to collective action when technology, to 
some extent, has changed the way people interact with each other and perceive 
information with their gadgets.  
Such a view is shared by P1, who in the interview commented that social 
media makes it easier to begin a social movement: 
  
Social media allows activists to mobilize people quicker and more easily. It 
also makes the speed of information on movements sharing a lot faster. (P1) 
 
What P1 described is the low threshold of starting a social movement. One can 
start a social movement simply by creating a Facebook page and asking her/his 
contacts to join or share with their personal contacts until there is a sufficient number 
of registered participants.  On the digitally enabled platform, everyone can create 
content, collaborate and recreate more content, which can potentially lean to an 
“empowerment of citizens” with the potential to generate economic or social changes 
(Benkler, 2006). 
When interviewed by the author, P2 even shared an idea about how to start a 
social movement via Facebook: 
 
If you have at least 50 to 100 friends on your Facebook account, then you 







to support your action, as long as your cause is reasonable and convincing. It 
is how easy you can create a small scale social movement on social media 
(P2).  
 
P2’s comments might help shed new light on how social media reshapes the 
way people think they can form a social movement, how they consume political 
information, and the way people decide whether to participate politically. In other 
words, the context in which people operate and influence each other in terms of 
participating in a political event might be changed in the digital age. However, it does 
not mean that social media has become the main driving force behind a collective 
action or social movement. What P2 and this study find is that social media and ICTs 
have the potential to generate disruptive social or political change without the 
traditional organisational process. Similarly, A5 noted the importance of social media, 
particularly Facebook, in the case of Taiwan’s recent social movements:  
 
Facebook is quite important as it connects different social circles and expands 
people’s networks. It also creates new types of opinion leaders, who can 
garner momentum through such expanded networks created online. (A5) 
 
The aforementioned comments from politicians and Sunflower Movement 
activists somewhat indicate the decreasingly important role of traditional media in the 
multifaceted relationship between citizens and social movements. If in the last century 
traditional media helped contribute to the building of ‘imagined communities’ 
(Anderson, 1983) by making their products appeal to the public’s nationalistic attitude, 
in the digital age ICT and social media enable people to form their own “imagined 
communities” without the mediation from mainstream media organizations. The 
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Sunflower Movement activists and supporters on several Facebook pages – “Taiwan 
Voice”, “Occupy Taiwan’s Parliament Action” and “Sunflower Movement Xueyun” 
– issued statements and news releases in different languages in an attempt to control 
how traditional media may cover the movement. As texts, pictures and videos can 
travel quickly from one follower’s social network to another, activists use the 
Facebook pages to diffuse the information on the movement beyond their personal 
networks. Similarly, Mattoni and Trere’s (2014) research on an Italian student-led 
movement finds that social media enables activists to “act, negotiate and engage” with 
the media through flows of multiple communication technologies in the continuum 
between mainstream media and new media (ibid., 264). As such, activists of the 
Sunflower Movement were offered plenty of alternative media combination that 
student activists of the 1990s could not even imagine. It is through the constant 
exchange, discussion and transmission of digital information of the Sunflower 
Movement that activists and their followers on social media together formed an 
“imagined community”. The community of the Sunflower activists changed Taiwan’s 
political landscape. as demonstrated in local elections occurring later that same year 
in November, 2014, and they also changed general public’s perception of social 
movement. This community also successfully attracted people from all walks of life, 
with A2 commenting: 
 
Since the Sunflower Movement, a lot of people who used to be aloof about 
politics now became more interested in public affairs. 
 
Perhaps it is useful to borrow Mattoni and Trere’s comment that ‘social 
movements were said to “take place as conversation” in which activists and their 
followers interact with “multiple audiences” on the multi-layered social media 
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platforms’ (ibid., 253). When people politically engage with each other on social 
media sites, the information and discussion they exchange and share constitute a 
collective voice, a collective action, and then a collective identity. Just like in this post 
written by Sunflower activists on Reddit: 
 
To be honest, we are all really tired. It’s been like a never-ending camping 
trip, except we’re in a fluorescent lighted building in the middle of the city. 
But we keep ourselves busy and organise… We’re definitely building 
momentum though.  




Perhaps, the strong momentum of the Sunflower Movement can be possibly 
attributed to empowered individualism as technologies provide citizens with various 
expressive tools to voice their opinion, being it personal, political or social. 
Individualism, as Inglehart (1997) notes, is embraced and exhibited by young citizens 
in their social and political orientation. The self-oriented social media reinforces 
people’s attention on her/himself  by making small, creative actions such as taking 
selfie photos, checking-in at every place she/he visits or sharing personal feeling or 
updates on the Facebook “status” with their followers. Nevertheless, it is interesting 
that under this sense of growing individualism, loosely connected individuals 
somehow manage to organise or mobilise enough people to f cause substantial social 
or political changes, such as was the case with the Arab Spring.   
Taking together the foregoing discussion and evidence gathered by the 
interviews, it is evident that social media helps facilitate a loose organisational 
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process of personalised information shared and distributed by diverse individuals 
through their own networks. To conceptualise how these individuals form a collective 
identity throughout the organization process, maybe Melucci’s (1996) ‘collective 
identity’ can be helpful, particularly in how to analytically describe the identity 
forming process in a movement. He argues that collective identity is formed through 
an interactive and shared definition produced by a group of individuals. Melucci 
further notes that by ‘interactive and shared’, he means a recurrent process in which 
individuals form a collective identity through negotiating, interacting, communicating, 
and influencing each other. In addition to the communication process, a certain level 
of ‘emotional investment’ enables individuals to “feel themselves part of a common 
unity” (Ibid., 71). His idea of ‘emotional investment’ is similar to what was described 
by P2 as “emotional mobilisation”: 
  
In many social movements such as a 2012 movement opposing the Wenlin 
Yuan condominium project, the live broadcasting of the event made a lot of 
people remotely feel that they were part of the movement. When protesters 
used Facebook to live-stream the event where a group of young people trying 
to stop the city government to demolish an old residential apartment, they also 
broadcasted the feeling of crisis, urgency to people who watched the event 












In the same vein, what social media offered activists during the Sunflower 
Movement was this interactive and communicative environment, through which 
people emotionally and politically engage and communicate with each other. Their 
collective actions took place in these interactive relationships and interconnected 
conversations on the various multi-layered digital platforms. It henceforth loosely 
formed a digitally enabled, imagined community in which individuals shared a 
collective identity while they tried to generate social and political change through the 
actions of creating and recreating content on social media.  
 
From Online to Offline; From Private to Public 
So far, the cases discussed in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 have focused on the usage of social 
media, how social movement organisations in Taiwan are similar to the idea of 
communication constitute organisation (CCO), and the collective identity shared by 
members of the digitally enabled social movements. It might be appropriate to argue 
that Facebook and other online social media sites create a democratising impact on 
people’s interaction online, by offering them information at their fingertips, providing 
them a platform for diverse demographics and equipping them with a wide variety of 
expressive tools.  
The role of social media has been a focus for many researchers who attempt to 
unfold the relationship between citizens and the technological infrastructures in a 
society (Costanza-Chock, 2012) and social media in contemporary democracy 
(Castells, 2012; Chadwick, 2013). This section, however, attempts to argue that 
citizens, especially the technology-savvy ones, are digitally enabled to express their 
personal views, be that social, cultural, or political, with the private sphere embedded 
in their personal social media accounts. When the private sphere can be partially or 
temporarily turned into a space with an access to the public, the private space is no 
236	
	
longer what it used to be. Mediated communication is complicated by the multi-
layered personal networks on the Internet, with ICTs and other technology turning 
people’s personal views expressed on social media or other online activities and 
communication into commodifiable data (Turow, 2001).175 The commodifiable data, 
transmitted on the Internet in the forms as pictures, videos, or texts, somehow become 
part of the driving force behind social and political change in modern democracy.  
 
When I am weak, then I am strong 
A6, an activist and translator during Sunflower Movement in an interview said that 
she did not meet many of her personal contacts on social media until she broke into 
the Legislature along with the protesting students: 
  
In the past social movements mostly relied on people you already knew. 
However, technologies allow people to know each other without meeting each 
other. As such, I met a lot of people through Facebook and other social media 
and many of the contacts I have on social media share similar values with me. 
(A6) 
 
In the case of A6, the bonding between her and her contacts on social media 
did not need to be based on face-to-face meetings but a set of shared values. Social 
media reshapes the way people choose to befriend each other. Not only that, social 
media also allow those people who never met but are digitally connected with each 
other a realm to take their private relations to another level, which is, in this instance, 








Based on the experience of A6, the interpersonal relations created over social 
media did not require face-to-face interaction. Such interpersonal relations are similar 
to the term ‘weak ties’ coined by Mark Granovetter. In his paper “Notes on the 
strength of weak ties” (Granovetter, 1983), Granovetter defines interpersonal relations 
with friends as strong ties, and personal relations with acquaintances created over 
social media as ‘weak ties’. Although strong ties might help one feel a deep sense of 
belonging to a church or certain goal-oriented groups, he argues that weak ties “are 
actually vital for an individual’s integration into modern society” (ibid., p. 203) as 
weak ties can also play a role in an individual’s opportunity for mobility. The more 
weak ties an individual has, the less likely she/he will be deprived of information 
from distant parts of the society. In the same vein, the accumulation of connections on 
social media might play a similar role as they help bring different groups of personal 
networks into contact with each other.  
A7, a graphic designer who said watching the protestors’ Facebook live 
stream was the key reason he decided to join the movement. Growing up in Belgium 
and speaking French as his first language, A7 mainly helped translate press statements 
into French, and occasionally helped design pictures for social media. When asked 
how had not known about the occupy movement already, A7 said: 
 
During the night (note: 19 March), while I was loitering on the Internet during 
one of my insomnia sessions, I clicked on a link on Facebook. It was a live 
streaming of the legislative yuan. I thought: “why is it still going on? WTF”! 
Without thinking too much, I began to watch the live streaming. Little by little 
my eyes opened, I couldn't believe my eyes. It wasn't what I was thinking. My 
eyes were glued to the screen for two hours. After which I began to look for 
news and info. And in few hours I found myself in a group of online translators 
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translating all that was happening by the minute on each corner of the street 
surrounding the Legislative Yuan”. 
(A7) 
 
A7 did not know whether any of his friends were occupying the Floor of the 
Legislature. However, his attention was caught by a link, probably shared by his 
friends and became available on his Facebook news feed, and the link led him to 
watch the livestream for two consecutive hours. And later on, he became one of the 
members translating and writing articles for the Facebook Page “Taiwan Voice”. In 
the interview, he seemed to still remember the emotion he had when watching the live 
stream.  Some might argue that people with strong ties are more likely to influence 
each other through communication (Haythornthwaite, 2002)176. However, from A7’s 
interview, it might be safe to argue that the accessible information about activities of 
an individual’s acquaintances (weak ties) can arguably become a source of 
information and a driving force which nudges the individual to react. Another 
example is the Sunflower Rally which took place on 30 March, for instance, about 
70,000 people clicked “join” on the Facebook event page, while a further 16,700 
people indicated that they may join the rally by clicking on the event page’s 
“interested” button. In the end the rally attracted nearly 500,000 people. The number 
of people who openly expressed willingness to go to the rally on Facebook was a key 
signal of viability to those who came later but did not click join on the Facebook page 










Picture 6.1 Facebook event page of 330 Anti-CSSTA Rally 
 
The trend of how people can easily connect with and influence each without 
actually knowing each other goes hand in hand with the decline of the traditional 
sense of membership of social groups, or what Robert Putnam (1995) would refer to 
as “social capital”. Social media focuses on the individual, and reinforces people’s 
“me-centric” orientation by enabling them to choose who to follow, what to share and 
what group to join. The threshold of joining a group becomes flexible as individuals 
can freely decide whether to join or leave a group. Such flexibility also allows people 
to have looser concept about “belonging to a group” than the traditional concept of 
membership to groups such as a political party. Take the Sunflower Movement, for 
instance, there were more than five Facebook pages set up by supporters or activists, 
with each attracting a minimum of 5,000 followers. Through these Facebook pages or 
other similar social media platforms, people can easily “participate” in the movement 
by sharing personalized information or making ‘micro-acts’ of participation, such as 
sharing a post on their personal Facebook accounts, retweeting a politician’s 
statement, posting on a social media site or watching live streaming of a protest online 
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(Margetts, John, Hale & Yasseri, 2016: 52).177 The ‘micro-acts’ proposed by Margetts 
and her colleagues not only reduce the threshold for a citizen to engage in a political 
event, but also lower the transaction costs both in relative terms and as a proportion of 
the participation might cost the individual (ibid.).  
 When the ‘micro-acts’ can be shared with a wider audience, the visibility of 
one’s activity is no longer an item solely restricted or limited to her/his private sphere. 
To some extent, the public and private spheres become interconnected or, sometimes, 
interchangeable, on the Internet, as Facebook and other social media platforms allow 
people to publicize their activities through a closed circle of personal contacts, as well 
as the outside world. And such interconnected public and private spheres triggered 
many, such as A7, who were in that complex sphere to join the movement.  
With the evidence and interviews discussed and presented in the preceding sections, it 
is clear that an individual can easily share her/his political view with strangers on 
Facebook simply by changing the privacy setting of their personal account. Or, the 
individual can choose to comment or post something on a public page, which can be 
accessed by anyone who has a Facebook account. When people comment on a post 
from the open Facebook page of a politician or public figure, her/his privately made 
opinion becomes publicly accessible in a digitally enabled semi-public sphere where 
everyone is free to comment or express political view. 
 In the interconnected online community, an individual’s existence is neither 
entirely private nor entirely public. In the multi-layered personal networks created on 
social media, one’s thoughts about political, economic, or social matters can be 
merged into the sea of information created by millions of individuals. When these 
converged technologies are intertwine with the way people express their private and 






what is private can offer a useful indicator of how they engage with the society 
politically, culturally and economically.  
 
6.6. Conclusion  
This chapter is not arguing that the organisational and communication process of 
social movements have been changed fundamentally by the convergence of social 
media and ICTs. It does, however, try to bridge the gap between existing research 
when most of the focus is currently aimed towards looking at how information 
diffuses on the Internet, how activists can be empowered by ICTs, or if social media 
usage increases one’s civic engagement. This chapter’s underlying argument is that 
ICTs create possibilities for citizens to engage in multiple arenas at the same time. 
The case of the Sunflower Movement provides a grand example of how a generation 
who were born into a democracy use social media to voice their pursuit of democratic 
values, and, at the same time, how technology transforms the way these young people 
engage with each other, engage with public affairs, and engage with the government. 
To start with, the key message delivered by the “Sunflowers”, the activists of 
the Sunflower Movement, has been its pursuit of democratic values. For the protesters, 
Democracy is not just about the freedom of speech. Democracy, they argued 
repeatedly during the event, means allowing the public direct channels to scrutinise 
the government’s policies and performance. This means that they put more emphasis 
on democratic values. Compared with older generations in society, the protesting 
students born in the 1980s exhibit a different perception of democracy and their role 
as a citizen in the information age. 
 The four demands of Sunflower Movement were not met by the government 
completely. However, they did successfully reject the CSSTA that the Ma 
administration had struck with Beijing. If the metric is policy achievements, then the 
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Sunflower activists did achieve political concessions (Bush & Rigger, 2019; Rowan, 
2018). Nevertheless, the publicity and visibility this event received in Taiwan and in 
the international community introduced the revival of  political participation by the 
youth in this young democracy. Moreover, the achievement of the movement can be 
found in the shifting political landscape in Taiwan (Liu, 2015)178 and the reviving 
political participation of the Taiwanese young people. One year after the 2014 
Sunflower Movement, one of the movement spokespersons reportedly told reporters, 
“I think young people are no longer indifferent to politics and so many of them came 
out to vote in the November elections (note: in 2014), which affected the outcome” 
(AFP, 2015).179 Similarly, the Taiwanese society in return also paid more attention on 
the voice of the youth. A survey conducted by one of the leading local newspaper 
United Daily News (UDN) found that 64 per cent of respondents agreed that the 
society paid more attention on the opinion of the younger generation. The same poll 
also showed that 47 per cent, nearly half, of those polled said that Sunflower 
Movement brought out positive impact on the Taiwanese society.180 
 The picture of people’s relations with social media and ICT is complex and 
difficult to be illustrated clearly. Based on the interviews with key stakeholders such 




















social media extends people’s personal networks and blurs the boundaries between 
their private and public spaces on the Internet. An individual’s communication, 
discussion, or participation can be transmitted in the form of digital data. That means, 
when data becomes the currency of people’s transaction in a political event, it is 
therefore more difficult to put people’s behaviour into different categories.  
 Apart from its impact on Taiwanese society, the Sunflower Movement also 
reshaped relations between the public and their democratic representatives. During 
Taiwan’s 2014 local elections, the money spent on traditional media by political 
campaigns dropped to NTD 95 million from NTD 242 million in 2010 (see table 6.1). 
 As technology has changed the way people receive and react to political 
information, many politicians have shifted resources and capital to spreading 
information via the Internet.  
 
Table 6.1 Money spent on campaign advertisement on traditional media outlets- 







This is one area of potential concern. When the online world becomes another 
“public arena” for politicians to engage with people, share their policies and messages 
with their constituencies, and criticise their opponent, it is important for democracy 
researchers or activists to understand how the Internet might have changed the 
relations between politicians and the public. At a time when democracy is under 
attack worldwide, some have begun to worry about the division created by the use of 
social media in society and argue for greater social responsibility from the big firms 
such as Facebook. 182 To combat fake news, the Economist even suggested that 
perhaps social media firms should push click bait further down the news feed. The 
idea that social media conglomerates should work harder seems convincing when 
democracies around the world are complaining about fake news. For instance, a UK 
parliamentary committee in 2018 issued a report and warned that disinformation and 
the spread of fake news online threatens the future of democracy in the UK.183 
However, such a remedy is against the funding purpose of those companies, making 
profit. Perhaps, a real solution requires all stakeholders - big firms, governments, and 
all netizens alike - to explore ways to improve the public sphere in the online world, 
while at the same time ensuring the freedom of citizens in the online private sphere.  
Another area to take into account is the connectivity created by the Internet 
and social media. As the case of the Sunflower Movement revealed, activists 
generated momentum and support from both people at home and from abroad. 
Amongst their supporters, some shared strong ties with the activists while some only 
shared weak ties with them. As online communication can  take place easily in the 









of citizens to generate positive (or negative) impact on democracy through their 
online collective actions remains untested. The Sunflower Movement offered a 
positive example in which citizens worked together to stop the government from 
ratifying a trade pact which might potentially damage their democratic way of life and 
harnessing their reliance on China’s economy. However, as it takes certain conditions 
to make a social movement possible and successful (Bourdieu, 2000), the Sunflower 
Movement’s success resulted from accumulated public resentment towards the KMT 
government, a weakening economy, and a growing awareness of Taiwanese identity 
amongst Millennials. Whether Taiwanese society will see another big scale of youth-



















Chapter 7- Analysis & Conclusion 
7.1 Summary of the Study 
The occupation, dubbed the “Sunflower Movement”, was not a single event, but a 
climax of a series of social movements, which began taking place when Ma Ying-jeou 
of the KMT won the presidency in 2008. The timing of the resurgence of social 
movements is significant. Theoretically speaking, Ma’s election signified the passing 
of what Huntington termed the “two-turnover test”, and should therefore functions as 
evidence that Taiwan’s democracy has reached a point of consolidation. Why then, 
when Taiwan’s democracy has been consolidated, did people still choose to take to 
the streets to have voices their heard? What does the resurgence of social movement 
mean? And what can we learn from this series of social movements in Taiwan and the 
participation of Taiwanese people during the events?  
This study has aimed to explore the resurgence of social movements and to 
explore whether Taiwanese people’s political engagement in the online and 
offline worlds offers some clues about young people’s perception of democracy 
and roles as citizens in a democracy. During the eight years of President Ma Ying-
jeou’s administration, the development of ICTs, along with the more converged 
nature of media architecture, gradually reshaped the way people have taken part in 
politics, expressed their views on public affairs, and communicated with each other 
and their elected representatives. This being said, the main purpose of this study is not 
about extolling the changes triggered by technology, but, rather, it is to revisit the idea 
of citizenship in a digital context. The following sections will review and analyse the 
theoretical framework discussed in the preceding chapters, as well as the evidence and 
findings drawn from the case studies on citizens’ political and civic engagement in 
Taiwan under the Ma government.  
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Overall, the qualitative data of this research offers an outlook of how a 
network of organisers and protesting students worked together to make the 
government respond to their demands. A key takeaway this study hopes to deliver is 
that the notion of citizenship, particularly the way citizens define what is public and 
private, has been vastly reshaped and changed by the rapid development of 
information and communication technologies (ICTs).  
 
7.2 Contribution, Validity, and Limitation of the Study 
 
Contribution 
The major contribution of this study is the documented review of the development of 
social movement in Taiwan and the impact of ICTs and social media on Taiwanese 
people’s political participation and communication under the KMT administration. 
Another contribution can be demonstrated from considering the following 
perspectives: how technology has revolutionised the way citizens communicate with 
each other; how technology enables social movement and strengthen citizens; as well 
as how technology has reshaped and redefined the notion of public and private 
spheres.  
In this study, first-hand insight shared by Taiwanese activists who took part in 
the major social movements are particularly useful in shedding new light on how 
people perceive their role as citizens in a democracy. The comments made by 
movement activists, members from both ruling and opposition political parties, and 
journalists also offer useful perspectives from different aspects of society. From a 
theoretical and philosophical perspective, those views are significant as they indicate 
a shift in citizens’ perception of their civil duties, as well as the definition of what 
constitutes public sphere and what constitutes private sphere. Conventional theorists 
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such as Putnam often argue that a vibrant civil society can help democracy become 
more stable and sustainable (Putnam, 2000; Almond and Verba, 1963). If their 
argument is still to make sense in today’s digitally connected society, then it is 
important to examine whether today’s research on citizenship has taken into account 
the contemporary context and people’s changing behaviour in the information age. 
With a research method which is mainly qualitative-focused, this study probes the 
usage of ICTs by citizens in a social movement and provides, as a result, intensive 
documented reports of the social movements that occurred under the Ma 
administration, as well as first-hand experience shared by leaders of the movements 
and other participants.  
 
Validity 
The validity of this study comes from its multiple-case design and mixed research 
methods, which were deployed by the author with an aim of offering an overall 
analysis and a more complete picture of social movements in Taiwan. The cases 
chosen for this study help illustrate a significant development in social movements in 
Taiwanese society, particularly during the years when the KMT government was last 
in power (2008 – 2016). The social movements under the first term of President Ma 
Ying-Jeou (2008 – 2012), benefitted from the growing mobilisation potential of 
online blogs and social media. These movements also signalled a shift from a 
traditional approach to a digitally enabled approach in movement mobilisation. The 
social movements then gathered pace during Ma’s second term (2012 – 2016) and 
amplified the usage of ICT tools and social media to an even greater extent. During 
these events, citizens’ private, social, and political engagements and activists’ 
activities were all embedded in the same multi-layered and convergent media 
environment. This also reveals a gradual trend of how ICTs and social media sites are 
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becoming an undeniable element in social movement organisation and the 
mobilisation process. Such trends echo what Ying explains in his Case Study 
Research that mixed methods allow researchers to probe complicated research 
questions and obtain a ‘richer and stronger array of evidence’ (Ying, 2009: 63). 
Because of the nature of the research question, a single method alone might not have 
been sufficient enough to gain a holistic picture of what the author was hoping for, 
and, as such, mixed methods became a reasonable choice for conducting this study.  
In this research, these methods are utilised to document the development of 
digitally enabled social movements in Taiwan. In addition, the author deployed semi-
constructed interviews and archive study to obtain an in-depth look at specific 
developments within the events. The author also used software to analyse the content 
and discourse of one of the student-led movements. As it is difficult to examine all the 
‘micro-acts’ conducted by all actors during the movements, this study relies on the 
materials and evidence archived by the social media sites (namely, Facebook), news 
reports, and remarks made by the movement activists to obtain insight about how 
movement organisers communicated with the public and generated momentum 
through their creative usage of ICT tools. By this means, this study offers an outlook 
of how ICTs and social media were used strategically by activists to engage with the 
public and their target audience. Following  the same logic, this study investigates 
how the public responded to the digitally enabled movements via different ICT tools.  
 
Limitations 
The first limitation of this study is the scope and range of the interviews and the data 
collection method deployed by the author. As this research ambitiously included a 
mixed research method in order to review a number of social movements under 
President Ma’s two terms, it was difficult to interview all activists from all 
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movements. Such a limitation means that a wide pool of activists or movement 
participants could not be included in the final analysis of this study. In an effort to 
mitigate the limitation, this study chose to focus on activists who were in charge of 
mobilisation and organisation during the major social movements. Given the 
momentum they successfully drew from the public, their remarks and comments are 
useful for the analysis of how ICTs and social media can enable and strengthen 
citizens in terms of organising a large-scale social movement. Nevertheless, the 
liability and accuracy of the interviews still rely on the interviewees. As most of the 
social movements studied by this research did bring about a certain level of change in 
society, the interviewees might tend to offer mostly positive feedback on the impact 
caused by the ICTs, and give relatively little criticism. An exception is interviewee P2, 
who didn’t praise the role the Internet played during the movements. Instead, P2 
merely pointed out how the Internet might have lowered the threshold for organising a 
protest or movement, as a few dozen people who are willing to support the same 
cause can be sufficient to stage a protest.   
Another limitation is that some interviewees later on changed their minds and 
refused to allow the author to use the interview materials after their affiliated political 
parties had won the general election in 2016 and they in turn became public servants 
or public figures. That some interviews in the end could not be included in this 
research certainly impacts the quality of this study, as the analysis missed out insight 
from some people who had figured quite prominently in social movements. To offset 
the impact, this study reviewed a lot of media reports from local newspapers and news 
channels. These reports supplemented the research materials and helped build a more 
rounded picture of the political reality from when the social movements were taking 
place in Taiwan.    
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Finally, a common limitation when conducting research based on qualitative 
methods is the difficulty of identifying causal relationships. This limitation  hinders 
the capacity of this study to explore the causes (if they exist) in the changing notion of 
citizenship (if it does change) in a modern democracy. However, qualitative research 
also allows the research materials to have an enhanced level of detail to it, and gives 
the author more opportunity to gain insight from the examination of the research 
materials. As citizens’ engagement in politics is never a fixed form of action, the 
author takes a qualitative approach to investigate the research subject in a detailed 
manner, and this has enhanced the overall research material and database that have 
been collected and created. For instance, the author reviewed relevant blog pages 
and, Facebook pages of the movements assessed in this study. In the case of the 
Anti-Media Monopoly Movement, the author read and coded every blog entry 
published by the activists and explored what were the key terms were used in the 
activists’ external communication. SAs such, it is probably safe to argue that the 
scope of this research helps provide a broad holistic picture of how technology might 
have affected young Taiwanese citizens’ political engagement, as well as their 




The theoretical discussion in this research reviewed how the orientation of citizenship 
was affected by the development of changing social structure (Dalton, 2008). In a 
modern American society, Dalton finds that citizens attach more attention and 
importance to forms of participation which reflect an idea of “engaged citizenship”, 
something which stresses the social responsibility of being a citizen and getting 
involved in elite-challenging activities. An example is “political consumerism”, which 
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means that citizens express their political views through making conscious choices 
about their consumer products (Micheletti, Follesdal & Stolle, 2003).	Such changing 
orientation of citizenship seems to challenge what is argued by some theorists that 
today’s public discussion and civic engagement have been in decline (Macedo et al, 
2005; Putnam, 2000). They based their argument on the fact that today’s citizens vote 
less, spend less time in social clubs, and show little interest in public affairs, such as 
the physical act of joining a political party. 
However, if we generally agree that the development of technology is 
correlated to contemporary social change (Bell, 1973; Castells, 2010), then perhaps it 
is we should also necessary to re-examine the way we gauge civic engagement in 
relation to this idea. In the so-called information age, citizens might need to develop 
new civil skills in order to resolve new problems that arise from within a new social 
structure. One of the most obvious changes generated by the development of 
technologies is the increasingly elusive boundaries between the public and private 
spheres.  
First, on the concept of the public sphere, Taylor (1992) argues that:  
 
[t]he public sphere is a common space in which the members of a society are 
deemed to meet through a variety of media: print, electronic, and also face-to-
face encounters; to discuss matters of common interest; thus to be able to form 
a common mind about these.  
 
Based on his comments it can be surmised that, people in a democratic society 
gather in a common place, the so-called the public sphere, to exchange and form their 
opinions freely at both individual and collective levels. And the common opinions 
shared by the public are important, as they help the government formulate appropriate 
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policies to meet the demand from their people. In Taylor’s argument, the public 
sphere is not only an important feature of any modern society, but also a crucial 
element in the self-justification of a free self-governing society.  
This study borrows Taylor’s idea that a “digital public sphere” can emerge 
from the debate and discussion on public affairs carried out by citizens on the Internet. 
Citizens can find various kinds of forums, blogs, or websites to join their fellow 
citizens’ discussion on public affairs. Their opinion also helps the government form 
the most appropriate policies for both society and country. Furthermore, this opinion 
exchange and formation process is somewhat similar to Habermas’ idea of the public 
sphere. Even though according to Habermas, the idea of public sphere means physical 
places, such as coffee shops or pubs, where citizens can meet up to discuss and share 
their views on politics (Coleman & Blumler, 2009: 165), the Internet seems to offer 
citizens a bigger digital arena for deliberation through which opinions can be 
contested and argued.  
On the surface, the digital public sphere creates an environment for citizens to 
practice their civic skills and deliberate their political opinion online. However,  
technology also enables citizens to augment or extend their private sphere, as well as 
allowing them to decide whether to make their private sphere public or not. Their 
perception of citizenship, therefore, is demonstrated in the ‘micro acts’ carried out by 
citizens online and expanded by technology. These action can be as simple as sharing 
or liking a post on Facebook or in an online forum. To citizens who welcome this 
digitally connected and enabled reality online, their understanding of citizenship in 
the modern democracy might even transcend the personal and public domains. With 
no fixed boundaries to define their public and private spheres, citizens now are 
embracing new civil habits and reshaping the notion of citizenship into a networked, 
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digitally enabled idea which is more fluid, flexible, reflexive, and personal than the 
traditional concept of citizenship.  
That is why a main argument, which has been constantly discussed and 
contested throughout this study is the blurring of boundaries between the public and 
private spheres. In the information age, technology creates new arenas for citizens to 
carry out their discussion on public matters on the Internet. Online platforms connect 
citizens with their friends and family, acquaintances, and strangers. Essentially, 
citizens can have a plethora of strong and weak ties in the online world and the 
connectivity potential becomes a source of civil legitimacy with the online private 
sphere, as individuals can speak to multiple audiences through the same convergent 
media environment. It is in such a multi-layered and convergent media environment 
that the boundaries between the public and private spheres are blurred and maybe 
even have collapsed, or are at least showing clear signs that they are beginning to.  
In the case of social movements in Taiwan, citizens express their opinion or 
support via their private spheres which are mediated by ICTs and social media. By 
clicking the “Like” or “Follow” button on Facebook or Twitter, citizens conducted 
thousands of ‘micro acts’ to respond to both public or private matters during the 
movements taking place during the KMT administration between 2008 and 2016. 
These ‘micro acts’ constitute an enormous amount of fleeting engagements and at the 
same time reflect collective aspirations. On Facebook, blogs, YouTube or Twitter, 
these different platforms suggest different levels of intensity of engagement based on 
citizens’ preferences (Papacharissi, 2010).  
Part of the new civic engagement citizens seem to have developed in the 
information age are described by Castells (2012) as a “new species of social 
movement” (p. 15). The evidence and discussion from the preceding chapters also 
show that digital communication is organisation. Bennett & Segerberg (2012) coin the 
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term “connective action” to explain the changing nature of the mobilisation process of 
social movements in the information age. That is to say, the phenomenon of Internet-
based mobilisation and social movement that is evidenced in the does not simply 
come from the interviews conducted for this research also supports the general 
argument that people can use digital tools to strengthen their weak ties with their 
acquaintances (Ellison, Steinfield & Lampe, 2007). At times when they require 
support for a public event or social movement they support, citizens can strengthen 
their weak ties spontaneously and turn their acquaintances into fellow supporters of 
the same cause.  
This shift of movement organisation makes it difficult to use traditional 
methods to gauge the level of support and momentum of a protest, a demonstration, or 
a public movement. Traditionally, one can easily assess the momentum of a member-
based civic organisation by looking at the number of the members or the frequency of 
their regular gatherings. For instance, in the 1990s, the Wild Lily Movement in 
Taiwan was mostly participated in by people who were already active in certain 
student groups or clubs at the universities. Or put another way, the movement was 
mostly organised and joined by people who already shared strong ties. However, with 
the coming of the information age this began to change. At first it seemed to be 
plausible to argue that this new media was becoming a tool for individuals to express 
opinions of their own, instead of listening to that of others. The worry was that 
technology might further isolate individuals if the usage of ICT was mainly centred 
around expressing personal opinion and reinforcing an individual’s self-identification 
(Papacharissi, 2007). Some scholars such as Putnam (2000) attribute the growth of 
self-focused activities and the notion of decreasing community engagement to media 
proliferation. He laments the decline of the ‘in-person’ exchange and interaction, 
arguing that such decline will lead to more Americans disengaging themselves from 
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community activities and political involvement. In other words, if more people prefer 
to spend time on certain media platforms than interacting with their fellow citizens in 
a community, the public sphere will begin to eroded if the number of participants in 
community life begins to decline. 
However, as ICT tools seem to be encouraging a more spontaneous form of 
self-driven engagement in politics, the consequence of this is that these tools are also 
indirectly reducing the traditional and conventional forms of elite-guided engagement 
(Norris, 2000). That means citizens can express their support or criticism over a social 
movement or public matter through self-driven activity. Their reliance on mass media 
or a traditional leader to form their public opinion is therefore reduced as well. Indeed, 
early 2000, when Norris was writing on this matter, was the time that social media 
began to make its mark uponenter the online world. Friendster was launched in 2002, 
MySpace and LinkedIn in 2003, Facebook in 2004, Flickr (a photo sharing site, which 
was used heavily by the Wild Strawberries Movement activists in 2008) in 2005, and 
Twitter in 2006.  
So, what if the decline of community life reflects the decline of people’s 
participation in old forms of community but not in the new types of community and 
personal ties? As the Internet has by now deeply infiltrated life, many traditional 
forms of community have either lost their charm or embedded themselves in the 
online world. Such change is also discussed by analysts, including Wellman & Haase 
(1999), who argue that people’s online interaction can supplement their face-to-face 
and telephone communication. In the same vein, they argue that the Internet actually 
can enhance face-to-face and telephone communication as people might (1) develop 
better understanding of each other; (2) share with each other different life aspects by 
exchanging photos, videos and other forms of files; and (3) arrange their offline 
activities through online communication (ibid., p. 438).  
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Building on the aforementioned theoretical discussion, it might be safe to say 
that ICT tools enable people to create different sets of personal networks in multi-
layered cyberspace. Such multiple personal networks formed on the social media sites 
further allow citizens to develop flexible political identification when they participate 
in a political event. For instance, citizens do not need to belong to a certain political 
party to demonstrate or affirm their political belief or stance. In fact, they can use 
these expressive tools and online channels to elaborate their political opinions and 
stances by making these so-called ‘micro acts’. To a certain degree, such expression 
can arguably compensate the declining membership of political parties. In student-led 
movements in Taiwan, activists tried not to be affiliated with any political parties as 
they did not want to be labeled by any certain political belief. As a result, many of the 
movements attracted participants across party lines, such as the 2013 White Shirt 
Movement and the 2014 Sunflower Movement. 
 
Social Movements in Taiwan 
As the previous sections have noted, the main contribution of this study is the effort 
made to document and review the major social movements that occurred in Taiwan 
between 2008 and 2016, and to offer an exploratory analysis of whether democratic 
values can be compatible with an East Asian society.  
For social movements under the Ma administration in Taiwan, multi-layered 
and convergent digital media environment served three instrumental roles: (1) 
organising and mobilising a movement; (2) shaping an online community and identity, 
and; (3) enabling activists and participants to join the movement in a spontaneous 
manner. More importantly, citizens’ private spaces on the Internet became more 
closely embedded with their public spaces. The following will further discuss and 
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analyse the evidence and research materials presented in the empirical Chapters of 4, 
5, and 6.  
Since former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew launched the debate of 
“Asian values” within the international community, advocates of “Asian values” often 
take these elements to defend their undemocratic practices in politics. They also argue 
that Western liberal democracy may be merely a culturally-specific morality, rather 
than a universal form of governance or political practice which can be applied by 
people across all cultures. They claim that Asian values, particularly those influenced 
by the hierarchy-oriented nature of Confucian thinking, make Asian cultures 
fundamentally incompatible with Western liberal values of democracy and human 
rights. When countries like China use the “Asian values” argument to dismiss the 
compatibility and practicality of Western democratic thinking with countries in East 
Asia, the story of Taiwan’s democratisation seems to gain more credence as being an 
important outlier that stands in opposition to this notion and differentiates Taiwan 
from many of its neighbouring countries. Of all third wave democracies in East Asia, 
Taiwan has both the greatest press freedom and the most dynamic democratic 
institution. In recent years, major international NGOs, such as Reporters without 
Borders, have been choosing Taiwan as their its base in East Asia, showing their 
recognition of Taiwan’s evolving democratisation.184 At the same time, the biggest 
authoritarian regime in the region, China, continues to cast a large shadow over other 
Asian countries with both its military and economic might. With China consistently 












important question as to why people in Taiwan still choose democracy as their core 
values, and whether Taiwan’s case can help demonstrate how democratic values and 
non-Western culture can be compatible in an East Asian society. 
Since Taiwan ended martial law in 1987, its democratic development has been 
moving forward at a steady pace, with democratic values gradually taking root in the 
soil of the Taiwanese society in East Asia. Traditionally, Taiwanese society is 
considered to have been influenced by both Japanese culture (during World War II 
when Japan colonized Taiwan) and Chinese culture (especially after 1949 when the 
KMT withdrew from China and brought hundreds of thousands of military personnel 
from China to Taiwan). Despite these two very distinct, and authoritarian, influences, 
it has only taken three decades for Taiwanese society to become a vibrant democracy, 
in which social movements  are gradually being accepted and celebrated as a way of 
civic expression.  
This study discussed several major movements including: The Wild 
Strawberries Movement in 2008, the Anti-Kuokuang Petrochemical Movement in 
2010-2011, the 2012 Anti-Media Monopoly Movement in 2012, the White Shirt 
Movement in 2013, and the Sunflower Movement in 2014. During these social 
movements, the usage of ICTs in the processes of organisation and mobilisation, as 
well as communication between the activists and the public, created a huge network 
consisting of multi-layered communication channels that presented themselves as 
being worthy of examination. This is summarised nicely by Papacharissi: 
 
Democracy naturally combines these personal trajectories of advancement 
and failures in every life through a commonly shared system of decision-




Chapter 4 discussed that during the first term of former President Ma Ying-
Jeou (2008 – 2012), Taiwan saw a resurgence of social movements, which were 
mostly initiated and led by college and university students. The discourse analysis of 
the Wild Strawberries Movement found a recurrent argument of “safeguarding the 
freedom of speech” and “protecting rights of assembly”. In the Wild Strawberries 
Movement, young activists demonstrated their budding potential in terms of their 
capacity to build networks and mobilise by utilising blogs, online streaming tools and 
Google groups to communicate internally amongst activists, as well as reaching out to 
a wide range of audiences both domestically and internationally.  Two years later, 
another major movement to take place during Ma’s first term, the Anti-Kuokuang 
Petrochemical Movement, also followed suit and used live streaming tools to live 
broadcast the protests or their communications with the government officials, such as 
public hearings. Such low-cost and expressive tools became significant in the early 
stages of the movements, as activists were trying to form a counter force against the 
power holders, namely the government.  
In particular, in the case of the Wild Strawberries Movement in 2008, 
protesters used ICT tools to create a networked alliance consisting of young people in 
Hong Kong and Taiwan. The two live broadcasting events held in Hong Kong 
Polytechnic University and Liberty Square in Taipei allowed participants to see each 
other synchronously and express support to each other throughout the course of the 
live streaming. The solidarity shown by the participants in the event later became the 
backbone of closer personal relations shared by the young activists from the two sides. 
This bonding was not only shared by the protesting students from Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, but could also potentially be accessed by those interested citizens who 
wanted to watch the events online remotely as well. This allows for the case to be 
made that during the live streaming event the weak ties shared between people from 
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Hong Kong and Taiwan were strengthened and transformed into strong ties, opening 
the possibility for this sharing to happen again in the future, and allowing the 
generation of positive changes for to their respective societies. 
The Wild Strawberries Movement shows several important elements of a 
digitally enabled movement. First, the low threshold for mobilisation enabled citizens 
to initiate an event or social movement without relying on an established political 
party or a traditionally charismatic leader. In addition, the low threshold for 
mobilisation also meant a lower threshold for participation as citizens could easily 
become part of the movement by making ‘micro-acts’ like clicking “join” on a 
protest’s Facebook page or joining an online campaign (Margetts et al, 2016).  
As people can easily see the number of participants or supporters on a 
Facebook page, the number to some degree can indicate the momentum of a protest or 
an event. Such information can also be an incentive for other interested citizens to 
consider whether they want to join the protest or not. Take the Wild Strawberries 
Movement, for instance, interested individuals might have had stronger incentives to 
join the same event after seeing their classmates update and upload photos and videos 
of the protest. At the same time, when citizens’ personal updates on Facebook (such 
as taking photos at a sit-in) became an incentive for their fellow friends or followers 
to pay attention or participate in an event, the personal updates caused the online 
private sphere to entwine itself with the public no longer private. This is because Bby 
revealing their personal updates and involvement of a political event on social media 
sites, such action blurs the boundaries between people’s private and public spheres on 
cyberspace. Their private sphere also serves the purpose of expressing their political 
views with their friends in a social setting. That is to say, a massive amount of 
information on a social movement in the online world closes the distance between the 
general public and politics in cyberspace.  
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The way protesters utilised ICT tools during the Wild Strawberries Movement 
laid a foundation for activists in later movements. Blogs helped the Wild Strawberries 
gain attention from the foreign community in Taiwan, as well as overseas Taiwanese 
students around the world. In 2011, the anti-KuoKuang Petrochemical Project 
activists also launched an official blog to share updates of their movement and 
information about the petrochemical industry, online petitions, as well as live stream 
videos of the protest. The Anti-KuoKuang protesters further utilised different social 
media platform to create different communication channels with three different 
groups: their core members, followers, and general public. One thing they did 
differently from previous environmental movements is that they allowed individuals 
to move between the three groups spontaneously. Such flexibility allows a great level 
of autonomy for an individual to engage or step out of the movement by taking self-
driven actions. Social media platforms also helped reduce the cost of participation, 
such as time, money, or labour. As a result, the Anti-KuoKuang Petrochemical 
Project Movement achieved what their predecessors failed to achieve: forcing the 
cancellation of the petrochemical project. The activists took just seven months to 
successfully convince the government to terminate this project, with President Ma 
even publicly pledging his support to build a wetland conservation area in the location 
where the petrochemical project was supposed to have been built on. 
In-between the Wild Strawberries Movement and the Anti-KuoKuang 
Petrochemical Project Movement, the year of 2010 saw two other small-scaled social 
movements, the Losheng Sanatorium Preservation Movement and the Anti-Dapu 
Demolition Protest utilise social media tools to generate greater public support. The 
four movements might have focused on different issues, but one thing they share in 
common is that their supporters blended their disparate political leanings and 
ideologies around the idea of social justice to come together through these events.  
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Triggered by the conservative and Beijing-friendly policies implemented by 
the Ma administration, the resurgence of social movements inspired more young 
activists to continue to ride the momentum accumulated through online mobilisation 
and pose further challenge to the government. Chapter 5 discussed how the Anti-
Media Monopoly Movement in 2012 took the scale and impact of digitally enabled 
movements to another level, with a successful Facebook campaign drawing support 
from overseas Taiwanese students around the world, including Europe. Many activists 
from the Wild Strawberries Movement carried their experience into the Anti-Media 
Monopoly Movement in 2012. In 2008, they relied on blogs to communicate with 
domestic and international audiences. In 2012, these tech-savvy activists switched to 
Facebook as the main online tool for sharing information on the development of the 
event and to mobilise supporters. A key strategy used by the activists is how they 
framed their argument by using easy-to-remember slogans such as “ni hao da, wo bu 
pa” (you are so big, I am not afraid/ 你好大，我不怕) to describe the contrast 
between the seemingly powerless activists and the powerful conglomerates they were 
fighting against. In order to generate bigger momentum, they created different online 
campaigns allowing everyone to take part by making “micro acts”. For example, the 
Facebook photo campaign they began attracted thousands of submissions, with some 
famous public figures like Chinese artist Ai Weiwei expressing support and even 
providing a photo of himself holding a poster with a slogan stating “I protect freedom 
of speech”.  The creative usage of online tools easily attracted a considerable number 
of participants both domestically and internationally. The momentum of the campaign 
elevated a local social movement to a global level that posed an ever mounting 
challenge towards the government and at the same greatly increased public criticism 
against it. Simply put, compared to the demonstrations that had gone before them, the 
Anti-Media Monopoly Movement activists took the usage of ICT tools to a new level, 
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by collaborating with different groups online (such as the photo campaign initiators, 
who were mostly overseas Taiwanese students) and helped enhance the scale of the 
movement from local to international.  
The protesting students’ use of social media in the process of mobilising and 
organising online campaigns and offline demonstrations during the Anti-Media 
Monopoly Movement was more sophisticated than those of previous movements 
which took place under Ma’s first term. In an article written by him, Chen Wei-Ting, 
one of the movement’s leaders, acknowledged the power of ICTs and social media 
and how online mobilisation can help generate a considerable momentum for offline 
demonstration. Chen argues that the momentum generated by online mobilisation is 
successfully shared by offline events. As the Facebook page of the movement helped 
display growing public support with its increasing number of followers and post 
“Likes”, the swelling numbers of on-the-ground supporters equally played back into 
helping those online figures grow and, as a result, the 2012 Anti-Media Monopoly 
Movement arguably became the very first convincing example of how personal 
networks on social media sites can help protesters organise a networked movement, 
and how citizens’ private spheres can be interconnected with the public sphere in a 
converged media environment. Through the collective actions taken by people from 
different personal networks and social groups, a series of events were initiated and 
launched by students across Taiwan from over 20 universities and colleges. In a show 
of solidarity, these online and offline campaigns echoed each other and synergised a 
solid network consisting of students, ordinary citizens as well as scholars, such as 
legal scholar Hung Kuo-Chang of the Academia Sinica (the highest research institute 
in Taiwan). Their network later even generated sufficient momentum to pressure the 
government to respond to their demand and agree to set up a higher threshold for 
conglomerates to purchase media outlets in Taiwan.   
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In 2013, the White Shirt Movement was initiated by thirty-nine people who 
came from all walks of life. For instance, their members included housewives, guys 
who had just finished compulsory military services, a journalist, and even a doctor. 
These activists were not from the same group of people as the Anti-Media Monopoly 
Movement and they did not have prior experience in initiating a demonstration like 
the people who had joined the Wild Strawberries Movement in 2008. The thirty-nine 
people who formed the group Citizen 1985 did so also without receiving any support 
or resources from political parties. They gained their legitimacy and public trust by 
being transparent in terms of how they spent the resources and the money donated by 
people through constantly publishing their financial statements online. Such a gesture 
was unprecedented and created a positive image of the movement, and made their 
supporters believe that every penny they donated was used for a good cause.  
During the White Shirt Movement, activists expanded their usage of social media to 
other online platforms, such as PTT, a popular electronic bulletin board system, 
Wikipedia, LINE (a messaging app, similar to Whatsapp, designed for mobile phone 
users), Skype, and YouTube. They understood that in the information age, the speed 
with which  of information can be  sharing is key to the success of any event. In an 
effort to reach a bigger audience, they took the initiative and created the Wikipedia 
pages of the movement in both Mandarin and English. They frequently uploaded 
event videos to popular video sharing platforms, such as YouTube. In addition to 
including popular online platforms into their social media strategy, they created a 
three-minute long video, also known as a “lazy-people package”, to offer interested 
individuals an easy-to-understand way to gain essential information about the origin 
and development of the movement. Without any form of support from political parties, 
the White Shirt Movement in the end successfully managed to get over 250,000 
people to join a rally in front of the Presidential Office, with many of the participants 
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participating in a social movement for the first time in their lives. During a speech 
given by a member from the 39-people Citizen 1985 at the rally, the member said: 
 
Today’s movement originated from an online article. The article first brought 
39 people together, and then garnered over 300,000 to stage a demonstration 
in front of the Ministry of Defence on 20 July. And, the article successfully 
mobilized over hundreds of thousands of people to come to the Ketagalan 
Boulevard in front of the Presidential Office today.185 
 
Just thirty-nine people started the While Shirt Movement with one online article. This 
fact  perfectly encapsulates the mobilisation potential of the Internet and how people’s 
private sphere in the cyber community can be expanded and transformed into a digital 
public sphere where revolutionaries come together to fight for the values of social 
justice they uphold dearly.  
In Chapter 6, the case of the 2014 Sunflower Movement was discussed to 
demonstrate how activists combined different creative uses of social media and ICT 
tools and garnered substantial support from the public towards another unprecedented 
event that saw the Legislature occupied for twenty-four consecutive days. This study 
has attempted to show that the way activists communicate and mobilise online can be 
referred to as an example of ‘“hybrid public sphere building”. This attempt is made in 
an effort to enrich citizenship studies by integrating the idea of community and the 
citizen, as discussed in the literature review chapter on different schools of citizenship. 
It was discussed that in the liberal model of the public sphere the role of mass media 
is amplified due to the privatisation and commercialisation processes. According to 






political function of the public sphere. He also warns that commercialised mass media 
can be used by interest groups or political parties to manipulate the public opinion. 
However, with more and more citizens beginning to follow public affairs and 
exchange their political views in the online world, the Internet becomes a digital 
public sphere for citizens in a modern democracy. In addition, cyberspace also ticks 
all the elements of Charles Taylor’s reflective description on the public sphere: (a) a 
common space, (b) media, and (c) matters of common interest. In a modern 
democracy, where the Internet infiltrates nearly every aspect of people’s life, one can 
stay at her/his own place and generate social change by engaging with an event or a 
social movement online. She/he can demonstrate support by making “micro-acts” 
online and making their actions public on their social media sites.  
In Chapters 4, 5, and 6, it was seen how many social movements achieved 
success because of the accumulation of countless “micro-acts” conducted by citizens 
on the Internet. The evidences and materials drawn from the digitally enabled 
movements between 2012 and – 2014 show how these movements have gradually 
become an indispensable force in pushing forward social and political change in 
Taiwanese society. Based on the foregoing discussion, this study argues that digital 
citizenship could be conceptualised as being the interconnected texts and 
conversations that take place in cyberspace. Today’s citizens can simply take to 
Facebook or Twitter to discuss public matters with their fellow citizens. Such online 
discussion and communication can be generated out of their self-oriented purposes, 
while at the same time creating real incentives for other people to take action to 
support, disapprove of, or join a political event.  
Moreover, in the online world, a citizen’s personal network can easily go 
beyond the limitation of physical boundaries. During the Wild Strawberries 
Movement, young activists from Taiwan and Hong Kong and their personal (perhaps 
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weak) ties were forged without actual in-personal contact. This demonstrates that in 
the the mobilisation and organisation processes of an event, people’s online 
interaction becomes an online community, which also has the potential to mobilise 
and become a fully fledged become a mobilisation, or even a campaign (and the 
online community can continue to play a role in all three of these stages). 
Communication itself becomes a “connectivity action” as defined by Bennett & 
Segerberg (2012). Such a trend was clearly evident during the Sunflower Movement. 
A4 used different closed Facebook message groups and other online communication 
tools to form a wide and exclusive community with fellow organisers or translators, 
which serves as just one example of how. As such, the key component in social 
movements and societies has begun to move from social groups into individualised 
and personalised networks.  
Of course, the personal ties created through these networks might not stay 
forever. Just as Flickr is slowly losing its charm amongst young people and being 
outperformed by other photo sharing apps like Instagram, citizens might continue 
forging these connective activities and digital public sphere in other upcoming social 
media sites in the future. Not only are the boundaries between the public and private 
spheres elusive, the communication between citizens and their close friends or 
acquaintances are also merged into one massive multi-layered media environment, in 
which, no action can be easily defined, because a micro-act can be both public and 









This study tries to integrate the theoretical debates over citizenship and the public 
sphere and argue that the analysis of digitally enabled social movements can help 
shed new light on the notion of citizenship in a contemporary democracy.   
Since early 2000, Taiwan has seen a resurgence of social movements which 
were mostly organised and mobilised with the assistance of ICT and technology. 
While some might argue that social movements act as a highly contentious form of 
politics against the political institutions and those who control the governing power, 
growing Internet-based movements can also reflect the fact that the private sphere on 
the Internet is becoming increasingly closer to the idea of the public sphere. As the 
preceding section notes, ICT tools and social media play three instrumental roles in 
social movements in Taiwan, the following sections will further elaborate each role.  
With the high penetration rate of the Internet in Taiwan, there is no doubt that 
technology and ICTs will only continue to gradually integrate further within to most, 
if not eventually all, aspects of people’s daily life. Today’s citizens can freely engage 
with their fellow citizens without the constraints of time and space meaning that. Both 
their strong and weak ties with their contacts can be built and maintained through 
various kinds of ICT tools, a process which allow citizens to form personal 
relationships without face-to-face interaction. As technology provides citizens a wide 
range of ways to communicate with each other instantly, this new communication 
style henceforth changes relations between citizens and their community. So, when 
When citizens’ reliance on traditional communities can be supplemented by the 
virtual connection enabled by ICTs and social media, the orientation of citizens’ 
behaviour inevitably becomes more self-focused rather than community-focused. It 
seems logical then, that as the way citizens engage with each other has been changed 
due to the rapid development of ICTs, the way they engage in public affairs or with 
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their democratic representatives and government must also be strongly considered to 
have become susceptible to large degrees of drastic change.  
This study also shows that Taiwanese Millennials attach a greater deal of 
importance to on issues concerning justice and democratic values and are willing to 
spend much more time on activities which reflect what Dalton calls “engaged 
citizenship”. As Dalton argues, today’s postmaterialists tend to be more sceptical 
about political institutions, and as such, their participation in conventional political 
activities  such as joining a political party has declined. Other research also finds that 
young people tend to directly address public issues by taking up activities which 
allow them to see instant or tangible results, with one example being an activity such 
as volunteering (Lopez et al., 2006). These activities when compared acts such as to 
voting or paying tax can be said to be more self-focused and self-oriented, as they can 
bring about an instant feeling of self-realisation. Similarly, the “micro-acts” 
conducted by citizens online seem to generate the same feeling as can be attained by 
taking part in a charitable act of volunteering for an afternoon. When citizens click the 
“join” button of a social movement’s Facebook page, they might feel good about this 
micro-act and feel that they have (digitally) taken part in the event. Of course, when a 
considerable number of citizens share the same Facebook post, their combined micro-
acts can potentially generate a big impact as they help increase the readership of the 
same post. However, one can never argue that “micro-acts” will replace citizens’ 
political participation in the offline world as it often still requires people to 
physically stage a demonstration to force a change to happen in society.  
From the materials obtained from the social media websites of several social 
movements’ social media websites, it is evident that the communication between 
activists and the public on the Internet helps constitute a collective identity as the 
digitally enabled communication and mobilisation processes are not just about 
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organising or mobilising people. To some extent, the importance of a leader was 
reduced, when the Internet empowered the participants and provided them with 
more autonomy in terms of how they want to contribute to the event. As the 
interviews and evidence drawn from the 2014 Sunflower Movement demonstrate, the 
process of movement organisation cannot be separated from the process of movement 
communication. That said, Putnam and her colleagues’ (2009) idea of 
‘communication constitutive of organising’ (CCO) is also realised in digitally enabled 
social movements in which the process of forming a collective identity and the 
process of communication are both taking place on the Internet at the same time.  
Through this process, an imagined community can be established through 
the online communication carried out by the activists and the public. A digitally 
enabled movement is similar to an imagined community, in which citizens can freely 
join or leave without the limitation of time and space. Such flexibility helps 
movement activists form supporting groups and strengthen their momentum by 
building from the support from online “imagined communities”.  Furthermore, 
technology enables activists to creatively participate in political campaigns. These 
“‘micro-acts”’ not only lower the threshold for citizens to engage in a social 
movement or a political event (Margetts, John, Hale & Yasseri, 2016), but also make 
joining a social movement easy and interesting. In summary, technology makes social 
movements appealing to people who used to be aloof to public affairs, and enables 
activists or movement organisers to take creative approaches to organise an event and 
mobilise and communicate with the public.  
Given the scale and usage of ICT tools, the social movements that took place 
during the KMT administration show a gradual, progressive process whereby each 
those Millennial protesters perfected their online communication and mobilisation 
skills each time they took part in a movement. From blog to live streaming, from 
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sharing press releases in multiple languages to asking people around the world to join 
a photo campaign to show solidarity, the techniques used in each campaign displayed 
an ability to quickly adapt and utilise new tools and technology to help further each 
respective cause. During the eight years that are focused on in this study, the result of 
this phenomenon was that Taiwanese Millennials achieved the enforcement of a 
number of key policy changes, such as the abolishment of the military court, and 
stopping the government from pushing Taiwan economically closer to mainland 
China. They wrote an unforgettable chapter in the story of Taiwan, and laid new 
groundwork for the possibility of future democratic development that is yet to come.  
 
7.5 Suggestions for future studies  
Based on the analysis and discussion in the preceding chapters, there are a number of 
potential research areas which can be built upon from the analysis of this study.  
Firstly, if the Internet does offer citizens a digital public sphere in the cyber 
community, then it is important to critically examine the democratic quality of the 
public sphere in the online world. Such research will have to rely on a large-n 
quantitative research design as social media platforms have provided citizens a sea of 
possibilities to engage in public affairs spontaneously, creatively, and innovatively. 
Due to the various designs of different social media platforms, it might useful for 
future research to design different research methods for different platforms. Some 
research on the role of social media in a democracy has already been conducted in 
Western developed democratic countries. However, due to the language barrier or 
different usage of ICT tools, the specific cases of East Asian democracies, such as 
South Korea or Taiwan, have so far rarely been the focus of any such research. 
Taking this into account, a comparative study on new democracies, especially the 
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third wave democracies in Asia, and the nature of their civic engagement within a 
digital context might well be worthy of further investigation. 
Second, a more in-depth study on a specific digitally enabled social movement 
in Taiwan might provide a considerable contribution to the literature on democracy in 
the information age. The findings of this study, therefore, might be a useful baseline 
for further researchers to further analyse how technology can empower citizens during 
a certain social movement at a certain point of time. Future research could also 
include quantitative methods to explore potential causal relationships between the 
changes of public spheres and their impact on citizens’ perception of citizenship in the 
information age.  
Third, it is important to understand the communicational dynamics in the 
mobilisation and organisation process in a successful social movement, but it is 
equally important to analyse social movements which failed. To fully understand the 
evolvement of the mobilisation process in the information age in Taiwan, it is 
important ask why technology has not been able to help all social movements 
generate the same momentum as it did in the case of 2014 Sunflower Movement. 
Perhaps it is necessary to define what it means to be a successful digitally enabled 
social movement before such research is conducted.  
Finally, future research can focus on theoretical debate as to whether digital 
citizenship really exists and if so, how? Such debate could involve reviewing the 
development of democracy in third wave democracies and how citizens in these 
democracies participate in politics in both the online and offline worlds. It might be 
interesting to include pro-democracy social movements taking place in a non-
democratic societies, such as Hong Kong.  
This study, then, has tried to integrate the theoretical debates over citizenship 
and the public sphere and argue that the analysis of digitally enabled social 
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movements can help shed new light on the notion of citizenship in a contemporary 
democracy. The original findings and discussion presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 
show a gradual development in “connective action” and how Taiwanese activists 
polished their skills in utilising social media to organise a social movement and 
mobilise supporters. The social movements discussed and reviewed in this study are 
not always focused on the same subject of protest, however, the activists behind these 
movements show that Taiwanese society, and the international community that 
today’s Taiwanese youth are remain very much committed to democratic values. 
They show this commitment through creative, spontaneous, and sometimes 
unexpected approaches. They are not afraid of taking to the streets so that they can 
ensure the government will not pursue its own political agenda at the cost of 
sacrificing a hard-earned democracy and freedom. Though the personal ties of current 
activists might not be as strong as those who participated in the White Lily Movement 
in the 1990s, they have demonstrated a new level of creativity and a strong 
mobilisation capability through and within their digitally enabled social movements. 
Under the eight-year tenure of then President Ma, these activists proactively led a 
resurgence in the practice of social movement in Taiwan, culminating in the 2014 
occupation of the Legislature. At the same time, they have managed to awaken a large 
part of the general public and inspire them to take a collective stance to defend 
democratic values on issues ranging from land rights to press freedom, and from 
political transparency to military human rights. They might be loud, but they enrich 
and drive forward Taiwan’s vibrant democracy.  
In closing, perhaps, it is appropriate to borrow a quote from Shakespeare to 





Be not afeard. The isle is full of noises  































A1: Chang Sheng-han, activist during the Wild Strawberries Movement (2008), Anti-
Media Monopoly Movement (2012), and the Sunflower Movement (2014).  
 
A2: Lin Fei-fan, activist during the Wild Strawberries Movement and Anti Media 
Monopoly Movement in 2008 and 2012, respectively; interviewed 28 August, 2016. 
 
A3: Chen Yu-An, Spokesperson of the Citizen 1985; interviewed 30 July 2016  
 
A4: Tao Hsiao-Man, Chief of News centre, Citizen 1985; interviewed 4 August 2016. 
 
A5: Wu Cheng, Sunflower Movement activist, now staff of Freddy Lim, Legislator, 
New Power Party; interviewed 28 August. 
 
A6: Karen Cheng, activist and translator, Sunflower Movement; interviewed 24 July 
2016. 
 









M1: Lin Chu-Yin, News anchor and political talk show host, interviewed 17 August 
2016. 
M2: Anonymous Journalist from the Journalist Magazine, interviewed 4 August 2016. 
 
Politician 
P1: Anonymous, aide of the office of a KMT Legislator, interviewed 20 August, 2016. 
P2: Huang Shou-Da, Director, Department of Youth, Democratic Progressive Party 






















Adler, R. P. and Goggin, J. (2005) “What Do We Mean By “Civic Engagement”?, in 
Journal of Transformative Education, Volume 3, Issue 3, pages: 236-253. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1541344605276792  
 
Ai, W. (2011) “Ai Weiwei”, Time Out Hong Kong. 
http://www.easybib.com/reference/guide/mla/newspaper accessed 30 Mar, 2013 
 
Almond, G., and Verba, S. (1963) The Civic Culture. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press 
 
Allison, G., Blackwill, R. D., Wyne, A., Kissinger, H. (2013) Lee Kuan Yew: The 
Grand Master's Insights on China, the United States, and the World, Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press.  
 
American Chamber in Taiwan (2017) “Facebook still dominates Taiwan’s social 
media”, in Taiwan Business Topics, published on 12 April, 2017, 
https://topics.amcham.com.tw/2017/04/facebook-still-dominates-taiwans-social-
media/, accessed 19 May, 2018.  
 
Amnesty international (2008) Taiwan: Police should avoid using excessive force at 
upcoming protests, available at 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/52000/asa380012008en.pdf, accessed 
1 June 2018.   
 
Ampofo, L., Anstead, N., and O’Loughlin, B. (2011) “Trust, Confidence, and 
Credibility”, Information, Communication & Society, first published on 20 June 2011, 
pp. 1-22, iFirst Article.  
 
Anderson, B. (1983) Imagined Community. London: Vergo. 
 
Bastone, R (1995) “Grammar in Discourse: Attitude and Deniability”. In G. Cook and 
B Seidlhofer. (eds.) Principle & Practice in Applied Linguistics, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 197-213. 
 
Beck, U. and Grande, E. (2007) Cosmopolitan Europe, Polity Press, Cambridge 
  
Bell, D. (1973) The Coming of Post-Industrial Society : A Venture in Social 
Forecasting. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
-(2006a) Beyond Liberal Democracy, Princeton University Press. 
- (2006b) China’s leaders rediscover Confucianism. International Herald 
Tribune. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/14/opinion/14iht-
edbell.2807200.html, accessed: 7 June, 2018 
-(2010) China’s New Confuciansiam: Politics and Everyday Life in a 
Changing Society, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
 
Benedict, A. (1983), Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of 
nationalism. London: Verso. 
 
Benkler, Yochai (2006) The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transform 
Markets and Freedom. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
279	
	
Bennett, W. L. (2003) ‘Communicating Global activism: Strengths and 
Vulnerabilities of networked Politics’, Information, Communication & Society, 6 (2), 
pp. 143-168. 
 
Bennett, L. & Segerberg, A. (2012) “THE LOGIC OF CONNECTIVE ACTION”, 
Information, Communication & Society, 15:5, 739-768. 
-(2013) The Logic of Connective Action: Digital Media and the 
Personalization of Contentious Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
Bimber, B. (2003) Information and American democracy: Technology in the 
evolution of political power, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bimber, B., Stohl, C., Flanagin, J., (2009) Technological Change and the Shifting 
Nature of Political Organization. In The Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics, 
edited by A. Chadwick and P. N. Howard. Abdingdon: Routledge.  
 
Blumber, J.G., Coleman, S. (2009) Citizenship: Theory, Practice, and Policy, New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Blumer, J. G., & Kavanagh, D. (1999) The third stage of political communication: 
Influences and features. Political Communication,  16(3), pp. 209-230. 
 
Bourdieu, P. (2000) Pascalian Meditations, trans, Richard Nice, Oxford: Policy Press. 
 
Bryce, J. (1993) Hindrances to Good Citizenship. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers 
 
Buechler, S. M. (1993) Beyond resource mobilization? Emerging trends in social 
movement theory, in The Sociological Quarterly, 34(2), pp.217-235. 
 
Bush, R. & Rigger, Shelley (2019) “The Taiwan issue and the normalisation of US-
China relations”, a reported published by Brookings Institute, on 16 January, 2019. 
Available online: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/The-
Taiwan-Issue-and-the-Normalization-of-US-China-Relations-Bush-Rigger1.pdf, 
accessed 29 January, 2019. 
 
Chiang, W-H (2011) The Right Thing, dir. Chiang Wei-Hua, Tongxiwenhua, 22 
December, 2011, DVD. 
 
Castells, M. (2012) The Rise of the Network Society. West Sussex: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
 
Chadwick, A. (2011) ‘Explaining the Failure of an Online Citizen Engagement 
Initiative: The Role of Internal Institutional Variables’, in Journal of Information 
Technology and Politics, 8 (1), pp. 21-40. 
-(2011) ‘Britain’s first live televised party leaders’ debate: From the news cycle 








Chang, C-C (2009) Politic al Communication in Taiwan in Political Communication 
in Taiwan, Edt. Lars Willnat, Annette Aw, pp.72-92. New York: Routledge 
 
Chang, Y-H et al. (2006) Research Report on Responsibility for the 228 Massacre. 
Taipei: Memorial Foundation of 228. English edition: 
http://www.228.org.tw/228_overview_e.html (accessed 30 March, 2018).  
 
Chao, V. (2014) “How Technology Revolutionised Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement”, 
The Diplomat, 15 April, http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/how-technology-
revolutionized-taiwans-sunflower-movement/  
 
Chen, B. & Liao, D-C (2014) “Social Media, Social Movements and the Challenge of 
Democratic Governability”, conference paper, retrieved from 
http://fsi.stanford.edu/publication/social-media-social-movements-and-challenge-
democratic-governability, accessed 3 June, 2018.   
 
Chen, K. (2017) “Land expropriation and social movements”, in Dafydd Fell (ed.), 
Taiwan's Social Movements under Ma Ying-jeou, London: Routledge.  
 
Chen, K. W. (2008) ‘Disciplining Taiwan: The Kuomintang’s Methods of Control 
during the White Terror Era (1947-1987)’, in Taiwan International Studies Quarterly, 
Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 185-210.  
 
Chen, S-H (2012) Wanglu shehui Dongyuan De Jiwangkailai: Fan Guoguangshihua 
Yundong de Shehui Keji Jichu He Xingdong Celue Yanhua (Processes of Web 
Society Movement: Foundation of Social Technologies and Evolution of Action 
Strategies in Opposing Kuokuang Petrochemical Park Project), in Chuanbo Yanjiu Yu 
Shijian (Journal of Communication Research and Practice), 2(1), January, pp.19-34. 
- (2015) ‘Wanglu Gongmin Xindong de Jiti Yanhua’ (Internet-based activism’s 
collective evolution) in Woshi Gongmin Yeshi Meiti (I am a citizen also a media: 
Sunflower and New Media practices/ 我是公民也是媒體), eds by Hong, Chen-
Ling, pp. 58-81. 
 
Chen, W-T (2012) ‘Women Ruhen Fan Wangzhong’ (How do we oppose Want China 
Times?), in Xinshehui Zhengci (Journal of New Social Policy), 23, 15 August 2012, 
pp 45-46. 
 
Chen, Y-F, Chung, J. (2017) “Some political parties funded by China: legislator”, 
Taipei Times, published on 15 March, 2017, available: 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2017/03/15/2003666802, accessed: 
20 January, 2018. 
 
Chou, Y-W (2013) “Taiwan’s Anti-Media Monopoly Movement: Achievements and 
The Future”, in China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, published on 2 May, 
2013. Available: https://cpianalysis.org/2013/05/02/taiwans-anti-media-monopoly-




Chen, B., Liao, D., Wu, H-C, Hwang, S-Y (2014) “The Logic of Communitive Action: 
A Case Study of Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement”, an article submitted to the Oxford 




Cheng, T. (2014) “Taiwan’s Sunflower Protest: Digital Anatomy of a Movement”, 
Flip the Media, published on 21 July, 2014, available: 
http://flipthemedia.com/2014/07/social-media-taiwan/, accessed on 17 August, 2014.   
 
Chu, Y-H (1994) “Social Protest and Political Democratization in Taiwan”, in Taiwan 
in the Modern World. The Other Taiwan, 1945 to the Present. M.E. Sharpe, New 
York, 1994, pp. 99-113. 
 
Chuang, B. (2000) Online campaigning in Taiwan: A case study of the 1998 general 
election. Journal of Advertising Research, 14, pp.31-52. 
 
Civil Media (2008) “yecaomei ji tubo jingzuo renshi lingchen zao jingfang qiangzhi 
quli” (Wild Strawberries & Tibetan protesters evited forcefully by police officers), 
published on 15 December, https://www.civilmedia.tw/archives/1965, accessed 1 
June, 2018 
 
Cole, M. (2013) ‘Forget the PLA, Taiwan’s Military Threatens Itself’, in the 
Diplomat, published on 2 August, 2013, available: 
http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/forget-the-pla-taiwans-military-threatens-itself/ 
accessed 2 June, 2018. 
-(2014a)“Taiwanese Occupy Legislature Over China Pact”, The Diplomat, 20 
March. http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/taiwanese-occupy-legislature-over-
china-pact/, accessed 5 October, 2015.  
-(2014b) Hundreds of Thousands Protest Against Trade Pact in Taiwan”, in 
The Diplomat, 31 March. http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/hundreds-of-
thousands-protest-against-trade-pact-in-taiwan/  
-(2015) Black Island: Two Years of Activism in Taiwan, CreateSpace 
Independent Publishing Platform. 
-(2017) “Civic activism and protests in Taiwan”, in in Dafydd Fell (ed.), 
Taiwan's Social Movements under Ma Ying-jeou, London: Routledge. 
 
 
Coleman, S. (2005) “The Lonely Citizen: indirect representation in an age of 
networks”, in Political Communication, 22(2), pp. 180-190. 
 
Coleman, S. & Blumler, J.G. (2009) The Internet and Democratic Citizenship. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Costanza-Chock, S. (2012) Mic check! Media cultures and the occupy movement. 
Social Movement Studies, 11(3-4), pp.375-385. 
 
Crozier, M., Huntington, S.P., and Watanuki, J (1975) The Crisis of Democracy, New 




Dahl, R. (1971) Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press.  
-(1992/1989) Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press 
-(1998) On Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 
 
Dahlgren, P. (2005) “The Internet, Public Spheres, and Political Communication: 
Dispersion and Deliberation”, in Political Communication, Vol. 22, pp. 147-162. 
- (2009) Media and Political Engagement. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 
 
Dalton, R. (2006) “Social Modernization and the End of Ideology Debate: Patterns of 
Ideological Polarization”, in Japanese Journal of Political Science (2006), pp. 1-22 
- (2008) The Good Citizen. Washington, DC: CQ Press 
- (2004) Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of 
Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
 
Dalton, R., Shin, D.C., Chu, Y-H (2008) Party Politics in East Asia: Citizens, 
Elections, and Democratic Development, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner.  
 
Dekker, P., Uslaner, E. M. (2001) Social Capital and Participation in Everyday Life. 
London: Routledge.  
 
Diamond, L. (1999) Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, Baltimore, MA: 
Johns Hopkins University Press  
-(2010) “Liberation Technology”, in Journal of Democracy, 21 (3), pp. 69-83 
 
Diamond, L. and Morlino, L. (2016) “The Quality of Democracy”. In Diamond, L., In 
Search of Democracy. London: Routledge 
 
Diani, M. (1992) “The concept of social movement”, in Journal of Sociology Review, 
40, pp. 1-25. 
 
Diani, M. (2000) “Social Movement Networks Virtual and Real”, in Information, 
Communication & Society, 3:3, pp.386-401 
Earl, J. & Kimport, K. (2011) Digitally Enabled Social Change: Activism in the 
Internet Age, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
 
Ellison, N. B., Steinfield, C., Lampe, C. (2007) “The benefits of Facebook ‘friends’: 
Social capital and college students’ use of online network sites”, in Journal of 
Computer-Mediated Communication, 12, 1143-1168. 
 
Enav, Peter (2013) “Taiwan media kingpin pushes hard on China ties”, The San 





Fan, Y. (2003) “Lianjie Yundongzhe Yu Biandong de Zhengzhi Jihui Yanjiu: 80s-90s 
Niandai Taiwan Mingzhu Zhuanxingguochengzhong Shehui Yungdong Canyuzhe de 
Gean Yanjiu” (Connecting activists and a changing political structure: Case studies on 
social movement activists in Taiwan during the 80s and 90s), in Chang, Mao-kui & 
Cheng, Young-nian, (ed.), Liangan Shehuiyungdong Fenxi (Analysis on social 
movements on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait), pp. 137-173, Taipei: Xinziranzhuyi 
Gongsi (新自然主義公司). 
-(2004) “Taiwan: No Civil Society, No Democracy” in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.) 
Civil Society and Political Chang in Asia. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, pp. 164-190.  
 
Fell, D. (2014) “Importance of social movements in Taiwan”, Taipei Times, published 
on 20 March, 2014, 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2014/03/20/2003586080/2, 
accessed: 1 June, 2018.    
-(2017) Taiwan’s Social Movement under Ma Ying-jeou, London: Routledge. 
-(2018) Government and politics in Taiwan, London, Routledge.  
 
Freedom House (2018) Freedom in the World 2018, available: 
https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world accessed: 23 May, 2018. 
 
Friedland, L. A. (1996) “Electronic democracy and the new citizenship”, in Media, 
Culture & Society, Vol. 18, pp. 185-212. 
 
Fuchs, D. (2007) The political culture paradium. In Oxford Handbook of Political 
Behavior, ed. R. K. Dalton and H.-D. Klingemann. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Gibson, R. K., Lusoli, W., Rommele, A., Ward, S. J. (2004) “Introduction: 
Representative Democracy and the Internet”, in Electronic Democracy: Mobilisation, 
Organisation and Participation, via New ICTs, edited by R. K. Gibson, A. Rommele, 
and S. J. Ward. London: Routledge.  
 
Gladweel, Malcolm (2010) “Small Change”, Why the revolution will not be tweeted, 
the New Yorker, 4 October, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/10/04/small-
change-malcolm-gladwell, accessed 19 March, 2014.  
 
Gold, T. (1996) “Civil Society in Taiwan: The Confucian Dimension,” in Confucian 
Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education in Japan and the Four Mini-
Dragons, ed. Tu Wei-ming. (Harvard University Press), pp. 244-258. 
 
Goffman, E. (1959) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York, NY: 
Doubleday. 
 
Gottlieb, C.C. (2002) Does the Internet Promote Democracy? Available online: 
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-0-387-35609-9_2.pdf Accessed: 19 
August, 2016 
 
Granovetter, M. (1983) The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, 
Sociological Theory, Vol. 1(1983), pp. 201-233. 
284	
	
Grčić, K., Babc, M. B., & Podobnik, V. (2014) “Generating Politician Profiles based 
on Content Analysis of Social Network Datasets”, in Journal of Universal Computer 
Science, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 236-255.  
 
Habermas, J. (1962, trans 1989) The Structural Transformation of the public sphere: 
an inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Trans. By Thomas Burger with 
Frederick Lawrence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1991). 
-(1984) The Theory of Communicative Action. Boston: Beacon Press. 
 
Guang, C-H (2014) “Meiti Bubao, Women Laibao: Taiwan Fanfumaoyundong De 
Meiti Guancha” (Media did not report, we report: Taiwan’s Anti-CSSTA movement 
and its media), Pao Pao Net, 29 March. https://pao-pao.net/article/60, accessed 10 
October, 2015.   
 
Hao, P. (2008) “Review of the Eight-Year Cross-Strait Relations under the DPP 
Administration”, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), published on 9 June, 
2008, http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/04116184645.pdf, accessed 21 May, 
2018.   
Harrison, M. (2012) “The Anti-Media Monopoly Movement 反媒體壟斷運動 in 
Taiwan”, in The China Story, 20 December. Electronic document, available: 
https://www.thechinastory.org/2012/12/the-anti-media-monopoly-movement-反媒體
壟斷運動-in-taiwan/, accessed 3 February, 2019.  
Haythornthwaite, C. (2002) Strong, Weak and Latent Ties and the Impact of New 
Media, The Information  Society, Vol18, pp. 385-401. 
 
Hawes, L. C. (1974) “Social collectivities as communication: Perspectives on 
organizational behavior”, Quarterly Journal of Speech, 60. Pp.497-502. 
 
Held, D. (2006) Reframing Global Governance: Apocalypse Soon or Reform?, a 
lecture given by Held at the University of Sheffield on 8 December 2005 to mark the 
11th anniversary of the Political Economy Research Centre (PERC). Available online: 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/David_Held2/publication/233228582_Reframin
g_Global_Governance_Apocalypse_Soon_or_Reform/links/00b7d529782f677614000
000.pdf] accessed on 23 May 2017.  
 
Hess, D. (2005). “Technology- and product-oriented movements: Approximating 
social movement studies and science and technology studies”, in Science Technology 
& Human Values, 30(4), 515-535. doi:10.1177/0162243905276499 
 
Ho, M-S (2012) “Sponsoring Civil Society: State and Community Movement in 
Taiwan”, in Sociology Inquiry, Vol. 82, No. 3, August 2012, pp. 404–423, 
-(2013) The Summer of Our Discontent. Published in China Policy Institute 
Blog, University of Nottingham, published on 2 October, 2013, available:  
https://cpianalysis.org/2013/10/02/the-summer-of-our-discontent/, accessed 1 
June, 2018. 
-(2014) “The Resurgence of Social Movement under the Ma Ying-jeou 
Government: A Political Opportunity Structure”, in Political Changes in 
285	
	
Taiwan under Ma Ying-jeou. Jacques DeLisle and Jean-Pierre Cabestan, eds. 
Pp. 100-119. New York and London: Routledge.  
-(2014) “Resisting Naphtha Crackers”, in China Perspectives no. 2014/3, peer 
reviewed article 5. Pp. 5-14. 
- (2015) “Kandejiande yu kanbujiande taiyanghua yundong”. In Initium Media, 
published on 30 December, 2015. Availabel from: 
https://theinitium.com/article/20151229-opinion-hemingxiu-09-sunflowers/, 
accessed on 19 October, 2018.  
  
Ho. M-S, Huang, D-H, Juan, C-T (2018) “The Institutionalisation of Social 
Movement Study in Taiwan”, in International Journal of Taiwan Studies 1(2018), pp. 
115-140.  
 
Horrigan, J. B. (2003) “The Internet Fosters Online Communities”, in The 
Information Age, Edt by Torr, J. D., Farmington Hills, MI: Greenhaven Press. 
 
Ho, S. S. & McLeod, D. M. (2008) “Social-psychological influences on opinion 
expression in face-to-face and computer-mediated communication”, in Journal of 
Communication Research 25(2), pp. 190-207. 
 
Ho, Y (2013) “Student, activism and social networks”, in Taipei Times, published on 
14 February, 2013, available: 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2013/02/14/2003554849, accessed 3 
June, 2018.  
 
Hou, E. and Hsin, Y-L (2013) ‘Thousands protest over solder’s death’, in the CNA, 
published on 20 July, 2013, available: 
http://focustaiwan.tw/news/asoc/201307200005.aspx, accessed 3 June, 2018.  
 
Hsia, A. (2015) “Minister Hsia: Cross-Strait Negotiations and Official Interaction 
Continue to Operate as Usual, thereby Building Peaceful and Stable Cross-Strait 
Relations and Creating More Niches for Taiwan Development and Public Well-
Being”, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, published on 28 August, 2015, 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=112987&ctNode=6337&mp=3, accessed 1 June, 
2018.   
 
Hsiao, H.H.M. (1997) “Social Movements and Civil Society in Taiwan: A 
Typological Analysis of Social Movements and Public Acceptance”(E), in The 
Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies, No.11, pp.7-26.  
-(2001) “Sociocultural Transformation in Taiwan since the 1980s”, in Taiwan 
Economics Success since 1980, ed. Chao-cheng Mai and Chien-sheng 
(Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar, 2001), pp. 162-164.  
-(2005) “Recapturing Taiwan’s Democratization Experience”, a speech given 
at World Forum for Democratisation in Asia, on 15-17 September, 2005, 
available: http://www.wfda.net/file/Hsiao.pdf, accessed 23 May, 2018. 
- (2007) “NGOs, the States, and Democracy under Globalisation: The Case of 
Taiwan”, in Civil life, Globalisation, and Political Change in Asia., ed. Robert 
P. Weller. London: Routledge. Pp.42-57 
-(2012) “Social Foundation of political Vitality”, in Steve Tseng (Ed.) The 




Hsiao, H. H. Michael & Ho, M-S (2010) ‘Civil society and democracy-making in 
Taiwan: Re-examining the link’, in Yin-wan Chu and Siu-lun Wong (eds), East 
Asia’s New Democracies: Deepening, Reversal, and Non-liberal Alternatives, London: 
Routledge, 43-64. 
 
Hsiao, H. H. Michael & Koo, H. (1997) The Middle Class and Democratisation, in 
Consolidation the Third Wave Democracies. Vol 1. Edt. By Larry Diamond, Marc F. 
Palttner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-Mao Tien Pp.312-333. Baltimore and London: The 
John Hopkins University Press 
 
Hsiao, Y. and Yang Y. (2018) “Commitment in the cloud? Social media participation 
in the sunflower movement”, in Journal of Information, Communication & Society, 
pp. 996-1013.   
 
Hsieh, S-Y (2009) “Ouran haishi biran? Yecaomei xueyun de jiegou xianzhi yu jiyun” 
(The structual limitation and opportunities of the Wild Strawberris Movement), in 
Sixiang  (Reflextion Magazine), Taipei: Linking Books (聯經出版社). 
 
Hsu, C-F (2017) “Cyberspace and the rise of Taiwanese identity”, in Changing 
Taiwanese Identities, eds by Bruce Jacobs and Peter Kang, London: Routledge.  
 
Hsu, P-R & Yang T-H (2008) Xueyun dingming yecaomei xuezhe lainshu 
biaoshengyuan (Protest is named “Wile Strawberries Movement” scholars sign 
petition showing support), Cooloud, published on 11 November, 2008, available: 
https://www.coolloud.org.tw/node/29833, accessed 2 June, 2018.  
  
Hsu, P., Zong, H-Y & Hsiao, L-C (2008) “Sanbai Xuesheng Jingzuo lifayuan Yaoqiu 
Mahengfu Gongkai Daoqian, Bing Liji Xiu Jihui Youxing Fa” (300 students sit-in in 
front of Cabinet, calling on Ma administration to openly apologise and amend the Act 
on Parade and Assembly), Coolloud, published on 6 November, 2008,  
http://www.coolloud.org.tw/node/29596, accessed 1 June, 2018. 
 
Hsu, S. and Chang, R. (2013) ‘Hung’s death caused by power corruption: Ma’, Taipei 
Times, published on 16, July, 2013, available: 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/07/16/2003567194/1, accessed 
on 3 June, 2018. 
 
Hu, P-K (2005) “Kuangbiao de niandai: Taiwan bentu xueyun” (An era of wildness: 
Taiwan’s local student-led movements), UDN, published on 2 March, 2005, available: 
http://city.udn.com/2976/1161542, accessed 19 May, 2018.  
 
Hughes, C. (2014) “Revisiting identity politics under Ma Ying-jeou”, in Taiwan 
President Ma Ying-Jeou’s First Term in Office (2008-2012), eds, by Jean-Pierre 
Cabestan and Jacuese DeLisle. PP. 120-136. London: Routledge. 
 
Hung, C-F (2014) ’The Internet and Taiwan’s New Civic Movement in the 
Information Age: Hung Chung-Chiu’s Case (2013), in Asiascape: Digital Asia, 1-2 
(204), pp.56-77. 
 
Huntington, S. (1991) The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth 




Hwang, J-Y (2016) “Transitional Justice in Postwar Taiwan”, in Routledge Handbook 
of Contemporary Taiwan, Gunter Schubert ed., pp.169-183, London: Routledge.  
 
Inglehart, R. (1990) Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.  
 
Inglehart, R. (1997) Modernization and Postmodernization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Jensen, M. J., Danzigerm, J. N., & Venkatesh, A. (2007)’Civil Society and Cyber 
Society: The Role of the Internet in Community Associations and Democratic 
Politics’, The information Society, 23(1), pp.39-50. 
 
Johnston, H (2002) ‘Verification and Prof in Frame and Discourse Analysis’, in 
Methods of Social Movement Research, London: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 
62-91. 
 
Kant, I. (1991 [1970]) Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kavada, A. (2015) “Creating the Collective: social media, the Occupy Movement and 
its constitution as a collective actor”, Journal of Information, Communication & 
Society, Vol 18(8), pp. 872-886. 
 
Ketcham, R. (2004) The Idea of Democracy in the Modern Era, Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas. 
 
Kerbal, M.R., & Bloom J.D. (2005) “Blog for America and Civic Involvement”, in 
Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 10(4), pp.3-27.  
 
Kittilson, M.C. & Dalton, R. (2010) “Virtual Civil Society: The New Frontier of 
Social Capital?”, in Journal of Political Behavior, Vol. 33, pp. 625-644. 
 
Kivisto, P. and Faist, T. (2007) Citizenship: Discourse, Theory and Transnational 
Prospects. Malden, Mass: Blackwell. 
 
Klein, J. (2012) “Wikileaks, Arab uprisings, English riots and occupy wall street: 
Implications for internet policy and practice from a business and industry outcome 
perspective”, Information, Communication & Society Journal, (14.6)  
 
Koo, Hagen (1991) Middle Classes, Democratisation, and Class Formation: The Case 
of South Korea. Theory and Society, Vol. 20, No 4 (Aug., 1991), pp-485-509 
 
Kumar, K. (2005). From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Kuo, G. (2013) “ROC Cabinet approves anti-media monopoly bill”, in Taiwan Today, 
published on 26 April, 2013, available: 





Kymlicka, W. (1995) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Lee, (2012) “Exploring the practice of civic participation of Internet lurkers: A case 
study of the “Wild Strawberries Movement”, in Xiwenxuie Yanjiu (Journal of 
Journalism), Vol. 112, July, 2012, pp. 77-116.  
 
Levine, P. (2003) “Online campaigning and the public interest”, in D. M. Anderson & 
M. Cornfield (Eds.), The civic web: Online politics and democratic values, (pp. 47-
62). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefeid. 
 
Lewis, J., Inthorn, S., and Wahl-Jorgensen, K. (2005) Citizens or Consumers? New 
York, NY: Open University. 
 
Lin, E. (2014) The Sunflower Movement, brought to you by the Internet, Taipei 
Times, published on 3 April, 2014, Available from: 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2014/04/03/2003587148, accessed on 
3 April, 2014. 
 
Lin, P. (2013) ‘People must battle to change military’, in Taipei Times, page 8 
 




Liu L-H & Hu Y-T (2015) ‘Xinwen Yiwofeng Baodao yu Jieshou Fenxi Chutan: Yi 
Hongzhongchiuan Weili” (News package report and analysis on news receivers: Case 
study of Hung Chung-Chiu), in Fuxinggang Xuebao (Journal of Fu-Hsin Hill),  
June(106), pp. 69-94. 
 
Lipset, M. S. (1959) ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development 
and Political Legitimacy’, in American Political Science Review, 53(1), pp. 69-105. 
 
Livingston, S. & Asmolov, G. (2010) “NETWORKS AND THE FUTURE OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS REPORTING”, in Journal of Journalism Studies, Vol 11, 2010, 
Issue 5, pp. 745-760. 
 
Lopez, M.H., Levine, P., Both, D., Kiesa, A., Kirby, E., Marcelo, K. (2006) The 2006 
civic and political health of the nation: A detailed look at how youth participate in 
politics and communities. College Park, MD: Center for Information and Research on 
Civic Learning and Engagement.  
 
Lu, P-H (2012) “Xiangming Quandou Zan Chulai: Chutai Fan Guoguang Shihua 
Qingnian de Wanglu Shijian” (Netizens’ “Life”: exploring the Internet activities of 
young activists from Anti-Kuoguang Petrochemical Group), dissertation for Cheng-
Chi University, Department of News, see in Chen, Shun-Hsiao (2012) “Wanglu 
shehui Dongyuan De Jiwangkailai: Fan Guoguangshihua Yundong de Shehui Keji 
Jichu He Xingdong Celue Yanhua” (Processes of Web Society Movement: 
Foundation of Social Technologies and Evolution of Action Strategies in Opposing 
289	
	
Kuokuang Petrochemical Park Project), in Chuanbo Yanjiu Yu Shijian ( Journal of 
Communication Research and Practice ), 2(1), January, pp.19-34. 
 
Macedo, Stephen, et al. (2005) Democracy at Risk: How Political Choices Undermine 
Citizen Participation and What We Can Do about It. Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press. 
 
Margetts, H., John, P., Hale, S.A., and Yasseri, Y. (2016) Political Turbulence: How 
Social Media Shape Collective Action. Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
 
Margolis, M., Resnick, D. (2000) Politics as Usual. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Margolis, M. (2007) E-Government and Democracy. In The Oxford Handbook of 
Political Behaviour, edited by R. J. Dalton and H.-D. Klingemann. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
McGrady, R. (2009) Gaming against the greater good. First Monday, 14(2). Retrieved 
from http://firstmonday.org/article/view/2215/2091 
 
McLuhan, M. (1962) The Gutenberg Galaxy. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto 
Press. 
 
Merriam, C.E. and Merriam, R.E. (1954) The American Government: Democracy in 
Action. Boston: Ginn & Co. 
 
Mill, J. S. (1991 [1859]) “Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform” in J. M. Robson, ed., 
Essays on Politics and Society, Vol. XIX (1977), pp. 322-323. 
 
MOI (2010). Annual Statistical Reports of Ministry of The Interior. Taipei: Ministry 
of Interior.  
 
Moriarty, J. (2018) US Taiwan Enduring Partnership, seminar titled “The United 
States and Taiwan: An Enduring Friendship”, at Institute for International Studies, 
Stanford University, 4 May, 2018, available: 
https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/ambassador-james-moriarty-talks-us-taiwan-relation-
aparc accessed: 5 May, 2018.   
 
Mossberger, K., Tolbert, C. J., & McNeal, R. S. (2008) Digital Citizenship: The 
Internet, society and participation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Mouffe, C (1988) “Radical Democracy: Modern or Postmodern?” Universal Abandon? 
The Politics of Postmodernism. Andrew Ross, ed. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, pp. 31-46. 
 
Myers, R. H., Lin, H-t eds (2007) Breaking with the Past: The Kuomingtang Central 





accessed: 10 May, 2018 
 
Ngo, T. (1989) The emergence of political opposition in an authoritarian regime: the 
case of Taiwan, (Thesis). University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong SAR. 
Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.5353/th_b3194961.  
 
Norris, P. (2000) A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Post-industrial 
Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
                 (2001) Digital Divide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
..   (2002) Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Politics Activism Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
OHCHR (2011), Cambodia - 20 years on from the Paris Peace Agreements, available: 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Cambodia-
20yearsonfromtheParisPeace.aspx, accessed 30 November, 2017.  
 
O’Donnel, G. and Schitter, P. C. (1986) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore, MA: John Hopkins 
University Press. 
 
Papacharissi, Z. (2007) “The Blogging Revolution? Audiences as Media Producers”, 
in Blogging, Citizenship, and the Future of Media, M. Tremayne (Ed.), Routledge.  
- (2010) A Private Sphere, Cambridge: Polity. 
 
Putnam, R. (2000) Bowling Alone. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. 
 
Putnam, L. L., Nicotera, M.A., & McPhee (2009). Introduction, in L. L. Putnam and 
A. Maydan Nicotera (Eds.), Building theories of organization, pp. 1-20. New York: 
NY: Routledge.    
 
Rawls, J. (1997) “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, in The University of Chicago 
Law Review, Vol. 64, No. 3 (Summer, 1997), pp. 765-807/ 
 
Rawnsley, M-Y T. & Feng, C-S (2014), Anti-Media Monopoly Policies and Further 
Democratisation in Taiwan, in Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 43(3), pp 105-128. 
 
Rawnsley, G. & Rawnsley, M-Y. (2001), Critical Security, Democratisation and 
Television in Taiwan, Milton Park: Taylor & Francis. 
 
Reporters without Borders (2018) 2018 World Press Freedom Index, available 
https://rsf.org/en/ranking , accessed 17 May, 2018.   
 
Rheingold, H. (1994) The virtual community: Homesteading on the electronic frontier. 
New York, NY: Harper Perennial. 




Rickards, J. (2016) Taiwan’s Changing Media Landscape, AmCham Busienss Report, 
25 March, 2016. http://topics.amcham.com.tw/2016/03/taiwans-changing-media-
landscape/  
 
Rigger, Shelly (1999) Politics in Taiwan. London: Routledge 
Rowen, I. (2015) “Inside Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement: Twenty-Four Days in a 
Student-Occupied Parliament, and the Future of the Regions”, in The Journal of Asian 
Studies, 74(1): 1-15.  
- . 
Rowen, Ian. 2018. “Youth activism”. In Ogawa, Akihiro (ed) Routledge Handbook on 
Civil Society in Asia. Routledge. https://www.routledge.com/Routledge-Handbook-of-
Civil-Society- in-Asia/Ogawa/p/book/9781138655959. 
 
RSF (2018) “2018 World Press Freedom Index”, Reporters without Borders (RSF), 
published on 25 April, 2018, available online: https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2018, 
accessed 30 June, 2018.  
 
Sassen, S. (2002) “Locating Cities on Global Circuits”, in Environment & 
Urbanization, Vol. 14, No. 1, April 2002, pp.13-30. 
 
Scheufele, J. R. & Curtis, T. (1997) Tendencies and Tensions of the Information Age. 
New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.  
 
Schmidt, V. A. (2011) ‘Speaking of change: Why discourse is key to the dynamics of 
policy transformation’, Critical Policy Studies, 5(2): 106-126. 
 
Schudson, M. (1998) The Good Citizen: A History of American Civil Life.  New York: 
Free Press. 
 
Schoenberg, S. (2011). “Social Media Open New Chapter in 2012 Campaign”, 




Segerberg, A., & Bennett, W. L. (2011) “Social media and the organization of 
collective action: Using twitter to explore the ecologies of two climate change 
protests”, in The Communication Review, 13(3), pp-197-215. 
 
Shan, S. (2012) “Senior editors quit ‘China Times’ to protest attacks”, Taipei Times, 
published on 10 August, 2012, available 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2012/08/10/2003539928, accessed 
3 June, 2018.   
 
 
Shelly, B. (2005) Democratic Development in East Asia. London: Routledge.  
 
Shih, D. C. (2008) “The Third Wave in East Asia Comparative and Dynamic 





Sonoda, S. (2012) “Contending Models for China’s Future Development: Social 
Building and Governance”. Paper presented at the Fifth International Forum for 
Contemporary Chinese Studies, August 8-9, Beijing. 
 
Sparks, C. (2001) “The Internet and the global public sphere”, in W. L. Bennett & R. 
M. Entman (Eds.), Mediated politics: Communication in the future of democracy, 
(pp.75-95). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Stolle, D. and Hooghe, M. (2005) “Inaccurate, exceptional, one-sided or irrelevant? 
The debate about the alleged decline of social capital and civic engagement in 
Western societies, in British Journal of Political Science, 34(4), pp. 703-721. 
 
Strong, M. (2018) “Taiwan leaps forward on Human Freedom Index”, Taiwan News”, 
published on 27 January, 2018, available: 
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3350855, accessed 30 June, 2018.   
 
Sunstein, C. (2001) Republic.com. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Sutter, R.  (2012) Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War. 
Playmouth: Rowman & Littlefield 
 
Swanson, D. (2000) “The homologous evolution of political communication and civic 
engagement: good news, bad news, and no news”, in Journal of Political 
communication, 17(4), pp409-414. 
 
Taylor, C (1992) “Modernity and the Rise of the Public Sphere”, the Tanner Lectures 




accessed 3 April, 2016 
-(1995) “Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere”, in Philosophical Arguments. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
 
Tien, H-M & Shiau, C-J (1992) Taiwan’s Democratisation: A Summary. World 
Affairs, Vol. 155, No. (2), Democracy in Taiwan: Part One (Fall 1992), pp58-61 
 
Tiezze, S. (2014) “Protestors to Leave Taiwan’s Legislature on Thursday”, in The 
Diplomat, 8 April, http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/protestors-to-leave-taiwans-
legislature-on-thursday/, accessed 2 December 2014. 
 
Tilly, C. (1978) From Mobilisation to Revolution, Reading, MA: Addison –Wesley. 
 
The Economist (2018) “Democracy continues its disturbing retreat”, The Economist, 
published on 31 January, 2018, available online: https://www.economist.com/graphic-
detail/2018/01/31/democracy-continues-its-disturbing-retreat, accessed 30 June, 2018.  
 
The Economist (2019) “The retreat of global democracy stopped in 2018”, The 




democracy-stopped-in-2018, accessed 9 January, 2019. 
 
Thompson, D. (1970) The Democratic Citizen. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Tsatsou, P. (2018) “Social Media and Informal Organisation of Citizen Activism: 
Lessons From the Use of Facebook in the Sunflower Movement”, in Social Media + 
Society”, https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305117751384, First Published February 1, 
2018. 
 
Turow, J. (2001) Family boundaries, commercialism, and the Internet, Journal of 
Applied Development Psychology, 22(I), pp.73-16. 
 
Vaccari, C., Chadwick, A., O’Loughlin, B. (2015) “Dual Screening the Political: 
Media Events, Social Media, and Citizen Engagement”, in Journal of Communication, 
Vol. 65, Issue 6, pp. 1041-1061. 
 
Valenzuela, S., Park, N., 7 Kee, K. F. (2009) “Is there social capital in a social 
network site? Facebook use and college students’ life satisfaction, trust and 
participation”, in Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 14, 875-901. 
 
Van Deth, J. (2000) “Interesting but irrelevant: Social capital and the saliency of 
politics in Western Europe”, in European Journal of Political Research, Mar, Vol. 37, 
Issue 2, pp. 115-147. 
 
Vegh, S. (2003) “Classifying Forms of Online Activism: The Case of Cyberprotests 
against the World Bank”, in M. McCaughey & M. D. Ayers (Eds.) Cyberactivism, 
New York, NY: Routledge.  
 
Verba, S., Norman, H., Kim, J. (1978) Participation and Political Equality. New 
York, NY: Cambridge Press University. 
 
Verba, S., Schlozman, K. & Brady, H. (1995) Voice and Equality. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Wang, Chris (2013) “Protesters occupy government building”, Taipei Times, page 1 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/08/20/2003570116, accessed 
10 October, 2015.   
 
Wang, C. (2014) “Legislative Siege: Reporter’s notebook: New generation of activists 
step forward”, in Taipei Times, page 3. 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/03/23/2003586352, accessed 
7 October, 2015.  
 
Wang, D. (1972) Taiwan de fang xuan ju zheng dang fu xuan xuan chuan zhi fang shi 
yu qi xiao guo [Campaigning for different parties and its effects] Mass 




Wang, F. (2008) “New student sit-ins pop up across nation”, Taipei Times, published 
on 10 November, 2008, available: 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/11/10/2003428179, accessed 
1 June, 2018.  
 
Wang, G. (2016) “A Green Legislature: Taiwan’s New Parliament More Different 
Than Ever”, Ketagalan Media, published on 17 Feb, 2016, available: 
http://www.ketagalanmedia.com/2016/02/17/a-green-legislature-taiwan-new-
parliament-more-different-than-ever/, accessed 18 May, 2018.  
 
Wang, H.-Z. and Hsiao, H.-H.M. (2002). “Social capital or human capital? 
Professionals in overseas Taiwanese firms”, in Journal of Contemporary Asia 32(3), 
pp. 346-362. 
 
Warren, M. (2001) Democracy and Association. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Weintraub, J., Kumar, K. eds. (1997) Public and Private in Thought and Practice: 
Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy, Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. 
 
Wellman, B. et al. (2001) “Does the Internet increase, decrease or supplement social 
capital? Social networks, participation and community involvement”. American 
Behavioural Scientist, 45, pp. 436-455. 
 
Welsh, E. (2002)Dealing with Data: Using NVivo in the Qualitative Data Analysis 
process, Foriym: Qualitative Social Research, Vol. 3(2), Art 26, May, 
 
Wen, W-C (2014) Facebook political communication in Taiwan: 1.0/2.0 messages 
and election/post-election, in Chinese Journal of Communication, Vol 7, 2014. 
 
Wong, C-C (2014) “Generating a Voice Among Media Monsters: the Case Study of 
the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement in Taiwan”, a paper submitted for publication 
in the proceedings of the Australian and New Zealand Communication Association 
Annual Conference, Swinburne University, Victoria 9-11 July, 2014. 
 
World Economic Forum (2002) The Global Information Technology Review 2001-
2002. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Available online: 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/report.pdf [Accessed 2 
June, 2015] 
 
Wright, T. (1999) Student Mobilisation in Taiwan: Civil Society and Its Discontents. 
Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No 6 (Nov-Dec, 1999), pp. 986-1008. 
- (2001) The Perils of Protest: State Repression and Student Activism in 
China and Taiwan, Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i Press. 
 
Xu, Q (2014) “Cong Liangan Jiaodu Kan Taiwan Min Zhu De Tezheng” (Analyze 
Taiwan’s democracy from the cross-Strait perspective), Guangcha Zazhi (Observer 
Magazine), No. 16 (Dec). pp.34-36.  
 
 
